The end of the law: human evolution, neurolaw, and the soul by Opderbeck, David
Opderbeck, David (2016) The end of the law: human 
evolution, neurolaw, and the soul. PhD thesis, University 
of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/36118/1/final%20for%20print2.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
This article is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution No Derivatives 
licence and may be reused according to the conditions of the licence.  For more details see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.5/
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
1 
 
The End of the Law:  Human Evolution, Neurolaw, and the Soul 
David W. Opderbeck 
Ph.D. in Systematic and Philosophical Theology 
 
 
2 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1:  Method ......................................................................................................................... 3 
1. From Convergence to Conflict ............................................................................................. 4 
2. Independence and NOMA ................................................................................................. 13 
3. Strong Integration:  Process Theology ............................................................................... 14 
4. Presuppositionalism and Reformed Epistemology ............................................................ 16 
5. Dialogue and Critical Realism ............................................................................................ 21 
6. Fides et Ratio? .................................................................................................................... 28 
7. Postliberalism and Other Narrative Theologies ................................................................. 32 
8. Radical Orthodoxy’s Critique of the Secular ...................................................................... 39 
9. Towards An Integrated Methodological Perspective ........................................................ 46 
Chapter 2:  Law and Christian Theology ....................................................................................... 67 
1. The “Law” of Inner-Trinitarian Relations ........................................................................... 67 
2. The Laws of Divine Command ............................................................................................ 69 
3. Law, the Soul and the Christian Tradition:  Tertullian ....................................................... 83 
4. Law, the Soul and the Christian Tradition:  Lactantius ...................................................... 87 
5. Law, the Soul and the Christian Tradition:  Augustine ...................................................... 89 
6. Law, the Soul, and the Christian Tradition:  Aquinas ......................................................... 92 
Chapter 3:  Paleo-Law:  Have We Always Been Human? ............................................................. 95 
1. The Evolution of “Human” Culture:  The First and Last Human ........................................ 97 
2. Language, Mind, and the Cultural Explosion ................................................................... 106 
3. The Emergence and Reduction of Transcendence and “Law” ........................................ 111 
3 
 
4. Law and Writing ............................................................................................................... 112 
5. Reductive Sociobiology .................................................................................................... 116 
Chapter 4:  Neuro-Law and the End of Persons.......................................................................... 121 
1. The Emergence of NeuroLaw ........................................................................................... 121 
2. The Path of the Law:  Reductive NeuroLaw ..................................................................... 124 
3. NeuroLaw and the Camp ................................................................................................. 129 
4. NeuroLaw and the Normal Distribution .......................................................................... 132 
5. Law and Science ............................................................................................................... 135 
6. From the Bad Man to Homo Economicus to Homo Irrationaliblis .................................. 138 
7. Cautionary Tales............................................................................................................... 140 
8. NeuroLaw and neo-Aristotelianism ................................................................................. 143 
Chapter 5:  Mind, Law, Soul ........................................................................................................ 146 
1. The Cartesian Mind and Mental Causation ..................................................................... 146 
2. Theology, Emergence, and the Soul ................................................................................ 153 
3. The Laws of Nature .......................................................................................................... 165 
4. Adam, Christ, and the Law ............................................................................................... 174 
5. Law, the Origin of the Soul, and Original Sin ................................................................... 176 
6. Law, Participation, and Grace .......................................................................................... 179 
Chapter 6:  Revitalizing the Soul of the Law ............................................................................... 191 
1. The New Natural Law ....................................................................................................... 191 
2. Jean Porter, Stanley Hauerwas, and “Nature as Reason” ............................................... 198 
3. The Violence of the Law ................................................................................................... 206 
4. Biopolitics in the State of Exception ................................................................................ 213 
5. From the State of Exception to the State of Grace .......................................................... 219 
4 
 
6. Law and Christian Participation in Violence .................................................................... 227 
7. Jesus, Law and Violence ................................................................................................... 230 
8. Radical Orthodoxy:  Law and Violence, Law and Theocracy ........................................... 242 
9. Law and the Tale of Two Cities ........................................................................................ 246 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 253 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 256 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
This Dissertation pursues three related goals.  First, it explores basic methodological questions in 
the sub-field of “theology and science.”  Second, it tackles one of the most difficult issues in 
Christian “theology and science” discourse:  the question “who was Adam,” a question that 
encompasses the problems of human uniqueness, human sin, and the redemption of humanity.  
Third, it offers a theological and philosophical critique of certain jurisprudential claims made by 
some scholars in the emerging discipline of “neurolaw,” that is, the application of neuroscience 
to the law.   
The question of “neurolaw” provides a framework for entry into the broader underlying issues of 
theological anthropology and theological method.  My central argument is that “law” is the key 
to unlocking the question “who was Adam” – that “law” is an essential part of what makes 
humans unique, that “law” highlights the depth of human sinfulness, and that the internalization 
of “law” through faith in the true Adam, Christ, is essential to human redemption.  On the way 
to making this argument I address the modern contention that “law,” like any other human 
cultural artifact, is merely the byproduct of our evolutionary history.  To address that question, I 
suggest that recent work in theological epistemology that draws from phenomenology and 
narrative theology, including some thinkers associated with “Radical Orthodoxy” and 
“postliberalism,” offers important resources for considering such questions.  More directly, I 
suggest that the lineaments of Christian orthodoxy – the Triunity of God, the absolute ontological 
difference between God and creation, and Chalcedonian Christology – best frame how we should 
think of human beings, who are at once creatures with a long biological evolutionary history and 
agents who stand “before the law.” 
Chapter 1 begins with “method.”  In some ways this Chapter follows the conventional heuristic 
that categorizes approaches to “theology and science” along a continuum ranging from conflict 
to consilience.  But this Chapter also seeks to problematize the “and” in “theology and science.”  
It offers one of the most comprehensive discussions in the faith and science literature of how 
“narrative” or “postmodern” theologies that seek to break down dichotomies between “faith” 
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and “reason” might help overcome the perception that either “theology” or “science” must 
remain distinct enterprises even while perhaps grudgingly conceding some ground to each other. 
Chapters 2 and 3 survey the problem of “neurolaw” as presented by human evolutionary history 
and neurobiology.  Consistent with the methodological perspective developed in Chapter 1, I 
accept the overwhelming evidence for the long history of human biological evolution and for the 
intimate connection between our neuro-chemical systems and what we call “mind” and “will,” 
but I reject any reductionism in which the phenomena of human uniqueness and human agency 
could be represent “nothing but” evolution and neurobiology. 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide philosophical, theological and historical critiques of reductive concepts 
of neurolaw.  These Chapters show why reductive neurolaw fails, through analytic philosophical 
arguments as well as through phenomenological accounts of human experience, consistent with 
how Christian theology historically has thought about the sources of law.  These Chapters also 
trace connections between the concept of the “laws of nature” and trends against reductionism, 
particularly in the “new Aristotelianism” among some philosophers of science.   
Chapter 6 responds to a possible objection to my connection between “law” and the goodness 
of creation, which is the problem of originary violence.  In any historical human society, positive 
law is established and maintained against “criminal” elements by force of arms – that is, by 
violence.  The doctrine of creation, however, tells us that God created human beings out of love, 
without any coercion, and the doctrine of redemption tells us that God invites humans into 
restored fellowship with Himself but compels no one.  I argue in these chapters that law in the 
“Garden” originally was not coercive, that Christ’s fulfillment of the law in his atoning death 
restores law to its rootedness in love, and that Christ’s resurrection, which anticipates our future 
resurrection, seals the promise of a law of love embedded again in every redeemed human heart, 
without violence.  These Chapters also explore some implications for the theological 
anthropology developed throughout the text for political theology and ethics, particularly 
concerning concepts of human freedom.  
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Chapter 1:  Method 
The questions I am asking in this dissertation about human agency, law, and jurisprudence in light 
of contemporary knowledge about human evolution imply more basic questions about the 
relationship between theology and the natural sciences, or even more fundamentally, about the 
relationship between “faith” and “reason.”  As Jeffrey Stout and others have noted, modern 
theology, particularly when it attempts to engage the natural sciences, always entails a significant 
amount of methodological “throat clearing.”1  This chapter surveys the salient historical and 
philosophical background of the theology and science literature but also seeks to push beyond 
the settled paradigms to question the “and” in the relation between “theology and science.”  My 
view is that problems of the sort I am trying to address in this dissertation entail metaphysical 
truths that imply and require theology as a given framework.  “Natural science,” if it is to operate 
from an epistemologically stable base, already presumes a doctrine of creation.  Therefore, 
“natural science” is a subdivision of “philosophy,” which is always related to and contained within 
“theology.”2  
This kind of posture, however, raises significant issues in light of the history of the natural 
sciences in relation to Christian theology.  From the Galileo affair to contemporary “scientific 
creationism” and “intelligent design” arguments, Christians have too often advanced claims in 
the name of theology that ironically undermine the essential Christian conviction that creation is 
a contingent reality with an inherent stability, rationality and consistency resulting from God’s 
continual sustenance of the created order.  In response to this extreme response, many modern 
“theology and science” scholars propose models that seem to relegate theology to the 
                                                     
1 Stout said that “[p]reoccupation with method is like clearing your throat:  it can go on for only so long before you 
lose your audience.”  Jeffrey Stout, Ethics After Babel:  The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents (Princeton:  
Princeton Univ. Press 2001), 163.  Similarly, although William Placher argued that theologians should “abandon 
their preoccupation with method and get on with the business of doing theology,” he acknowledged the need to 
discuss method.  William C. Placher, Unapologetic Theology:  A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation 
(Louisville:  WJK 1989), 7.  Placher acknowledged the irony:  “Prolegomena to Prolegomena!  Worse and worse!”  
IbIbid.  Similarly, David Kelsey has noted that “in today’s methodologically hyper-self-conscious world of technical 
academic theology,” any kind of “broadly methodological judgment” will prove controversial and should be 
identified.  David H. Kelsey, Eccentric Existence;  A Theological Anthropology, Volume One (Louisville:  WJK 2009). 
2 See Thomas Aquinas, ST I.6, Reply 1 and 2 (stating that “[s]acred doctrine derives its principles not from any 
human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as through the highest wisdom, all our 
knowledge is set in order. . . .  The principles of other sciences either are evident and cannot be proved, or are 
proved by natural reason through some other science.”). 
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background or that significantly modify the orthodox conception of God as the transcendent 
creator and sustainer of all things.3  The method I wish to follow seeks to avoid these twin dangers 
by proposing a robust doctrine of God and creation that leads to an equally robust anthropology 
and epistemology.  While such a method cannot convince skeptics who require basic belief in 
God to be justified on supposedly neutral terms, I hope it at least demonstrates that the Christian 
belief in God and creation is consistent with a meaningful concept of “reason.”  In fact, after 
laying the methodological groundwork, I will argue that the Christian doctrines of God and 
creation supply far richer notions of human agency, reason, and “law” than any reductively 
materialist doctrine. 
1. From Convergence to Conflict 
 
The field of “science and religion” has become an important sub-discipline in modern theology.4  
This development parallels the rapid ascendancy of “science” as the paradigm of trustworthy 
authority in modernity and the related development of the “conflict” or “warfare” narrative of 
the relation between science and religion.5  The rise of secularism is intimately related to the 
social and intellectual authority commanded by “science” in modernity.6   
Theology in the Christian, Jewish and Muslim traditions historically interacted fruitfully with the 
“science” of the day, at least prior to the seventeenth century.  The Hebrew creation narratives 
                                                     
3 For a discussion of the Christian doctrine of creation, see, e.g., David Fergusson, Creation (Eerdmans:  Grand 
Rapids, 2014); Hans Swartz, Creation (Eerdmans:  Grand Rapids 2002); David Fergusson, “Creation,” in John 
Webster, Kathryn Tanner and Iain Torrance, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology (OUP:  Oxford 
2007); Alister E. McGrath, The Foundations of Dialogue in Science & Religion (Blackwell:  Oxford 1998), 36-79; 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Toward a Theology of Nature:  Essays on Science and Faith (Louisville:  Westminster / John 
Knox 1993), 29-49; David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite:  The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Eerdmans:  
Grand Rapids 2003), 249-318. 
4 See, e.g., Rachel Muers and Mike Higton, Modern Theology:  A Critical Introduction (London:  Routledge 2012), 
Chapter 11; Peter Harrison, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion (Cambridge:  CUP 2010); Alister 
McGrath, Science & Religion:  A New Introduction (Hoboken:  Wiley-Blackwell 2nd ed. 2010). 
5 See McGrath, Science & Religion:  A New Introduction, 9-11. 
6 See, e.g., Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self:  The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge:  Harvard Univ. Press 
1989), Chapter 19; A Secular Age (Cambridge:  Harvard Univ. Press 2007), Chapter 7; Brad S. Gregory, The 
Unintended Reformation:  How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society (Cambridge:  Harvard Univ. Press 2012), 
Chapter One; Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment:  Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 
(Oxford:  OUP 2002); John Hedley Brooke, “Science and Secularization,” in Peter Harrison, ed., The Cambridge 
Companion to Science and Religion (Cambridge:  CUP 2010). 
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in the Biblical book of Genesis both absorb and distinguish the ancient near eastern cosmologies 
of Assyria, Babylon and Egypt.7  The Church Fathers adapted and transformed Platonic philosophy 
and cosmology, and medieval Muslim, Christian, and Jewish theologians adapted the insights of 
Aristotle after the rediscovery of the Aristotelian corpus by Islamic scholars.8   
In 1616, however, the Copernican view of heliocentrism, confirmed and popularized by Galileo, 
was condemned by the Catholic Church.9  Galileo himself was condemned and his works were 
banned by Papal decree in 1633.10  The Papal Decree of Condemnation asserted that  
The proposition that the Sun is the center of the world and does not move from 
its place is absurd and false philosophically and formally heretical, because it is 
expressly contrary to Holy Scripture.  
…. 
The proposition that the Earth is not the center of the world and immovable but 
that it moves, and also with a diurnal motion, is equally absurd and false 
philosophically and theologically considered at least erroneous in faith. 11 
There is considerable scholarly debate about the circumstances of Galileo’s condemnation.  As 
Charles Hummel describes it, “Galileo’s trial of 1633 was not the simple conflict between science 
and religion so commonly pictured.  It was a complex power struggle of personal and professional 
pride, envy, and ambition, affected by pressures of bureaucratic politics.”12  Galileo’s own acerbic 
personality, as well as the crisis of the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and the Thirty 
                                                     
7 See John F. Walton, Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament:  Introducing the Conceptual World of 
the Hebrew Bible (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic 2006); M. Conrad Hyers, The Meaning of Creation:  Genesis and 
Modern Science (Louisville:  Westminster John Knox 1984). 
8 See Hans Boersma, Heavenly Participation:  The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 
2011); David B. Burrell, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (South Bend:  Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1993); 
David C. Lindberg, “The Fate of Science in Patristic and Medieval Christendom,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Science and Religion; Conor Cunningham, Darwin’s Pious Idea:  Why the Ultra-Darwinists and Creationists Both Get 
it Wrong (Grand Rapids:  Eerdman’s 2010), Chapter Seven. 
9 See Charles E. Hummel, The Galileo Connection:  Resolving Conflicts Between Science & The Bible (Downers 
Grove:  InterVarsity Press 1986); “Famous Trials:  The Trial of Galileo” webpage, available at 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/galileo/galileo.html. 
10 Hummel, The Galileo Connection, 108-118; “The Trial of Galileo” webpage, text of Papal Condemnation, available 
at http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/galileo/condemnation.html. 
11 “The Trial of Galileo” webpage, text of Papal Condemnation, available at 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/galileo/condemnation.html. 
12 Hummel, The Galileo Connection, 116. 
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Years’ War, are also often cited by defenders of the Church as contextual factors around Galileo’s 
condemnation.13  Even after Galileo’s condemnation, heliocentrism continued to be taught as a 
mathematical concept, and by 1835, the heliocentric texts of Copernicus and Galileo were 
removed from the Catholic Church’s Index of Forbidden Books.14  In 2000, Pope John Paul II 
formally apologized for the Church’s treatment of Galileo, along with apologies for historic 
mistreatment of Jews, the Crusades, and other matters.15   
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the Galileo affair represents a touchstone event for the 
relationship between theology and science.  The heliocentric cosmos challenged not only the 
interpretation of a few Biblical passages, but also the broader Aristotelian cosmology that 
informed the medieval synthesis of “science” and theology.16  When Newtonianism subsequently 
questioned Aristotelian causation and the sense of a great chain of being more broadly, Lyellian 
geology questioned the antiquity of the Earth and the “days” of creation recorded in Genesis 1, 
and Darwinism questioned anthropocentric biology, theology faced an even more significant 
challenge.17  At the same time, scientific methods of textual analysis, archeology and 
historiography were being applied to the Biblical texts in ways that questioned the fundamental 
integrity of the Bible.18 
Nineteenth century Christian thinkers reacted to the Newtonian, Lyellian and Darwinian 
challenges inconsistently.  During the ascendency of Newtonianism, many opted for a kind of 
mechanistic Deism that was at odds with the Christian view of a God who is intimately 
                                                     
13 See The Vatican Observatory Website, “The Galileo Affair,” available at 
http://vaticanobservatory.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=197%3Athe-galileo-
affair&catid=89%3Ahistory-of-astronomy&Itemid=242&lang=en. 
14 Ibid. 
15 The theological basis for these apologies is set forth in the International Theological Commission’s December 
1999 document Memory and Reconciliation:  The Church and the Faults of the Past, available at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000307_memory-
reconc-itc_en.html, approved by then-Cardinal Josef Ratzinger acting as Prefect of the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith. 
16 See Hummel, The Galileo Connection, Chapter 1. 
17 See Rachel Muers and Mike Higton, Modern Theology:  A Critical Introduction (London:  Routledge 2012), 
Chapter 11.  As Conor Cunningham argues, it is not at all clear that any of these developments do, in fact, 
challenge all notions of a chain of being or of human uniqueness.  Cunningham, Darwin’s Pious Idea, 2-3.  This 
perspective will be developed later in this Chapter. 
18 See Mark S. Gignilliat, A Brief History of Old Testament Criticism:  From Benedict Spinoza to Brevard Childs (Grand 
Rapids:  Zondervan 2012). 
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providentially involved with creation.19  In Christian theology’s first encounters with Darwinism, 
notwithstanding the perhaps exaggerated accounts of the clash between Samuel Wilberforce 
and Thomas Henry Huxley, the majority responded with cautious appraisal and appropriation of 
both Lyell and Darwin, while working with notions of providence that attempted to 
accommodate both the Biblical picture and Newton.20  Their efforts sometimes led to theological 
aberrations such as William Paley’s “watchmaker” natural theology, but they nevertheless 
worked from a framework that assumed the “book of scripture” and the “book of nature” spoke 
complementary truths.21 
The Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy that erupted among American Protestants in the 
early twentieth century, however, ignited a tinderbox of conflict, highlighted in the infamous 
“Scopes Monkey Trial” of 1925 in Dayton, Tennessee.22  Fundamentalists rejected Darwinian 
science in toto, and further rejected in toto the historical-critical inquiry of the Biblical sources.23  
The rise of Protestant Fundamentalism supported the development of “creation science,” which 
asserts that the Bible can be read as an inerrant scientific text and that God literally created the 
universe in six days around 6,500 years ago.24  The enormous cultural influence of “creation 
science,” particularly in North America but increasingly world-wide, is evidenced by the multi-
                                                     
19 See Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge:  Harvard Univ. Press 2007), Chapter 7. 
20 From a Protestant perspective, for example, see Mark A. Noll and David N. Livingstone, eds., B.B. Warfield, 
Evolution, Science, & Scripture:  Selected Writings (Grand Rapids:  Baker 2000).  For a typical account of the Huxley-
Wilberforce conflict as a watershed crisis moment for Christian theology, see Muers and Highton, 212-215.  For a 
more careful account of the Huxley-Wilberforce encounter, David Livingstone, “That Huxley Defeated Wilberforce 
in Their Debate Over Evolution and Religion,” in Ronald L. Numbers, ed. Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths About 
Science and Religion (Cambridge:  Harvard Univ. Press 2009); J.R. Lucas, “Wilberforce and Huxley:  A Legendary 
Encounter,” The Historical Journal 22:313-330 (June 1979).  For an account that limits the immediate significance 
of the debate but underscores the genuine theological tensions felt by Wilberforce over the problem of human 
evolution, see Frank James, “On Wilberforce and Huxley,” Astronomy and Geophysics (1) 2005. 
21 See McGrath, Science & Religion:  An Introduction, 31; John Henry, “Religion and the Scientific Revolution,” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion, 52-55. 
22 Ibid., 220-221. 
23 See George Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism (Grand Rapids:  Eerdmans 1990), 
Chapters 6, 9. 
24 See Ronald L. Numbers, The Creationists:  From Scientific Creationism to Intelligent Design (Cambridge:  Harvard 
Univ. Press 2006); “Answers in Genesis” website, available at http://www.answersingenesis.org. 
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million dollar “Creation Museum” in Kentucky.25  In the view of “creation science,” there is a clear 
conflict between theology and modern evolutionary science.   
Neo-Calvinist presuppositionalism is a living reaction to the fundamentalist-modernist 
controversy, a dispute that began in American Presbyterianism in the 1920's.  "Modernist" 
Presbyterians embraced the new critical Biblical scholarship and the new natural sciences, and 
accepted the challenges geology, paleontology, and evolutionary biology presented for "literal" 
readings of scripture.  Traditionalist Presbyterians insisted on adherence to the essential tenets 
of the Westminster Confession of Faith, including, perhaps most notably, the infallibility or 
inerrancy of scripture.26  Ironically, the "traditionalist" Bibliology of many early figures in this 
debate, including B.B. Warfield, was not hostile to scientific developments.  Warfield, whose 
writings on the inerrancy of scripture still inform conservative and fundamentalist Evangelical 
theology today, argued that the modern geology and biology, including biological evolution, 
could be compatible with an inerrant Bible, even if he drew lines around the possibility of human 
evolution.27  Nevertheless, disputes over the inspiration of the Bible and other "fundamentals" 
of the faith caused the traditionalist and modernist Presbyterians to divide, with the modernists 
gaining control over Princeton Theological Seminary and the traditionalists forming a new school, 
Westminster Theological Seminary, in Philadelphia.28 
The fundamentalist-modernist division was in significant part a reaction to the disruptions caused 
by German “higher” Biblical criticism of the nineteenth century.29  Biblical scholars such as Julius 
Wellhausen built on approaches dating back to the Renaissance in an effort to discern the “true” 
and “historical” meaning of the Biblical texts apart from the constraints of received dogma.  
Wellhausen and others challenged prior beliefs about the unity and integrity of the Biblical 
sources.  Wellhausen argued, for example, that the Pentateuch was a redaction of three 
theologically and narratively disparate and even contradictory sources, rather than a unified, 
                                                     
25 See Creation Museum Website, available at http://creationmuseum.org/. 
26 See George Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism (Grand Rapids:  Eerdmans 1990). 
27 See Mark A. Noll and David N. Livingstone, B.B. Warfield, Evolution, Science, and Scripture:  Selected Writings 
(Grand Rapids:  Baker Books 2000). 
28 See Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism. 
29 Ibid. 
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essentially historically accurate account from the inspired pen of Moses.  Their philological 
methods were combined with spectacular advances in the nascent disciplines of archeology and 
epigraphy, such as the discovery of the tablets containing the Epic of Gilgamesh by Hormuzd 
Rassam in 1853.30   
The “higher” critics painted a picture of the Bible as a thoroughly contingent human document 
that was derivative of the mythologies of its surrounding cultures, rather than a pristine account 
of universal origins essentially dictated by God.  Their understanding of the Bible coincided with 
philosophical trends, particularly German Romanticism, that in turn influenced academic 
theology.  German Protestant scholars such as Friedrich Schleiermacher and, later, Rudolph 
Bultmann, attempted to demystify the faith and to recast doctrines once thought basic to 
orthodoxy, such as the virgin birth, original sin, the vicarious atonement, the particularly of Christ 
in salvation, and the inspiration of scriptures, in merely experiential terms.31  When conservative 
scholars and pastors began publishing the volumes known as “The Fundamentals” in 1910, they 
believed – with some justification – that they were responding to an intellectual crisis that went 
to the very heart – the “fundamentals” – of historic Christian faith.32 
But the Fundamentalists who took up the mantle of defending the faith from the modernists in 
the early twentieth century typically were less flexible than predecessors such as B.B. Warfield 
who could cautiously incorporate at least some of the empirical data of the new natural sciences 
and the new Biblical scholarship into his understanding of Biblical inspiration and inerrancy.  
Significant portions of The Fundamentals were devoted to attacks on higher criticism and 
Darwinism that lacked any texture or nuance.33  A line was drawn:  any accommodation to 
Darwin’s theory of evolution was a surrender of the essentials of Christian faith. 
                                                     
30 See Steven L. McKenzie and Stephen R. Haynes, eds., To Each its Own Meaning:  Biblical Criticisms and Their 
Application (Louisville:  Westminster John Knox 1999). 
31 See Rachel Muers and Mike Higton, Modern Theology:  A Critical Introduction (London:  Routledge 2012), Section 
A. 
32 See Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism..  Full text scans of The Fundamentals are 
available at the Internet Archive, https://archive.org/details/fundamentalstest17chic. 
33 See, e.g., the following essays in The Fundamentals:  Griffith Thomas, “Old Testament Criticism and New 
Testament Christianity”; Dyson Hague, “History of the Higher Criticism”; Franklin Johnson, “Fallacies of the Higher 
Criticism,”; Henry Beach, “The Decadence of Darwinism”; George Frederick Wright, “The Passing of Evolution;” An 
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In America, of course, Christianity and popular concepts of democratic governance have also 
been closely intertwined.  It is not surprising that the early twentieth century Fundamentalists 
became alarmed about the teaching of evolutionary biology in public schools and sought to limit 
that activity through legislation.  These efforts resulted in the infamous “Scopes Monkey Trial” in 
1925.34  Although Scopes was convicted under Tennessee’s Butler Act of unlawfully teaching 
evolution in a public school, the performance of the State’s witnesses, including attorney William 
Jennings Bryan, who also prosecuted the case, was widely ridiculed.35  The Fundamentalist side 
began to withdraw from wider cultural engagement and to focus on separatist institutions that 
would preserve the purity of their movement.   
This trend coincided with the popularization within Fundamentalist groups of the eschatology of 
dispensational premillenialism.36  The Fundamentalist’s predecessors, including Warfield, had 
mostly belonged to a strain of Reformed theology that espoused an optimistic post-millennial 
eschatology.  Warfield and his compatriots understood themselves as participants in an 
ideological fight, but they believed their ideas would gradually but inexorably triumph as the 
Kingdom of God expanded.  The neo-Calvinists who adopted some form of Cornelius Van Til’s 
presuppositionalism tended towards an “amillennial” eschatology, and partly for that reason 
occupy a rarified space in theology-and-science discussions.  In stark contrast, dispensational 
                                                     
Occupant in the Pew, “Evolutionism in the Pulpit.”  It should be noted that The Fundamentals contained a few 
notable examples of more careful thought about Christian faith and natural science, including James Orr’s essay 
“Science and Christian Faith.”  Orr noted that, in the Bible, “[n]atural things are taken as they are given, and 
spoken of in simple, popular language, as we ourselves every day speak of them. The world it describes is the 
world men know and live in, and it is described as it appears, not as, in its recondite researches, science reveals its 
inner constitution to us. Wise expositors of the Scriptures, older and younger, have always recognized this, and 
have not attempted to force its language further.”  Ibid.  Orr further argued that “few are disquieted in reading 
their Bibles because it is made Certain that the world is immensely older than the 6,000 years which the older 
chronology gave it. Geology is felt only to have expanded our ideas of the vastness and marvel of the Creator’s 
operations through the aeons of time during which the world, with its teeming populations of fishes, birds, 
reptiles, mammals, was preparing for man’s abode — when the mountains were being upheaved, the valleys being 
scooped out, and veins of precious metals being inlaid into the crust of the earth.”  Unfortunately the weight of 
essays in The Fundamentals did not follow Orr’s measured approach.  Nevertheless, even Orr insisted on the 
special, recent creation of Adam and Eve.  See Ibid. 
34 See George Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (Oxford:  OUP 2d ed. 2009), Chapter XXI. 
35 See Ibid.; Ronald L. Numbers, The Creationists:  The Evolution of Scientific Creationism (Berkeley:  Univ. Calif. 
Press 1992), 72-73. 
36 See Matthew Avery Sutton, American Apocalypse:  A History of Modern Evangelicalism (Cambridge:  Harvard 
Univ. Press 2014). 
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premillenialists believed that they were living in the “end times,” a dark period of increasing evil 
and apostasy immediately preceding the “Great Tribulation,” a time of intense and terrible 
judgment equated with the Biblical “Day of the Lord.”  Only after the Great Tribulation would 
Christ establish his Millennial Kingdom, during which he would reign on David’s throne for one 
thousand years of peace on Earth, to be concluded with a final human-demonic rebellion that 
would result in Christ’s destruction of this world and the final judgment.  The dispensationalist 
belief that the present times were the “end times” before the Tribulation reinforced the 
Fundamentalists’ strategic retreat after the Scopes trial.  The broader world was irredeemably 
corrupt and headed for fiery judgment.  The only safe place was aboard the Ark of a putatively 
literalist Biblical faith.37  
The populist dynamism of the American evangelical movement, however, could not long permit 
evangelical Fundamentalists to remain on the cultural sidelines.  The period following World War 
II in particular witnessed a resurgence in world missions along with a new cultural visibility and 
prominence for American Evangelicals eager to retain the theological underpinnings of The 
Fundamentals while distancing themselves from the isolationism of post-Scopes 
fundamentalism.  Evangelical leaders such as Carl Henry, J.I. Packer, Bernard Ramm, and Francis 
Schaeffer, and institutions such as Wheaton College, promoted political engagement and “the 
integration of faith and learning.”  Although they were not yet prepared to grant the validity of 
Darwinian evolution, neo-Evangelical intellectuals mostly accepted Lyellian geology and the 
mainstream scientific consensus about the vast age of the Earth. Ramm’s 1954  book “The 
Christian View of Science and Scripture,” which argued for the validity of “framework” or “day-
age” interpretations of Genesis 1, was highly influential over the American Scientific Affiliation, a 
conservative Evangelical organization devoted to finding harmony between their theology and 
the natural sciences.38   
                                                     
37 See Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism.  For a fascinating original source on 
dispensational theology, see Clarence Larkin, Dispensational Truth, or God’s Plan and Purpose in the Ages (1920).  
38 Bernard Ramm, The Christian View of Science and Scripture (Grand Rapids:  Eerdman’s 1954).  For a discussion of 
the American Scientific Affiliation and the disputes between progressive creationists and young earth creationists, 
see Numbers, The Creationists, 159-181. 
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Not all who wished to identify as culturally engaged Evangelicals, however, were willing to accept 
even Lyellian geology.  In 1961, largely in response to Ramm, Henry Morris and John Whitcomb 
published The Genesis Flood, a powerful apology for “scientific creationism.”39  Morris and 
Whitcomb believed that a “literal” reading of the Bible, including the conclusion drawn from 
Biblical chronology that the Earth is less than 10,000 years old, could be supported through the 
proper application of scientific methods.  They promoted a “catastrophic” rather than 
“uniformitarian” view of geology, under which most of the features mainstream geologists 
attribute to long, gradual processes could instead be explained with reference to a world-wide 
deluge at the time of Noah.  The Genesis Flood was an immediate sensation and remains a basic 
text for young earth creationists (“YEC”) today.  Sociologically, it divided, and continues to divide, 
American Evangelicals among those who insist upon YECism and some version of “flood geology” 
and those who do not.  More importantly for Christian theology broadly considered, the YEC 
model promoted in The Genesis Flood supplied, and still supplies, much of the fuel for culture 
war debates over “science and religion” around the world.  From the 1960s through the present, 
American courts, including the Supreme Court, have heard challenges to public school science 
curricula mounted by YEC or Intelligent Design (“ID”) advocates, and presently the multi-million 
dollar “Creation Museum” in Kentucky does brisk business and underpins a vast YEC educational 
network popularized by the “Answers in Genesis” organization.40 
A somewhat more sophisticated version of this sort of creationism is the “Intelligent Design” 
movement, which attempts to disprove the theory of evolution through scientific evidences for 
“design” in creation through statistical gaps and probabilities and information theory.41  Although 
many ID proponents do not identify with scientific creationism’s insistence on reading the book 
of Genesis literally, they likewise presume that the Biblical revelation must somehow conform to 
                                                     
39 John C. Whitcomb and Henry M. Morris, The Genesis Flood:  The Biblical Record and its Scientific Implications 
(Phillipsburg:  P&R Publishing 1961). 
40 For significant case law, see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Edwards v. Aguillard, 428 U.S. 578 (1987); 
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp.2d 707 (2005).  For the Creation Museum, see the Creation 
Museum website, available at http://creationmuseum.org/.  For Answers in Genesis, see the Answers in Genesis 
website, https://answersingenesis.org/. 
41 See Ibid.; William A. Dembski, Intelligent Design:  The Bridge Between Science & Theology (Downers Grove:  IVP 
Academic 2002); “Uncommon Descent” website, available at http://www.uncommondescent.com. 
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and be confirmed by “science.”42  And because of this presumption, ID advocates generally argue 
that the findings of evolutionary biology fundamentally conflict with Christian theology.43 
The extraordinary cultural influence of “new atheists” such as Richard Dawkins represents 
another extreme node of this warfare thesis.44  Darwinism is here elevated to an all-
encompassing worldview.  For example, David Sloan Wilson, Distinguished Professor of Biological 
Sciences and Anthropology at Binghamton University, argues that Darwinian evolution fully 
explains everything, including every aspect of human nature.45  Anyone who thinks otherwise, 
even “intellectuals” who are not religious, is a kind of fundamentalist, an “’academic 
creationist.’”46  Religion, for these ultra-Darwinists, is like a pernicious virus that must be 
eradicated by science.47 
2. Independence and NOMA 
 
In contrast – or apparent contrast – to these conflict models, many opt for an “independence” 
model in which “science” and “religion” occupy entirely separate, non-overlapping domains.48  
The late biologist Stephen Jay Gould introduced the concept of “nonoverlapping magisteria” 
(NOMA) that purported to separate scientific claims from moral truth.49  This perspective is 
                                                     
42 See Conor Cunningham, Darwin’s Pious Idea, 278-280. 
43 Hence the double meaning in the title of one of William Dembski’s recent books:  The End of Christianity:  
Finding a Good God in an Evil World (Grand Rapids:  Baker Academic 2009), in which Dembski argues that 
Christianity fails without a scientifically demonstrable chronology for the Fall from Eden.  Dembski’s attempt to 
provide such a chronology is certainly far more sophisticated than that of creation science.  He accepts the 
geological age of the Earth and even the broad outlines of biological evolution (albeit punctuated in some way by 
infusions of Divine “design” apart from the ordinary processes of nature), but he argues that the Fall had 
retroactive effects because time can run forwards and backwards.  Absent this sort of mathematical construction 
of the retroactive effects of time, however, it seems that Dembski would agree with the ultra-Darwinists that 
Christianity has been scientifically falsified. 
44 See, e.g., Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston:  Mariner Books 2008).  See also Cunningham, Darwin’s 
Pious Idea, 272-275 (“Our Auntie Jean and Richard Dawkins”). 
45 David Sloan Wilson, Evolution for Everyone:  How Darwin’s Theory Can Change the Way We Think About 
Ourselves (New York:  Delacorte Press 2007). 
46 Ibid. at 3 (quoting The Nation, “The New Creationism:  Biology Under Attack,” 1997). 
47 Dawkins, The God Delusion. 
48 McGrath, 46-47. 
49 Stephen Jay Gould, “Nonoverlapping Magesteria,” Natural History 106:16-22 (March 1997).  See the discussion 
of NOMA in Cunningham, Darwin’s Pious Idea, 270-272. 
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reflected, to a certain extent, in the U.S. National Academy of Sciences statement on the 
compatibility of science and religion: 
Science and religion are based on different aspects of human 
experience. In science, explanations must be based on evidence 
drawn from examining the natural world. Scientifically based 
observations or experiments that conflict with an explanation 
eventually must lead to modification or even abandonment of that 
explanation. Religious faith, in contrast, does not depend only on 
empirical evidence, is not necessarily modified in the face of 
conflicting evidence, and typically involves supernatural forces or 
entities. Because they are not a part of nature, supernatural 
entities cannot be investigated by science. In this sense, science 
and religion are separate and address aspects of human 
understanding in different ways. Attempts to pit science and 
religion against each other create controversy where none needs 
to exist.50 
“Independence” models, however, seem inevitably to devolve into “conflict,” in which “faith and 
evidence” and “natural and supernatural” are put at odds, as the NAS statement above reflects.   
3. Strong Integration:  Process Theology 
 
In contrast to these conflict models, the mainstream science and religion literature emphasizes 
“dialogue” between and/or “integration” of scientific and religious perspectives.51  Strong 
Integrationist models tend towards a willingness to reconfigure religious categories in ways that 
seem required by the natural sciences.  Process theology, which tends to identify Godself as part 
of the developing and emerging cosmos, is a prime example of this sort of move.52  For process 
theology, reality is fundamentally a dynamic process.53  Rather than envisioning God as the 
transcendent source of the universe, for process theology, “God is not the exception to the 
dynamic nature of the universe, but rather the dynamic God-world relationship is the primary 
                                                     
50 National Academy of Sciences website, “Evolution Resources,” “Compatibility of Science and Religion,” available 
at http://www.nationalacademies.org/evolution/Compatibility.html. 
51 See McGrath, 47-49. 
52 See John Cobb and David Ray Griffin, Process Theology:  An Introductory Exposition (Louisville:  Westminster John 
Knox 1996). 
53 See Bruce G. Epperly, Process Theology:  A Guide for the Perplexed (London:  T&T Clark 2011), 20. 
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example of creaturely experience in its many expressions.”54  In this view, “[i]n our dynamic and 
ever-changing world, God is the most dynamic and ever-changing reality; God’s becoming 
embraces the eternal, temporal, and everlasting in an ever-creative, self-surpassing dialogue with 
the universe.”55 
Because God is a dynamic and evolving reality, process theology eschews the classical notion of 
God’s perfections.56  Process theologians view the claim that God is omniscient and omnipotent 
as remnants of Greek thought best left behind.57  They argue that a God who is omniscient and 
omnipotent must be responsible for evil and that both scripture and Christian experience disclose 
God in relational terms.58  They further argue that God’s classical perfections would destroy the 
possibility of human creativity and creaturely freedom.59  Many process theologians argue, in 
particular, that evolutionary theory elides the classical understanding of God’s perfections: 
While some Christians believe that God has directed the course of 
the universe from the very beginning, determining every detail 
without creaturely input, and is guiding the universe toward a pre-
determined goal, process theology imagines an open-ended 
universe, in which God’s vision is also open-ended and subject to 
change in relationship to creaturely decision-making and accidental 
occurrences.60 
A thread that ties these claims together within process theology is the integration of theology 
and science.61  Indeed, “[p]rocess theology is firmly rooted in an evolutionary understanding of 
the universe.”62  Thus process theology also eschews the concept of creation ex nihilo, arguing 
that, instead, “[e]ven before the big bang, God was interacting with the primordial elements of 
this universe or another universe from which this universe may have emerged, as some 
                                                     
54 Ibid. at 21. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. at 33-44. 
57 Ibid. at 34. 
58 Ibid. at 38-44. 
59 Ibid. at 83-91. 
60 Ibid., 97. 
61 Ibid. at 92-102. 
62 Ibid. at 97. 
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cosmologists suggest.  God has never been without a world, which provides opportunities for, 
and limitations of, the embodiment of God’s creative vision.”63 
This vision of emerging reality also affects process theology’s anthropology.  Human beings are 
not metaphysically special but rather are “fully embedded in the evolutionary process.”64  Human 
beings are not impacted by any sort of “original” sin but rather have always partaken in a bilateral 
relationship of call-and-response with God.65  In fact, “[t]o the surprise of many more traditional 
theologians, process theologians recognize that deviation from God’s moment by moment vision 
is not always bad:  it may inject new possibilities into the creative process.”66  Moreover, process 
theology tends to identify the human “soul” not with particular individuals, but rather with 
human society extended over time.67  The “soul” is “in every sense a part of nature, subject to 
the same conditions as all other natural entities.”68  Further, “the body, and specifically the brain, 
is the immediate environment of the soul.”69  Because of the embeddedness of the human person 
and specifically the human brain in the flux of evolutionary history, the human soul is intimately 
connected with the entire universe: 
The soul is, then, in immediate contact with some occasions of 
experience in the brain and with the mental poles of experiences 
of other souls….  Indirectly, but intimately, the soul also prehends 
the whole society that constitutes its body and still more indirectly, 
but still very importantly, the wider environment that is the whole 
world.  At the same time, the soul contributes itself as an object for 
feeling by other souls, the contiguous occasions in the brain, and 
indirectly by the whole future world.70  
4. Presuppositionalism and Reformed Epistemology 
Process theology entails a methodology that seems to privilege modern science as a broad 
epistemology.  Other methods that involve some degree of conflict and some degree of 
                                                     
63 Ibid. 98. 
64 Ibid. at 99. 
65 Ibid. at 100-101. 
66 Ibid. at 101. 
67 See John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead (Louisville:  
Westminster John Knox 2d ed. 2007). 
68 Ibid., 19. 
69 Ibid., 21.  See also Ibid. at 43-49 for Cobb’s refinement of Whitehead’s views on this point.   
70 Ibid., 23. 
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consilience between theology and science challenge the epistemological grounds for what is 
sometimes called “scientism.”  As we have seen, this kind of move is employed in a crude form 
by the young earth creationists.  But it is also employed in a more sophisticated way by some 
theologians and philosophers in the Reformed tradition. 
For example, Cornelius Van Til’s “presuppositionalism” reflected a particular sort of adjustment 
between “faith” and “reason” within neo-Calvinist theology.71  Van Til argued that all human 
knowledge claims are based on faith-based presuppositions.  Because human beings are 
fundamentally sinful, their presuppositions are often wrong.  A key function of scripture, in Van 
Til’s system, was to provide a means of correcting sinful human presuppositions with Divine 
revelation.  Scripture supplied propositional content that must inform proper human reasoning.  
Among the basic propositional truths of scripture was that the universe is God’s creation, not 
merely a chance product of evolution.   
Van Til’s epistemology can lead to young earth creationism, but that is not always the case.    
Indeed, one of the leading Reformed presuppositionalist thinkers today, who is a stalwart faculty 
member at Westminster Seminary in Philadelphia, is Vern Poythress, who argues in his book 
“Redeeming Science” that some version of evolutionary biology could be consistent with 
scripture, though he is also partial to certain kinds of intelligent design theories.72  One of the 
subtleties here is that, while presuppositionalists such as Poythress insist on the propositional 
inerrancy of scripture, their epistemology precludes any claim that the propositional truth of 
scripture is self-evident to unaided reason.  Thus, they refer to the “self-attestation” of scripture, 
which is related to the “illumination” of scripture by the Holy Spirit.73   
These notions of self-attestation and illumination secure the inerrancy of scripture prior to any 
effort at interpretation and allow interpreters to find alternative inerrant meanings when the 
literal sense of scripture seems to contradict other well-established facts, such as the facts of the 
                                                     
71 See Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Phillipsburg:  P&R 4th ed. 2008). 
72 Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Science:  a God-Centered Approach (Wheaton:  Crossway 2006). 
73 See, e.g., Roger R. Nicole and J. Ramsey Michaels, eds., Inerrancy and Common Sense (Grand Rapids:  Baker 
Books 1980); Moises Silva, “Old Princeton, Westminster, and Inerrancy,” in Harvey M. Conn, ed., Inerrancy and 
Hermeneutic:  A Tradition, a Challenge, a Debate (Grand Rapids:  Baker Books 1988), 67 (stating that “I happen to 
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modern natural sciences.  Because they are propositionalists, however, these Reformed thinkers 
do not advocate a return to the traditional four-fold sense of scripture, by which the literal sense 
might be superseded by an allegorical or tropological sense.74  An apparent conflict between 
scripture and science, for them, requires a more careful examination of both scripture and 
science until a set of non-contradictory propositions about the nature of the universe that 
accounts both for the propositions stated in the “book of scripture” and propositions adduced 
by observation of the “book of nature” can be ascertained.75  At the same time, within their 
theological system, some propositions that seem evident in scripture are of such importance that 
for more “conservative” interpreters they are treated as essentially inviolate – notably the special 
creation of a literal “Adam” and “Eve.”76  Still, in recent years, some conservative Reformed 
presuppositional theologians attempting to reconcile faith and science have suggested that 
“Adam” and “Eve” may have been the first humans specially created in a spiritual sense and may 
even have co-existed with other humans not biologically descended from them.77   
A more sophisticated and formidable kind of presuppositionalism informs the “Reformed 
Epistemology” of Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and other notable American 
philosophical theologians.  Plantinga contends that “knowledge” is a function of properly 
“warranted” belief, and that among the properly basic warrants are assumptions about the 
regularity and continuity of the universe along with the assumption that God exists.78  In in his 
book Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga emphasizes the internal witness of the Holy Spirit, 
which provides a form of epistemic certainty about the existence of God.79  Plantinga argues that 
                                                     
74 See Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis:  The Four Senses of Scripture, Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids:  Eerdmans 1998). 
75 See Ibid. 
76 See, e.g., John Jefferson Davis, “Genesis, Inerrancy, and the Antiquity of Man,” in Inerrancy and Common Sense, 
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it is “[b]y faith – the whole process, involving the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit – 
something becomes evident (i.e., acquires warrant, has what it takes to be knowledge.”).80   
But Plantinga does not merely argue for a form of fideism.  Rather, he suggests that the warrants 
of faith are shown to be sensible and reasonable in light of the entire context of the beliefs those 
warrants produce, and, indeed, that those beliefs make more sense than the possibility of 
atheism.  This sounds like a form of coherentism, but Plantinga explicity rejects “pure and 
unalloyed” coherentism as well as Bayesian coherentism.81  Instead, Plantinga is partial to what 
he calls “BonJourian Coherentism,” after the work of Laurence BonJour.82  Plantinga suggests that 
BonJour’s work presents a “chastened coherentism” that does not require either the 
foundationalist premises of “pure and unalloyed” coherentism or the mathematical foundations 
(with their own epistemic limits) of Bayesian coherentism.83   
From this basis, Plantinga suggests that a better starting point is the question of “proper 
function.”84  The notion of “proper function,” Plantinga says, “is inextricably involved with 
another:  that of the design plan of the organ or organism in question – the way the thing in 
question is supposed to work, the way it works when it works properly, when it is subject to no 
dysfunction.”85  There are then, according to Plantinga, four conditions for a belief having proper 
warrant:   
a belief B has warrant for you if and only if (1) the cognitive faculties 
involved in the production of B are functioning properly (and this is to 
include the relevant defeater systems as well as those systems, if any, that 
provide propositional inputs to the system in question); (2) your cognitive 
environment is sufficiently similar to the one for which your cognitive 
faculties are designed; (3) the triple of the design plan governing the 
production of the belief in question involves, as purpose or function, the 
production of true beliefs (and the same goes for elements of the design 
plan governing the production of input beliefs into the system in question); 
                                                     
80 Ibid., 265. 
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discussion of coherentist models, see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Coherentist Theories of Epistemic 
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and (4) the design plan is a good one:  that is, there is a high statistical or 
objective probability that a belief produced in accordance with the 
relevant segment of the design plan in that sort of environment is true.86 
In Warranted Christian Belief, and in his more popularly accessible work on faith and science, 
Plantinga attempts to show how these conditions are met concerning what he considers the core 
beliefs of Christian faith, and addresses what he considers possible “defeaters” to his account of 
the warrants for Christian belief.87  In Plantinga’s lexicon, “[a] defeater for a belief A is another 
belief B such that once you come to accept B, you can no longer continue to accept A without 
falling into irrationality.”88  In particular, Plantinga takes on arguments by prominent atheists 
such as Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, who argue that evolution and theism are 
incompatible because there is a lack of evidence for design in the universe.89  Plantinga suggests 
that “classical theists” generally believe statements about Divine action and providence such as 
those found in the Heidleberg Catechism: 
Providence is the almighty and ever present power of God by which he 
upholds, as with his hand, heaven and earth and all creatures, and so rules 
them leave and blade, rain and drought, fruitful years and lean years, food 
and drink, health and sickness, prosperity and poverty – all things, in fact, 
come to us not by chance but from his fatherly hand.90 
 
This picture of Divine action and providence, Plantinga suggests, is disrupted by Newtonian and 
Laplacian science, but is no longer problematic in light of quantum mechanics.91  Given his 
presuppositional approach and his theological views about Divine action, Plantinga also 
expresses support for fine tuning arguments and, at least to some extent, for Intelligent Design 
theory.92  He suggests that the evidence of fine tuning in the universe and the discourse of 
Intelligent Design are consistent with the “design plan” of human noetic capabilities, while the 
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atheistic belief that all of this apparent design arose through chance is highly implausible.93   The 
best Dawkins and Dennett can do, Plantinga suggests, is show that the development of life by 
chance is not entirely impossible, while theism can do far better by showing a more complete 
and plausible picture of how theistic beliefs are warranted.   But, as Plantinga acknowledges, his 
arguments do not represent an effort to prove the truth of Christian belief on Christian grounds.  
He agrees that “[e]verything [in his arguments] really depends on the truth of Christian belief,” 
but hopes that he can at least refute “the common suggestion that Christian belief, whether true 
or not, is intellectually unacceptable.”94 
5. Dialogue and Critical Realism 
 
Many proponents of “dialogue” models between science and religion identify themselves as 
“critical realists,” and this may be the dominant paradigm in the contemporary “religion and 
science” literature, at least among “conservative” scholars.95  A critical realist approach 
recognizes that all human knowing is mediated through human thought and language forms, 
including both scientific and theological knowing – and thus it is “critical.”96  Nevertheless, critical 
realists assert that there is a reality extrinsic to human thought and language that is capable of 
sustained investigation, and that human beings are capable of making progress towards fuller 
understanding of that extrinsic reality.97  The theological realities that theologians attempt to 
investigate and the natural realities that scientists attempt to investigate must each be 
approached with tools appropriate to their respective domains.98  As Alister McGrath argues, 
“[b]oth the scientific and religious communities can be thought of as attempting to wrestle with 
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the ambiguities of experience, and offering what are accepted as the ‘best possible explanations’ 
for what is observed.”99   
McGrath develops his model of critical realism in science and theology in significant part from 
the philosophical contributions of Roy Bhaskar and Michael Polanyi.100  For critical realists in the 
tradition of Bhaskar, society is both a preexisting given and a product of human activity.101 
Individuals do not create society, but they do continually reproduce and transform society.102 
Society is neither a reified structure that exists apart from human activity nor an entirely 
voluntary creation of individuals.103 Bhaskar likens this “transformational model of social activity” 
to a sculptor who creates something out of the materials and tools available to her.104 The result 
is that society emerges from, but is not reducible to, the choices of individuals.105 Society is “a 
complex totality subject to change both in its components and their interrelations.”106 
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Critical realists recognize that knowledge has both social and physical dimensions.107 There is a 
reality external to human perception, language, and cognition.108 Human perception, language, 
and cognition, however, limit our direct epistemic access to reality.109 Human perception of 
reality is a “transitive” dimension because it is subject to change based on human language, 
history, and culture.110 Reality itself, however, is “intransitive.”111 According to Roy Bhaskar, 
reality is stratified and can be conceived as three layered: empirical (observable by human), 
actual (existing in time and space), and real (“transfactual and enduring more than our perception 
of it”).112 
Bhaskar thus emphasized the social aspects of human knowledge without reducing all of reality 
to a human construction. An important aspect of Bhaskar’s social theory of knowledge is his 
rejection of “methodological individualism”—the notion that societies are reducible to 
individuals.113 A “social atomism” in which the analysis of societies can be reduced to the 
preferences of individuals will never adequately explain social action.114 But neither is society 
merely the result of collective pressures on individuals, or a simple dialectic between these two 
poles.115 Rather, society has a dual character: social groups provide the ground through which 
                                                     
107 Roy Bhaskar states that 
Any adequate philosophy of science must find a way of grappling with this central paradox of 
science: that men in their social activity produce knowledge which is a social product much like 
any other, which is no more independent of its production and the men who produce it than motor 
cars, armchairs or books, which has its own craftsmen, technicians, publicists, standards and skills 
and which is no less subject to change than any other commodity. This is one side of ‘knowledge’. 
The other is that knowledge is ‘of’ things which are not produced by men at all: the specific gravity 
of mercury, the process of electrolysis, the mechanism of light propagation. None of these ‘objects 
of knowledge’ depend on human activity. If men ceased to exist sound would continue to travel 
and heavy bodies fall to the earth in exactly the same way, though ex hypothesi there would be 
no-one to know it. 
Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, 21. 
108  See Critical Realism: Essential Readings ix–xiii (Margaret Archer, et al. eds., 1998) (noting that “critical realism 
claims to be able to combine and reconcile ontological realism, epistemological relativism, and judgmental 
rationality.”) (emphasis in original). 
109  Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, 21. 
110  Ibid. 
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112 Ibid. at 21–62.  
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individuals reproduce and sometimes transform society.116 A level of reality can emerge from a 
more basic level without being reducible to the more basic level.117 
Like Bhaskar, Michael Polanyi sought to mitigate the destructive tendencies of positivism without 
destroying the normativity of science. One of Polanyi’s primary concerns was the danger of 
authoritarian control over science extant in the then communist East. 118 Polanyi was keen to 
demonstrate that science is an inherently social enterprise just like any other human project, and 
that as a social enterprise science must be subject to democratic control.119 Also like Bhaskar, 
Polanyi recognized that reality is stratified.120 Each level of reality operates under the ‘marginal 
control’ of higher levels, but the higher levels are not reducible to the lower.121 
Polanyi recognized that positivism fails because it relies on some unverifiable foundations. As 
Polanyi noted, “It is indeed logically impossible for the human mind to divest itself of all 
uncritically acquired foundations. For our minds cannot unfold at all except by embracing a 
definite idiom of beliefs, which will determine the scope of our entire subsequent fiducial 
development.”122 The notion of positivism itself, then, depends on an idiomatic structure that is 
neither verifiable nor self-evident. 
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117 Ibid. at 113 (stating that “the operations of the higher level cannot be accounted for solely by the laws governing 
the lower-order level in which we might say the higher-order level is ‘rooted’ and from which we might say it was 
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118 Polanyi explains this concern at the beginning of one of his key works, The Tacit Dimension. Describing the denial 
of independent science under communism, Polanyi says “I was struck by the fact that this denial of the very existence 
of independent scientific thought came from a socialist theory which derived its tremendous persuasive power from 
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Lakatos, and to some extent Paul Feyerabend. Michael Polanyi, Scientific Thought and Social Reality (Madison:  
International University Press 1974), 76; see, e.g., Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes 
(Cambridge:  CUP 1978); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (New York:  Verso 3d ed. 1993) (1975). 
119  Polanyi, Scientific Thought and Social Reality, 3. 
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Scientific Theology: Reality, 226 (2002). Interestingly, the stratification of reality can also be observed in Thomas 
Aquinas’ approach to law. See William S. Brewbaker II, “Thomas Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Law,” 58 Ala. L. 
Rev. 575, 600–02 (2007). It is noted that “Thomas assumes that a single scientific method is insufficient to enable 
investigation of all types of reality, and this assumption affects his account of law.” Ibid. at 600.  
122 Polanyi, Scientific Thought and Social Reality, 76. 
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Polanyi also emphasized the communal nature of scientific practice and the “tacit” knowledge 
involved in such communal information transfers. As he noted, “[t]he transmission of beliefs in 
society is mostly not by precept, but by example . . . [t]he whole practice of research and 
verification is transmitted by example and its standards are upheld by a continuous interplay with 
criticism within the scientific community.”123 Thus, scientific knowledge is a set of socially 
constructed analogical models that are developed through practices acquired and implemented 
in unique social networks.  
Finally, Polanyi realized that the social networks through which scientific practices are 
transferred, like all social networks, incorporate elements of social control. One of the principal 
means of control over scientific information networks is peer review. Polanyi observed that 
scientific journal referees “are the chief Influentials, the unofficial governors of the scientific 
community. By their advice they can either delay or accelerate the growth of a new line of 
research.”124  Nevertheless, within this social matrix, science can make genuine progress in 
understanding. 
Similarly, theology, critical realists argue, seeks to interpret experienced reality within the 
context of a traditioned community.125  In this respect, many critical realists are sympathetic to 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of the role of community and tradition in the shaping of 
philosophical inquiry.126  For Christians, of course, the central experienced reality that requires 
theological interpretation is the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ, and the 
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Ibid. Cf. Lee Smolin, The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What Happens Next 
(Houghton Mifflin Company 2006).  
125 McGrath, The Foundations of Science & Religion, 160-64. 
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interpretive community is the Church.127  Christian theology and doctrine develop as the Christian 
community reflects on this central experience.  Just as in the natural sciences, massive paradigm 
shifts in the understanding of theology and doctrine should be rare, but some degree of revision 
must always remain a possibility because the reality that lies behind the experience is only ever 
partially understood. 
This emphasis on the event of revelation in Christ among many Christian critical realists is not 
surprising, as many of them (including, notably, Alister McGrath), are connected to Karl Barth 
through the work of Thomas Torrance.128  Barth, consistent with his understanding of revelation 
and philosophy, resisted any systematic definition of God: 
The equation of God’s Word and God’s Son makes it radically 
impossible to say anything doctrinaire in understanding the Word 
of God.  In this equation, and in it alone, a real and effective barrier 
is set up against what is made of proclamation according to the 
Roman Catholic view and of Holy Scripture according to the later 
form of older Protestantism, namely, a fixed sum of revealed 
propositions which can be systematized like the sections of a 
corpus of law.  The only system in Holy Scripture and proclamation 
is revelation, i.e., Jesus Christ.129 
But Barth – who, after all, over the course of thirty-five years wrote a Church Dogmatics 
comprised of about six million words of dense text – did not mean we can say nothing truthful 
about God.  After resisting what he understood as the Catholic and Scholastic Reformation’s too-
neat methods of systematization, Barth emphasized the importance of words and speech: 
Now the converse is also true, of course, namely that God’s Son is 
God’s Word.  Thus God does reveal Himself in statements, through 
the medium of speech, and indeed of human speech.  His word is 
always this or that word spoken by the prophets and apostles and 
proclaimed in the Church.  The personal character of God’s Word is 
not, then, to be played off against its verbal or spiritual character.  
It is not at all true that this second aspect under which we must 
                                                     
127 See T.F. Torrance, Reality & Evangelical Theology:  The Realism of Christian Revelation (Downers Grove:  
InterVarsity Press 1999), 84-120. 
128 See McGrath, The Foundations of Science & Religion, 34 (citing Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science (Oxford:  
OUP 1969)). 
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understand it implies its irrationality and thus cancels out the first 
aspect under which we must understand it.130 
Barth’s concern throughout his discussion of the Word in Volume I of the Church Dogmatics was 
to preserve the freedom and integrity of theology against Enlightenment rationalism.131  Barth 
was particularly concerned with the way rationalism gave rise to nineteenth century liberal 
demythologizing Protestant thought.  Barth also resisted how rationalism underwrote both 
Protestant fundamentalism and the Scholastic Thomism of much Catholic nineteenth century 
Catholic thought.  Torrance worked from these basic Barthian premises to modify Barth’s famous 
“nein” to natural theology with a qualified “yes.” 
The critical realist approach to theology and science results in a paradigm in which the disciplines 
of theology and natural science remain distinct but can contribute to each other at higher levels.  
McGrath summarizes his version of this program as follows: 
1. The natural sciences and the religions are quite distinct in terms 
of their methodologies and subject matters.  It is quite 
improper to attempt to limit them, for example by suggesting 
that the sciences have to do with the physical world and the 
religions with a distinct spiritual world.  The distinction 
between ‘science’ and ‘religion’ concerns more than subject-
matter. 
 
2. At points, despite their clear differences, those working in the 
fields of science and religion find themselves facing similar 
issues, especially in relation to issues of representation and 
conceptualization.  At point after point, those interested in 
science and religion find themselves facing very similar 
questions, and even adopting similar approaches in the 
answers which they offer. 
 
3. At points of major importance, the methods and theories of the 
natural sciences are genuinely illuminating to those concerned 
with religious matters.  Equally, there are points where religious 
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beliefs and approaches cast considerable light on issues of 
scientific method.  The investigation of these convergences is 
mutually enlightening and significant.132 
6. Fides et Ratio? 
It is useful to compare McGrath’s critical realism with Pope John Paul II’s views on faith and 
science.  The comparison demonstrates some residue of the old Protestant-Catholic debates 
about the effectiveness of human reason after the Fall.  But the comparison also highlights ways 
in which both branches of the Western Church converge on the centrality of the doctrine of 
creation as the ground of the possibility of “science.” 
The Roman Catholic approach to faith and science, exemplified in the Pontifical Academy of the 
Sciences, is sometimes said to represent a “dialogue” approach.133  There is of course not only 
one “Roman Catholic approach” to the relation between theology and science, and many 
Catholics working in this field would identify themselves as critical realists or assume the posture 
of critical realism without identifying it.134  Indeed, Pope John Paul II famously stated that 
“[s]cience can purify religion from error and superstition; religion can purify science from idolatry 
and false absolutes.  Each can draw the other into a wider world, a world in which both can 
flourish.”135   
                                                     
132  McGrath, The Foundations of Science & Religion, 34. 
133 See McGrath, 47-48; Pontifical Academy of the Sciences website, available at 
http://www.casinapioiv.va/content/accademia/en.html. 
134 See, e.g., John F. Haught, Making Sense of Evolution:  Darwin, God, and the Drama of Life (Louisville:  
Westminster John Knox 2010); Michael Heller, Creative Tension:  Essays on Science and Religion (West 
Conshohocken:  Templeton Foundation Press 2003).  Haught argues as follows:   
 
Christian theology, I firmly believe, cannot responsibly take refuge in pre-Darwinian 
understandings of these concepts [of design, descent, and diversity].  Instead, it must look for 
theological reflection broad enough to assimilate all that is new in scientific research without in 
any way abandoning the substance of Christian teaching.  This theological task requires a deep 
respect for traditional creeds and biblical texts, but it also assumes that in the light of new 
experience and scientific research, constant reinterpretation of fundamental beliefs is essential 
to keep any religion alive and honest.  This is especially the case with Christianity after Darwin. 
 
Haught, Making Sense of Evolution, xvii. 
135 Letter of His Holiness John Paul II to Rev. George V. Coyne, S.J. Director of the Vatican Observatory, June 1, 
1988, available at  http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/letters/1988/documents/hf_jp-
ii_let_19880601_padre-coyne_en.html 
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This oft-quoted statement of John Paul II was part of a longer letter to Jerry Coyne, Director of 
the Vatican Observatory, in preparation for a study week celebrating the three hundredth 
anniversary of Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica.136  The Pope stressed in 
that letter that the model he envisioned was one of dialogue rather than integration: 
By encouraging openness between the Church and the scientific 
communities, we are not envisioning a disciplinary unity between 
theology and science like that which exists within a given scientific 
field or within theology proper. As dialogue and common searching 
continue, there will be grow towards mutual understanding and a 
gradual uncovering of common concerns which will provide the 
basis for further research and discussion. Exactly what form that 
will take must be left to the future. What is important, as we have 
already stressed, is that the dialogue should continue and grow in 
depth and scope. In the process we must overcome every 
regressive tendency to a unilateral reductionism, to fear, and to 
self-imposed isolation. What is critically important is that each 
discipline should continue to enrich, nourish and challenge the 
other to be more fully what it can be and to contribute to our vision 
of who we are and who we are becoming.137 
Theologians, the Pope noted, can utilize the best science of their times to help them understand 
and articulate theological truths, but science cannot simply dictate terms to theology: 
Now this is a point of delicate importance, and it has to be carefully 
qualified. Theology is not to incorporate indifferently each new 
philosophical or scientific theory. As these findings become part of 
the intellectual culture of the time, however, theologians must 
understand them and test their value in bringing out from Christian 
belief some of the possibilities which have not yet been realized. 
The hylomorphism of Aristotelian natural philosophy, for example, 
was adopted by the medieval theologians to help them explore the 
nature of the sacraments and the hypostatic union. This did not 
mean that the Church adjudicated the truth or falsity of the 
Aristotelian insight, since that is not her concern. It did mean that 
this was one of the rich insights offered by Greek culture, that it 
needed to be understood and taken seriously and tested for its 
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value in illuminating various areas of theology. Theologians might 
well ask, with respect to contemporary science, philosophy and the 
other areas of human knowing, if they have accomplished this 
extraordinarily difficult process as well as did these medieval 
masters.138 
Likewise, the Pope stated, the practice of natural science is neither to be equated with theology 
nor isolated from it: 
For science develops best when its concepts and conclusions are 
integrated into the broader human culture and its concerns for 
ultimate meaning and value. Scientists cannot, therefore, hold 
themselves entirely aloof from the sorts of issues dealt with by 
philosophers and theologians. By devoting to these issues 
something of the energy and care they give to their research in 
science, they can help others realize more fully the human 
potentialities of their discoveries. They can also come to appreciate 
for themselves that these discoveries cannot be a genuine 
substitute for knowledge of the truly ultimate.139 
The Catholic “dialogue” approach, at least on some readings of it, already assumes that all 
investigation of truth is theological.  The possibility of “natural reason” is given precisely because 
of prior theological claims about the gift of created human nature and its capacity to participate 
in the truth of God.  In his introductory discussion of the relation between theology and 
philosophy, Fides et Ratio, for example, Pope John Paul II states that all knowledge, whether 
derived from philosophy or faith, depends first on God, who makes knowledge possible by grace.  
“Underlying all the Church's thinking,” John Paul II said, “is the awareness that she is the bearer 
of a message which has its origin in God himself (cf. 2 Cur 4:1-2).” 140   The Church did not receive 
this message through its own power or abilities, nor was the message communicated through 
abstract intellectual means.  Rather, John Paul II said, it stems from a personal encounter with 
God in Christ: 
At the origin of our life of faith there is an encounter, unique in 
kind, which discloses a mystery hidden for long ages (cf. 1 Cor. 2:7; 
Rom 16:25-26) but which is now revealed:   “In his goodness and 
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wisdom, God chose to reveal himself and to make known to us the 
hidden purpose of his will (cf. Eph. 1:9), by which, through Christ, 
the Word made flesh, man has access to the Father in the Holy 
Spirit and comes to share in the divine nature”.141   
Further, God’s self-revelation in Christ was entirely a free act of grace:  “[t]is initiative is utterly 
gratuitous, moving from God to men and women in order to bring them to salvation.   As the 
source of love, God desires to make himself known; and the knowledge which the human being 
has of God perfects all that the human mind can know of the meaning of life.”142 
Therefore there is no question of philosophy superseding faith.  There is no sharp division, in 
Fides et Ratio, between “nature” and “grace”:  all that pertains to “nature,” to God’s creative 
design, is also the gift of “grace,” of God’s ecstatic, self-giving love.  Nevertheless, for John Paul 
II, “nature” involves empirical realities that are susceptible to human knowledge through a form 
of reasoning appropriate to the object.  “Philosophy” therefore possesses an inherent integrity, 
structure, and grammar.  “The truth attained by philosophy and the truth of Revelation,” John 
Paul II said, “are neither identical nor mutually exclusive”:    
There exists a twofold order of knowledge, distinct not only as 
regards their source, but also as regards their object….  Based upon 
God's testimony and enjoying the supernatural assistance of grace, 
faith is of an order other than philosophical knowledge which 
depends upon sense perception and experience and which 
advances by the light of the intellect alone.  Philosophy and the 
sciences function within the order of natural reason; while faith, 
enlightened and guided by the Spirit, recognizes in the message of 
salvation the “fullness of grace and truth” (cf. Jn 1:14) which God 
has willed to reveal in history and definitively through his Son, Jesus 
Christ (cf. 1 Jn 5:9; Jn 5:31-32).143 
John Paul II therefore sees a positive role for “philosophy” as a complement to “faith.”   Indeed, 
for John Paul II, “natural reason,” apart from revelation, is capable of showing that there is a God 
who created the universe.  Nevertheless, it is finally our faith in God’s creative goodness that 
establishes confidence in the capacities of “natural reason” to comprehend creation, and it is our 
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faith in God’s transcendence that establishes the proper bounds of reason.   These themes of 
transcendence and participation as applied to the relation between theology and science are 
perhaps reflected more clearly in an introduction John Paul II wrote for a 2004 Pontifical Academy 
of Sciences report in the Academy’s four hundredth anniversary, where he stated 
I am more and more convinced that scientific truth, which is itself 
a participation in divine Truth, can help philosophy and theology to 
understand ever more fully the human person and God’s 
Revelation about man, a Revelation that is completed and 
perfected in Jesus Christ. For this important mutual enrichment in 
the search for the truth and the benefit of mankind, I am, with the 
whole Church, profoundly grateful.144 
7. Postliberalism and Other Narrative Theologies 
“Postliberal” theology represents an effort to move beyond classical theological liberalism 
through “a return to a premodern faith rooted in the faith community, while fully realizing the 
impossibility of a full return to premodern dogma.”145  Although postliberal theology is a diverse 
movement, “it always stresses the narrative of scripture along with the community of the church 
and its practices.”146  Postliberal theology has been described as non-foundationalist, intra-
textual, socially centered, respectful of plurality and diversity, and inclined towards an 
ecumenical “generous orthodoxy.”147  In this respect, postliberal theology reflects the “linguistic 
turn” and the influence of philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alasdair McIntyre and 
Thomas Kuhn, along with theologians such as Augustine, Aquinas, and Barth.148 
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Because postliberal and related narrative theologies focus on the constitutive character of 
theological language – that is, because they reflect the linguistic turn in philosophy – they can 
seem disinterested in any sort of modern “faith and science” project.  Nevertheless, some key 
figures in these movements have made contributions to conversations about natural theology, 
including David Kelsey, Stanley Hauerwas, and Sarah Coakley.   
David Kelsey has written extensively on method in theology and science, in connection with his 
two volume theological anthropology, Eccentric Existence.149  Kelsey understands “theology” as 
a kind of ecclesial practice, “one of several practices that make up the common life of some self-
identified communities of Christian faith,” that is, of the Church.150  Kelsey’s use of the term 
“practice” is meant to evoke Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, and includes “any form of socially 
established human interactivity that is conceptually formed, is complex and internally coherent, 
is subject to standards of excellence that partly define it, and is done to some end but does not 
necessarily have a product.”151  Although such practices are internally defined, however, they are 
necessarily “public,” because they are socially established.152  And, because the socially 
established communities in which such practices arise are historically embedded, the shape of 
those practices may change over time.153  In particular, such change “may take the form of new 
historical knowledge of the cultural contexts in which authoritative Scriptures and theological 
formulations should be interpreted, and thereby change their bearing on the theological claims 
they were once thought to authorize.”154  Moreover, because these practices are subject to 
historically embedded standards of excellence, they will have some reference beyond the 
internal community towards other communities of practice with which they interact.155  For 
example, Kelsey suggests, when theological practices “incorporate arguments in a number of 
very different argument-making practices (e.g., history, literary criticism, philology, and 
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metaphysics)” then the theological practices are to that extent subject to the standards of 
excellence of those other practices.156  So, Kelsey argues, “[f]or example, when a proposal in 
secondary theology is defended as a historical proposal (say, ‘Jesus of Nazareth was crucified by 
the Romans’), the arguments advanced in support of the proposal must count as good arguments 
in the practice of history (e.g., arguments based on what counts as good evidence in the practice 
of history).”157 
Given his ecclesio-centric view of the practice of theology and his affinity for MacIntyre, Kelsey 
recognizes that part of the practice of theology entails understanding the historical theological 
tradition.  However, as theology continues to be enacted in time and as it continues to interact 
with other developing traditions of practice, it will inevitably change.  Therefore, Kelsey says, “the 
contents of the theological tradition, part of that-which-is-handed-over, are to be taken very 
seriously by enactments of secondary theology as formulations from which important insights 
may be learned, but not taken uncritically or as unreformable, much less infallible.”158    
When Kelsey applies this methodology to the question “who was Adam,” the results are perhaps 
predictably stark.  Kelsey describes the “premodern” view as embedded in the theological loci of 
creation and salvation, and describes it as follows:  “Adam and Eve were historical figures created 
ex nihilo as fully actualized adult human beings, perfects specimens in every way, and . . . the fall 
was a disaster in their personal lives whose consequences include the necessity of hard labor for 
physical survival, social injustice and oppression, disease, pain in childbirth, and the death of the 
body.”159  In contrast, Kelsey says, “[t]he notion of there being an individual or a pair who began 
the species Homo sapiens as fully actualized human beings ex nihilo, without living antecedents, 
is unintelligible in the context of an evolutionary view of the origin of every living species.  It is 
no longer believable that a unique fall ever happened or that it happened to anyone like Adam 
and Eve.”160  For Kelsey, the theological project of “faith seeking understanding” must comprise 
an effort not to produce proofs of now implausible historic Christian beliefs such as belief in Adam 
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and the fall, but to “exhibit[] the intelligibility of practice that compose the common life of 
communities of Christian faith by identifying the ways in which they are conceptually formed, the 
‘end’ to which they are enacted, their ‘standards of excellence,’ and how they hang together – 
that is, the patterns of their relationships with one another – all in order to assess critically 
whether the community’s enactments of the practices are adequate.”161 
Stanley Hauerwas is another postliberal theologian who has written about natural theology, with 
results that seem different than Kelsey’s.  Hauerwas is an unlikely entrant in the faith and science 
conversation, but he gave the Gifford Lectures in 2001, which were published as With the Grain 
of the Universe:  The Church’s Witness and Natural Theology.162  Hauerwas’ central theme in 
those lectures was that “natural theology divorced from a full doctrine of God cannot help but 
distort the character of God and, accordingly, of the world in which we find ourselves.”163  This 
claim resonates with much of what the Radical Orthdoxy thinkers profiled in the next section 
have to say about natural theology.  Indeed, Hauerwas here quotes John Milbank’s quip that 
“’the pathos of modern theology is its false humility,’” and notes that “I hope Milbank’s warning 
about false humility explains why I cannot help but appear impolite, since I must maintain that 
the God who moves the sun and the stars is the same God who was incarnate of Jesus of 
Nazareth.”164  Hauerwas argues, with John Howard Yoder, that the cross is the center of reality 
and that “those who bear crosses work with the grain of the universe.”165  The cross, Hauerwas 
says, is central to God’s being, and Christians cannot sidestep the cross in the interest of 
apologetics.  Moreover, since the cross is central to God’s being, it is also central to ecclesiology, 
“or the politics called church. . . .”166 
Hauwerwas then moves on to tackle the modern presumption that philosophy and other sciences 
stand alongside or above theology, rather than under the claims of sacra doctrina and theology.  
He argues that Aquinas understood “natural reason” and “revelation” as rational complements, 
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not as “epistemological alternatives,” such that “those who attempt in the name of Aquinas to 
develop a ‘natural theology – that is, a philosophical defense of ‘theism’ as a propaedeutic for 
any further ‘confessional’ claims one might want to make – are engaged in an enterprise that 
Aquinas would not recognize.”167  Hauerwas cites as support for this view one of the “reformed 
epistemologists” we mentioned in a previous section, Nicholas Wolterstorff.  Aquinas, Hauerwas 
says, was engaged in a Trinitarian projected “from beginning to end,” imbued with the 
Aristotelian idea that we can only make sense of effects by trying to understand their causes.168 
While Hauerwas seeks to retrieve the sense of holism and transcendence in pre-modern thought, 
he does not seek a naïve return to the Middle Ages.  According to Hauerwas,  
The assumption that the Middle Ages represents a time when Christians 
‘got it right’ not only doe an injustice to the complexity of the times and 
places so named, but also betrays the gospel requirement that even in a 
world that understands itself to be Christian, faithful witness is no less 
required for the truth that is Christ to be known. . . .  The very attempt to 
tell the story of modernity as one of decline from a genuinely Christian 
world ironically underwrites the assumption that the story that Christianity 
is is inseparable from the story of Western culture.”169 
 
Hauerwas is also reluctant to offer a precise genealogy of modernity.  He suggests the fact “[t]hat 
we live in an age in which the church is but another voluntary agency and theology, at best one 
subject among others in the curriculum of universities is the result not just of mistakes in the 
thirteenth century but of the effect of innovations such as the clock that intellectuals (exactly 
because we are intellectuals) are prone to discount.”170  He ties this to a critique of what he takes 
as the Constantinian notion that Christian belief can be imposed as an intellectual system rather 
than received only through lived practices. 
After this prolegomenon, Hauerwas profiles three previous Gifford lecturers, William James, 
Reinhold Niebuhr, and Karl Barth.  For the purpose of this Dissertation, the most interesting of 
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these is Hauerwas’ engagement of Barth, given the way in which Barth is also central to “critical 
realism” in theology and science.  Hauerwas suggests that “Barth, in spite of his disavowal of 
natural theology, provides the resources necessary for developing an adequate theological 
metaphysics, or, in other words, a natural theology,” if “’natural theology’ simply names how 
Christian convictions work to describe all that is God’s good creation.”171 
One of the keys to Hauerwas’ reading of Barth is Christology, and particularly the humanity of 
Christ as it relates to our humanity.  Humans are distinct from the rest of creation because we 
can express our gratitude to God through knowledge and service, and we are capable of taking 
an active part in God’s work of redemption through the building of culture.172 
A final thinker in this group of postliberal theologians, though that label may not fit her precisely, 
is Sarah Coakley.  In her 2012 Gifford Lectures, “Sacrifice Regained, Evolution, Cooperation and 
God,” Coakley laid out a methodological and practical program for a revitalized natural 
theology.173  In those lectures, Coakley sometimes sounds like a critical realist and sometimes 
like a postliberal, so she serves as a useful bridge between these groups.   
Coakley tries to show that current arguments in the philosophy of science, in particular the 
philosophy of biology, about altruism and cooperation, are consonant with certain kinds of 
teleological perspectives on creation drawn from the Christian theological tradition.  At the same 
time, she wishes to resist any suggestion that teleology is something superadded to nature by 
God or that evolution is a story about nature “getting better.”174  With Michael Polanyi and Simon 
Conway Morris, Coakley suggests that there might be some sort of “’irreducible structure’ to 
evolutionary life itself,” which invites philosophical and theological reflection.175  She wishes to 
avoid the Kantian option in which God is a not a subject of reason but merely an “as if” that 
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guarantees the moral law.176  She also, however, wishes to avoid “any trace of the extrinsic God 
competing for space with the processes of His own creation. . . .”177 
The path forward, Coakley believes, is in “neo-Aristotelian accounts of both biological processes 
and moral virtues,” which ask about the purposes of phenomena such as cooperation and 
altruism.178  Such neo-Aristotelian accounts, Coakley suggests, “cohere more illuminatingly” with 
the phenomena of evolution than the kinds of consequentialism or emotivism that many 
evolutionary psychologists prefer.179  Yet Coakley does not suggest that theology is only 
something that might provide some perhaps pleasant addendum to the magisterium of science.  
She notes that “[t]he era of a confident announcement of the existence of God based solely on 
de-contextualized rational argumentation . . . is one we now recognize as a mistaken 
philosophical 'blip' -- it was a rearguard modernist attempt to beat Kant at his own game, to 
reassert the truth of 'theism' according to supposedly universalistic and a-historical canons of 
truth."180  At the same time, however, she argues that “[t]he art of giving a reasoned, 
philosophically-and-scientifically-related, account of the ‘hope that is in us’ in a public space is a 
Christian duty, and it may take a great variety of forms.”181 
Coakley’s methodological proposal entails six related “hallmarks”:  (1) “the rejection of ‘flat-
plane’ foundationalism”; (2) “the resistance to non-realism and the fact/value split”; (3) 
“retrieving creation ex nihilo:  God as Being”; (4) “the rejection of falsely-denuded ‘deism’ and 
‘theism’”; “(5) the alignment of will and reason in response to ‘natural theology’ arguments”; and 
(6) “the spiritual senses and the ascetic capacity to ‘see’ God in the world.”182  Coakley recognizes 
that “both evolutionary theory and Christian theology are founded in irreducible narratives of 
                                                     
176 Ibid., 14. 
177 Ibid., 18 (emphasis in original). 
178 Ibid., 20. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Lecture 6, “Reconceiving ‘Natural Theology’:  Meaning, Sacrifice and God,” available at 
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/gifford/documents/Gifford_Lecture_6_-_lecture_text.pdf, 5-6. 
181 Ibid., 3.  She states further that “this task is not about the soap-box, but it’s not for the faint-hearted or 
defensive either.  It has to be as philosophically and scientifically sophisticated as it is spiritually and theologically 
cogent; in short, it must not merely dazzle; it must truly invite and allure.”  Ibid., 4. 
182 Ibid., 5-15. 
39 
 
unfolding change and movement,” such that neither are totally “objective” or free of context.183  
Nevertheless, Coakley eschews the claim that recognizing our dependence on context renders us 
incapable of reasoned claims about scientific and philosophical realism.184    Such realism, Coakley 
suggests, requires a return to the theological notion of God as Being, which involves more careful 
attention to the question of Divine action.185  Coakley cites Aquinas as a key example of how to 
think about God’s “relation” to the world without engaging in onto-theology or constraining God 
within time as in open theism or process theology.186  To avoid these mistakes, Coakley notes, it 
is essential to make specific doctrinal claims and not merely to argue for a generic kind of 
“theism.”187  In particular, the doctrine of the Trinity and careful attention to Christology are 
essential to Christian claims about Divine action and the purposes of creation.188  Finally, Coakley 
suggests that there is a necessary affective dimension to how (or whether) we “see” God in the 
world and that spiritual and ascetic practices can progressively enable us to see Him better.189 
Throughout her Gifford Lectures, Coakley focuses on the question of extraordinary altruism as 
an application of her method.  She suggests that great moral figures such as Mother Theresa and 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer explode the usual game theoretic categories of “altruism” and “cooperation” 
in ways that suggest something beyond those categories. 190  Such examples, she suggest, have 
“seemingly passed beyond mere cultural evolution and become a manifestation of response to a 
transcendent realm of grace and ‘supernormality’” and ultimately can best be  explained with 
reference to Christology and the hope of the resurrection.191 
8. Radical Orthodoxy’s Critique of the Secular 
 
Like postliberal theology, Radical Orthodoxy seems to bring resources to the faith and science 
conversation that have only recently entered the debate, for example in Conor Cunningham’s 
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Darwin’s Pious Idea, Michael Hanby’s No God, No Science:  Theology, Cosmology, Biology, and 
David Bentley Hart’s The Experience of God:  Being, Consciousness, Bliss.192  One of Radical 
Orthodoxy’s core assertions is that all truth claims are theological – that narratives finally rooted 
in the being of the Triune God will ring true and narratives located elsewhere will ring hollow or 
worse will prove nihilistic.193  In relation to the natural sciences, some thinkers influenced by 
Radical Orthodoxy (such as Cunningham, Hanby, and Hart) accept the basic empirical conclusions 
of the modern natural sciences but argue that the natural sciences themselves make no sense 
except in relation to sound theologies of God, creation and the human person.  In contrast with 
many postliberal theologians, Radical Orthodoxy emphasizes a recovery and revitalization not 
only to the language of premodern faith but also of the metaphysics of the Patristic Christian-
Platonic synthesis. 
Radical Orthodoxy’s intervention into the rhetoric of “theism” and “atheism” in the realms of 
epistemology and politics seems to offer a promising way beyond this looming collapse back into 
fundamentalism.  At first blush, Radical Orthodoxy itself seems like a more sophisticated form of 
fundamentalism (and this is precisely what it is, some of its critics would argue).  Radical 
Orthodoxy insists that there is no neutral “secular” knowledge, that all arguments finally imply 
the metaphysics of being, and that the metaphysics of being are always theological.  The question 
of God cannot be bracketed, set aside, or otherwise avoided.  But the question of “God,” for 
Radical Orthodoxy, is not a broad claim about “theism.”  It is, finally, the question of the Triune 
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God revealed in Jesus Christ.  This is the source of both the “Radical” and the “Orthodoxy” in 
“Radical Orthodoxy.”  “Theism” and “Atheism” are then each seen as sides of the same heterodox 
or heretical coin.  It is not that subjects such as mind, will, consciousness and neuroscience can 
best be explained by the assumption of at least some god.  It is that these phenomena finally only 
can be understood in connection with reference to the ecstatic relationality and unity of the 
Triune God who gives creation as a gift of love, who creates the human person in His own image, 
and who in Christ redeems and fulfills the true nature of humanity. 
It is not always clear, however, when these theological and philosophical claims might dictate or 
at least favor an empirical, propositional assertion at odds with the consensus of the modern 
natural sciences.  As with the other varieties of Christian epistemology introduced above, one of 
the core tensions is whether the Biblical narrative of “Adam and Eve” and the “fall” are in any 
sense “literal.”194  Can Radical Orthodoxy here offer only yet another kind of admixture of fideism 
and rationalism? 
The founding charter for Radical Orthodoxy is John Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory (“TST”), 
which is a sustained critique of the presumed neutrality of the modern social sciences.195  In a 
chapter on “Science, Power, and Reality,” Milbank attempts to distinguish social science, which 
describes human behavior, from natural science.196  Social science, Milbank argues, differs from 
natural science in that “human interaction in all its variety can only be narrated, and not 
explained / understood after the manner of natural science.”197 Milbank’s critique of social 
science sounds like the longstanding argument in the broader academy about whether disciplines 
such as sociology, political science, economics and psychology can truly be considered 
“scientific.”198  He adopts a phenomenological / narratival perspective on persons and cultures:  
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“’Narrating,’” he says, “turns out to be a more basic category than either explanation or 
understanding:  unlike either of these it does not assume particular facts or discrete meanings.  
Neither is it concerned with universal laws, nor universal truths of the spirit.”199  Narrative “is the 
final mode of comprehension of human society,” and “[t]o understand or explain a social 
phenomenon is simply to narrate it….”200   
But this does not only apply to the social sciences.  Even for the natural sciences, Milbank argues, 
“[a]s the phrase ‘natural history’ suggests, natural science does not rid itself of narrative, and 
indeed, it is just as possible to tell a story in which the characters are atoms, plants, animals, or 
quasars, as one where they are human beings.”201  The modern natural sciences have largely lost 
this sense of narrative because of the influence of reductive positivism.202  Citing Paul 
Feyerabend’s Against Method, Milbank notes that the observation of “data” is never a merely 
neutral activity because the act of constructing the context of an observation already requires a 
theoretical structure.203  All data is interpreted and there is no method without theory.   
Therefore, for Milbank, scientific investigation always involves narrative.  Milbank can then set 
aside as pretentious the claim of the modern social sciences to provide an objective, “scientific” 
account of society that atomizes social relations into discrete quantities, which always in the end 
implies relationships of competition and violence.204   And, following Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
account of traditioned inquiry, Milbank can offer an alternative narrative, that of Christian 
charity, in which human society is encompassed in an ontology of relational peace that begins 
with the ecstatic plenitude of the Triune God’s self-giving in creation.205 
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It is unclear precisely how Milbank’s account of the natural sciences in TST contrasts with 
McGrath’s critical realism.  Milbank’s references to the philosophy of science literature are 
extremely limited – in addition to Feyerabend, he refers only to Descartes, Kant, Whewell, Mill, 
Popper and Lakatos (and that all in one sentence!).206  Much of what Milbank says in TST about 
the social and pre-empirical theoretical basis for the conduct and interpretation of experiments 
is entirely consistent with Polanyi’s critically realist personalism, which Polanyi fleshes out it 
much greater detail.  Perhaps there are two basic differences:  (1) Milbank’s narratival approach 
does not accord the sciences a methodologically separate space from theology even at a pre-
integrative level; and (2) Milbank’s approach makes less space – although some space does seem 
to be given – for the alteration of the Christian theological narrative at a higher level of 
integration with discrete truths gleaned from the sciences.  At a basic level, it is a difference 
between an analytic (critical realism) and phenomenological (narrative) frame of reference. 
A more sustained effort to address the natural sciences from a theologian associated with Radical 
Orthodoxy is Conor Cunningham’s Darwin’s Pious Idea (“DPI”).207  Cunningham does not offer an 
explicit methodology for “faith and science” in DPI.   DPI is primarily a critique of materialism and 
the extreme naturalism of contemporary ultra-Darwinists, blended with a critique of scientific 
creationism and Intelligent Design theory.208  Cunningham seeks to demonstrate that each of 
these positions – materialism, extreme naturalism, scientific creationism and ID theory – encode 
common philosophical presumptions that undermine belief not only in the God of traditional 
Christian theology, but also in the ability of human beings to conduct an enterprise such as 
“science.”209  In fact, Cunningham argues, materialism and extreme naturalism make it 
impossible to believe in “human beings” or even in “evolution” itself.210  In contrast, Cunningham 
argues, “orthodox Christianity can offer an account of life and of nature that avoids such 
contemporary nihilism, and in so doing restore our commonsense world, and thus with it the 
possibility of beauty, truth, goodness, and lastly, our belief in evolution.”211  Thus Cunningham’s 
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implicit method is similar to Milbank’s but also diverges from Milbank.  Cunningham argues that 
reductive natural science is descendant of twisted theologies, particularly nominalism, and he 
adopts a metaphysical and phenomenological stance that seeks to demonstrate how Christianity 
not only “out narrates” but also is demonstrably true and necessary over materialism and 
naturalism even with respect to the nature and meaning of biological evolution.212 
Cunningham’s argument in DPI is “theological” throughout, but in the book’s final chapter he 
makes a sustained move towards what the mainstream theology and science literature might call 
“integration.”213  In that chapter, he tackles what many consider to be the central challenge 
proposed by biological evolution to Christianity:  the meaning of “Adam” and the Fall.  For 
mainstream Christian scholars interested in relating some account of Adam and the Fall to 
evolutionary biology, the most common approach is towards a neo-orthodox reading of the 
Biblical text:  the Biblical story of Adam has no referent in natural history and is rather a story of 
“everyman.”214   
Cunningham seems to make a similar move at the outset of this chapter:  he notes that “[m]any 
people believe there has been a cosmic Fall as a result of the ‘sin’ of the first humans, and death 
was a consequence of this supposed Fall.”215  Cunningham refers to Patristic exegesis of the 
Genesis creation accounts, which was far more sophisticated than contemporary “creationist” 
readings, and which emphasized the typological and allegorical senses of the text.216  In this 
reading, the Biblical story of Adam and the Fall is in fact the story not of a discrete moment in 
time that concerned a historical ancient human being who sinned, but rather it is the story of 
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Christ.217  The account of the “Garden” is not of a literal ideal state existing in the past, but rather 
is a form of eschatology as protology:  human beings are made for union with God, yet we each 
experience disunion in our concrete circumstances.  As Cunningham argues, 
Salvation is therefore true hominization, and thus real humanism:  
man becomes man only in Christ. 
A logical but sometimes overlooked consequence of this is that 
there is, in truth, only one Adam.  By contrast, the entire idea of 
the Fall (original sin, etc.) is premised by the assumption that there 
could be more than one Adam.  Yet Christ himself is the two trees 
in the Garden of Eden, while our sin and fallenness consist in every 
attempt, even as a possibility, to be human outside Christ.  Genesis, 
we contend, is nothing less than a prophecy of the incarnation and 
passion of the Christ.218 
The Fall, then, is felix culpa:  “[y]es, creation was intended to be perfect, and this eternal intention 
is its true nature; but God’s foreknowledge of man’s sin eschatologically ordered creation toward 
Christ and thus to perfection.”219 
Although this reading sounds neo-orthodox on the surface, Cunningham resists the kind of 
dualism that would render “Adam” and “the Fall” merely in nominalist or Pelagian terms for a 
passing emotion that might be overcome through education or effort.  The problem with such 
nominalist or Pelagian renderings is that they posit a stark dualism between “nature” and “grace” 
that cannot be maintained.220  Following Henri de Lubac, Cunningham argues that there is no 
pure nature (natura pura), no space in which “nature” is not also already given as “grace.”221  
Thus each “natural” human being also already participates in grace, in the “supernatural.”  And 
thus the participation of the entire human family in the sin of Adam, as well as the universal 
efficacy of the salvation made possible in Christ, are not merely individual instances of isolated 
experience, but involve the transcendence of human nature, which is given in creation.222  The 
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apex of creation, the concrete realization of nature-and-grace and natural-and-supernatural is 
Christ.223  It is only, then, in Christ that we are even capable of seeing “Adam.”224 
9. Towards An Integrated Methodological Perspective 
 
I am unconvinced by approaches to “theology and science” that represent extremes, either in 
declaring a “war” between theology and science (as in materialistic atheism, young earth 
creationism, and some forms of Reformed presuppositionalism) or in merging theology and 
science as in process theology.  I am likewise unconvinced by “NOMA” approaches that cabin 
“theological” and “scientific” thought into discrete categories, usually resulting in the 
marginalization of theology.  Integrative approaches represented by Alister McGrath’s “critical 
realism” or John Paul II’s “fides et ratio” are more compelling, and perhaps represent the best 
kind of analytic method.  But such analytic methods, reflecting their debt to Anglo-American 
analytic philosophy, can leave us intellectually and spiritually deracinated.  The truth, we suspect, 
cannot so easily be broken into discrete analytic units, even if that sort of analytic process often 
yields important insights into our mental biases and limitations. 
The strong integrationist program represented by process theology is in some ways appealing.  It 
does take seriously the claims of the natural sciences.  However, the way in which process 
theology tends to envision the “soul” as coincident with the universe itself as a conscious entity, 
perhaps as the conscious entity, finally strays far afield from the claims and methods of 
contemporary natural science.  Although even some materialists explain will and consciousness 
as emergent properties of the lower order realities of physical laws, they would not ascribe some 
super-added metaphysical status to those emergent properties.225   It is unclear, then, whether 
process theology really integrates theology and science or whether process theology is at best 
compatible with some emergentist perspectives within the natural sciences. 
Process theology also takes very seriously the problem of evil and the problem of creaturely 
freedom.  Perhaps what the world religions have traditionally thought of as “God” is also an 
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emergent property of the physical universe.  Perhaps the physical universe itself is “alive,” a 
growing consciousness in which we each, in our own small way, are a part, and which as a whole 
is expanding towards its own universal omega point.  Perhaps the suffering of the world, our 
suffering, is neither meaningless nor tied up with an inscrutable and arbitrary Providence, but 
rather is the birth pang of a universal mind, a “God” if we wish to use that term, in the process 
of its own delivery, a new, whole, fresh, unblemished child.226  There are obvious similarities here 
to some articulations of Christian eschatology, particularly among the Greek Fathers, but there 
are also echoes of other religious and theological traditions – Gnosticism, Hinduism, Buddhism, 
and some strains of Jewish and Islamic thought.  Wouldn’t this reflect another advantage over 
Christian theological orthodoxy?  Would some kind of universal process theology built on 
emergent naturalism permit the world’s religions finally to coexist in peace?  While this sounds 
like a promising new line of questioning rooted in innovative concepts of emergence, it is rooted 
in pre-Christian Platonism, and it suffers from the same defects as pre-Christian Platonism.  
Among the most basic of those defects is the question of “justice” and the related questions of 
“law” and “persons.”   
There is something compelling, of course, in the notion that human suffering is not without 
purpose, that our suffering is contributing to the birth of something better.  But that might be 
little relief to the person who pauses to reflect on the fact that he or she will know nothing of 
this, will receive no personal justice or benefit aside from perhaps some present psychic comfort.  
The countless masses whose heads were blown apart by Nazi pistols or who choked on Zyklon B, 
who were forced to kneel before Cambodian machine guns or were sliced by Rwandan hatchets, 
who were seared by American Napalm or vaporized by silent killer drones, along with every other 
person whose sufferings might have been greater or smaller – were they just the compost that 
feeds the sprouting Great Emergent Mind, a science-fiction answer to the questions of 
Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor?   
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Even the small present consolation of knowing that one is at least serving as compost requires 
some sense of certainty about the future’s outcome.  If emergence is the best hope, it is a frail 
hope, and really no hope at all.  An emergent process by definition is uncertain.  Emergence can 
only happen out of chaos.  It is precisely the stochastic nature of the most basic level of physical 
reality – that of quantum physics – that might allow undetermined, supervenient realities to 
emerge.  This is the difference between the Newtonian universe and the Einsteinian:  Einstein 
(via Heisenberg) makes room for uncertainty.  This uncertainty means that the universe’s omega 
point might not be anything we would consider “good” at all. The emerging universal mind might 
be a fiery consuming monster.  In fact, uncertainty means there can be no omega point.  An 
omega point, a final end, would entail a certain end.  The Canaanite Leviathan, the beast that 
emerges from of the primordial waters of chaos to swallow the world, cannot be tamed with 
hooks.  (Cf. Job 41.)  The Leviathan is without justice and without law. 
Further, process theology’s representation of the classical view of God’s perfections in relation 
to creation ex nihilo and creaturely freedom tends towards parody and straw man claims.  It is 
unclear, for example, who comprises the Christians referenced by Epperly who “believe that God 
has directed the course of the universe from the very beginning, determining every detail without 
creaturely input.”227  In his Guide for the Perplexed on process theology, Epperly uses popular 
evangelical preacher Rick Warren’s reference to God’s providence in Warren’s popular book A 
Purpose Driven Life as representative of the classical view.228 To suggest that Warren lacks the 
sophistication of Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Aquinas or Barth on these problems is more than 
an understatement, and Warren himself would not argue otherwise.   
Among more significant representatives of the Christian tradition, perhaps some versions of 
Calvinism or Jansenism would frame this sort of statement, but orthodox Christian theology has 
always recognized creaturely freedom, and particularly human moral freedom, within the ambit 
of God’s providence and in response to God’s grace.  Classical Christian orthodoxy is not 
deterministic fatalism.  Indeed the Second Council of Orange, though it condemned semi-
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Pelagianism, nevertheless held that human beings can participate or not participate in God’s 
grace:   “We not only do not believe that any are foreordained to evil by the power of God, but 
even state with utter abhorrence that if there are those who want to believe so evil a thing, they 
are anathema.”229  For example, the Catechism of the Catholic Church today states that 
“[f]reedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, and so 
to perform deliberate actions on one's own responsibility. By free will one shapes one's own life. 
Human freedom is a force for growth and maturity in truth and goodness; it attains its perfection 
when directed toward God, our beatitude.”230  The Catechism further states that  
The grace of Christ is not in the slightest way a rival of our freedom 
when this freedom accords with the sense of the true and the good 
that God has put in the human heart. On the contrary, as Christian 
experience attests especially in prayer, the more docile we are to 
the promptings of grace, the more we grow in inner freedom and 
confidence during trials, such as those we face in the pressures and 
constraints of the outer world. By the working of grace the Holy 
Spirit educates us in spiritual freedom in order to make us free 
collaborators in his work in the Church and in the world….231 
The Catechism therefore concludes that “[t]he right to the exercise of freedom, especially in 
religious and moral matters, is an inalienable requirement of the dignity of man.”232    It seems, 
then, that process theology is overstating a case against a mythical opponent.  In the end, the 
“God” of process theology, as well as its vision of the human “soul,” tends to devolve into a kind 
of pantheistic spiritualism that ultimately vindicates neither contemporary science nor natural 
theology.   
Critical realism as a model for interaction between theology and science seems far more 
promising than process theology.  Unlike NOMA approaches, critical realism does not 
hermetically seal the boundary between “science” and “religion.”  Critical realism does not 
represent a Kantian move in which religious or moral feeling is cordoned off from “pure reason,” 
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and this is a genuine advance over the Kantian bent of much of the modern scientific 
establishment – as evidenced, for example, in the National Academies of Science statement on 
NOMA quoted previously.  Moreover, critical realism creates genuine space for theological 
reform and development when certain theological claims plainly clash with reality.  Without 
some space in which the observations of the natural sciences can influence theology, it is 
impossible to avoid the intellectual and moral disaster of fundamentalist systems such as young 
earth creationism.  Certainly, if we seek to be faithful to the spirit of the Church Fathers, we will 
want to do theology with a keen eye towards the creation as it is given to us.233 
However, within critical realism, the interaction between the two disciplines of science and 
theology tends to be pictured as happening only at a higher level of integration.  In this way, a 
kind of modest foundationalism underpins the entire project, even though many critical realists, 
including McGrath, strongly eschew foundationalism.  This hidden modest foundationalism 
establishes the boundaries in which the theological and scientific disciplines do their own original 
work and in which any integrative work happens.  But if the Christian confession truly is “realist,” 
then there can be no autonomous space for a “science” that is not already “theological” in what 
it presumes about the nature of the universe, and there can be no neutral rule of correspondence 
that would adjudicate “between” theology and science.   
Indeed, McGrath’s own effort at constructing a natural theology is expressly non-foundationalist 
and presumes as a first principle “that the logos through which the world was created is 
embedded in the structures of the created order, above all the human person, and incarnated in 
Christ.”234  Natural theology, for McGrath, is not an effort to obtain neutrally rational “proofs” of 
God’s existence, but rather to demonstrate “that there is an accumulation of considerations 
which, though not constituting logical proof (how could experience prove anything in such a 
way?), is at the very least consistent with the existence of a creator God.”235  Nevertheless, two 
basic questions linger:  (1) from the perspective of Christian theology itself, does critical realism 
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envision a sufficiently theological account of “reason” that enables “natural science” in the first 
instance?; and (2) does critical realism propose an understanding of “nature” that resembles a 
kind of natura pura – a realm of pure nature that is not also already a realm of grace? 
This reference to “nature” and “grace” highlights the potential distinction between McGrath’s 
critical realism and some Roman Catholic perspectives:  in particular, what should we make of 
the analogia entis?  The subtle difference between this Roman Catholic vision as expressed by 
John Paul II and McGrath’s more Reformed-oriented critical realism mirrors, in interesting ways, 
the dialogue between the two great Swiss theologians who continue to inform many of the 
differences between broadly Catholic and broadly Protestant approaches to natural theology:  
Barth and Balthasar.236  The modified, qualified critically realist natural theology of Protestant 
thinkers such as T.F. Torrance and McGrath, who take their initial cues from Barth, is perhaps 
more cautious about the analogia entis, and therefore ends up with an integration of faith and 
reason only after a somewhat prolonged process of methodological separation.237   A Catholic 
thinker such as John Paul II might more readily see analogical correspondences between God and 
nature.   
Nevertheless, for a Catholic thinker such as John Paul II, even if, as Balthasar argued, “[n]ature 
cannot include grace at one moment and then exclude it the next,” grace cannot be “necessarily 
derived” from nature, and the use of Aristotelian terminology to describe the movement of the 
creature towards the goal of the beatific vision as a sort of “natural” movement is only 
analogical.238  Balthasar went so far as to argue that Barth’s rejection of natural theology and the 
analogia entis, if properly understood, was consistent with the decrees of the First Vatican 
Council on natural knowledge of God, again if properly understood.239  And, similarly, the 
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Protestant critical realist McGrath approvingly refers to Erich Przywara’s concept of the analogia 
entis as a model for the construction of natural theology.240  If there are differences between 
critical realist and specifically Roman Catholic models for the interaction between theology and 
science, in many cases those differences may be passingly small. 
These considerations suggest that a critical realist stance with an appropriately modulated 
understanding of the analogia entis could represent a robust, ecumenical way forward.  Indeed, 
I think that is correct.  Nevertheless, while the Protestant critical realist and Roman Catholic “fides 
et ratio” models present careful methodologies, they often are unclear on questions of particular 
application, not least in connection with areas of significant potential tension, such as the 
doctrines of Divine sovereignty, human uniqueness and the Fall.  I seek a method that does not 
suggest such basic truths could be overwritten by “natural” science. 
In response to these problems, in the vein of Reformed presuppositionalism and Reformed 
epistemology, it is tempting seek to assert the epistemological primacy of belief, and specifically 
of belief in a God possessing the attributes of classical theism.  From this primary belief, other 
primary beliefs may follow, including belief in the reliability of special revelation in the Bible as 
well as belief in the more general regularity of creation, or “general revelation,” tempered by 
belief in sinful humanity’s capacities for self-deception.  If such theological beliefs are primary, 
then apparent conflicts between “science” and “faith” might be resolved by a model that admits 
a degree of conflict at these difficult tension points, even as it still tries to retain some confidence 
in “general revelation.”     
The significant critique of this approach is that, while it might deliver an internally coherent world 
view, it cannot guarantee that any such world view actually corresponds to reality.  It produces, 
at best, a chain of circular reasoning in which an antecedent is supposedly proven merely by 
showing its consistency with consequent propositions that assume the antecedent – in other 
words, it commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent.  Sophisticated Reformed 
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epistemologists such as Alvin Plantinga respond that they are not committing this fallacy because 
basic belief in God is known through revelation and faith, not through argument.  The purpose of 
the argument is to show that there are no “defeaters,” no fundamental logical inconsistencies, 
in holding the basic belief in God.  But Plantinga also notes that in the Christian theology tradition 
faith is associated with a form of “certainty,” and consistent with his Reformed heritage he 
understands that “certainty” to reside in the internal witness of the Holy Spirit and not in other 
kinds of proofs.  Given the certain witness of the Holy Spirit, it is unclear why a Christian should 
be concerned about chains of reasoning that eliminate potential “defeaters.”  The certain 
testimony of the Holy Spirit should be indefeasible; if it is defeasible, it is not certain.  Plantinga’s 
response is that the apologetic exercise of removing potential defeaters is helpful to us in the 
human weakness and sin that can often obscure the Holy Spirit’s witness. 
An additional and perhaps more significant problem with Plantinga's approach is that, like naïve 
foundationalism, it can tend towards ontotheology.  “Ontotheology,” a term coined by 
Heidegger, is the notion that God is like any other being in the universe. 241  The problem of 
ontotheology is particularly acute in “theology and science” discourse precisely at the point 
addressed most directly by Plantinga:  that of Divine action and providence.  Consider, for 
example, a typical statement of God’s action in the Psalm 135:  “He makes clouds rise from the 
ends of the earth; he sends lightning with the rain and brings out the wind from his 
storehouses.”242  It is an obvious mistake to conclude the God is literally sitting at the “ends of 
the earth” pushing around the storm clouds with a giant God-finger.  The fact that we can 
understand the natural processes that give rise to thunderstorms – and that even Google Earth 
fails to reveal God pushing them around – does not falsify Psalm 135.  When Psalm 135 says God 
causes the thunderstorms, we know this entails a kind of causation that differs from the natural 
causes of thunderstorms, and that these different levels of causality are not incompatible.   
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Aquinas spoke of these different levels of causality in Aristotelian terms as “primary” and 
“secondary.”243  Plantinga speaks of what he calls an “Aquinas/Calvin Model” of knowledge and 
warrant, but he does not seem to appreciate how Aquinas speaks of Divine action or of the ways 
in which Aquinas and Calvin might relate or differ on this point.244  And when Plantinga offers the 
Heidelberg Catechism as a statement of what Christian theists believe about God’s action in 
creation, he does not seem to appreciate the subtle but significant debates about God’s 
providence in relation to creaturely freedom that wound through both the Magesterial 
Reformation and the Catholic divisions over Jansenism and the very different perspectives of the 
Eastern Church.  Plantinga’s lack of depth on this difficult theological question seems to leave 
him without resources for thinking about Divine action much beyond the flat perspectives of a 
kind of modern ontotheology.  The same problem affects other points at which Plantinga, in some 
of his other work, significantly modifies the classical understanding of God’s perfections that was 
(I would argue) shared by Aquinas and Calvin:  that God in esse is simple and impassible.245 
While Plantinga’s contributions to epistemology and theology and science are helpful in 
demonstrating the priority of faith, then, they ironically fail to follow through with the Christian 
theological claim that God is the transcendent creator and cause of all that is, not a part of 
creation.  However we try to conceive of and describe God’s action in originating and sustaining 
the creation, or the possibility of miracles, or God’s “emotional” connection to the creation, we 
must maintain the absolute distinction between God and creation, or else our project will 
collapse.  For this reason, Plaintinga’s focus on “design” arguments ultimately is misplaced.   
On the question of teleology and “design,” Coakley’s methodology holds greater promise 
because it explicitly refuses onto-theology and asserts the irreducible importance of the 
doctrines of Trinity, creation, incarnation and resurrection.  Indeed, I agree with every “hallmark” 
of Coakley’s method.  But Coakley’s application of the method to “supernormal” altruism is 
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problematic.  The most significant problem is the issue of what “normal” or “supernormal” could 
mean in the context of evolution.  As I will explore more fully in Chapter 4.4, “normal” in 
evolutionary terms is only a statistical description, which changes not only over time but across 
fitness landscapes.  The fact that there are some outliers – individuals who are extraordinarily 
altruistic in comparison to the mean (Mother Theresa), or extraordinarily selfish (Adolf Hitler) – 
is in itself neither remarkable nor particularly significant in relation to the total “n” of the sample 
size, which must include every human who ever has lived.  But Coakley hints at what I believe is 
more significant:  the more “normal” phenomenon of the law as an irreducibly transcendent and 
unique component of human “nature.”  As Coakley notes, there is a growing sense even among 
non-religious analytic philosophers that “balefully reductionistic moves in science, economics, 
public policy and the law” foreclose reasoned inquiry and argument, and a commitment to 
theoretic and ethical realism require some meaningful concept of “natural law.”246  I agree with 
Coakley that Aristotle and Aquinas, among others, are fruitful sources for bringing realism about 
natural law into conversation with evolutionary science, particularly, as Coakley suggests, in 
connection with neo-Aristotelian philosophy of science.247  But my focus on “law,” rather than 
on “supernormal” altruism, comports better with Coakley’s (and Aquinas’) own methodological 
preference for avoiding the use of theology as an outlier or afterthought.  Theology best explains 
what is “normal,” not only what is superadded to “nature.” 
In this regard, Milbank’s approach in TST is attractive for a number of reasons.  First, it deflates 
the presumed historic warfare between “faith” and “science” by offering a holistic account of 
“reason” that is already embedded in the Christian tradition.  There is no possibility of “conflict” 
between “faith” and “science” here because those terms simply have no meaning in isolation.  
There is, rather, a grand narrative of God’s self-giving creative love, which allows for human 
beings as creatures to observe and study and delight in the creation.  Second, it exposes the 
pretentions of reductive positivistic “science” as itself a kind of a-theology, with pre-empirical 
theoretical commitments not derived from its own supposedly objective methods.  Finally, it 
points toward a different form of apologetic in which the Christian narrative is offered in the 
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robust sense of a true apologia rather than as an “apology” before the bar of a totalizing 
modernity.248 
A potential problem with Milbank’s approach is evident in his reference to Feyerabend.  Like 
other constructivist philosophers of science, Feyerabend was an anti-realist and a nominalist.249  
Milbank’s theological project and the broader “Radical Orthodoxy,” movement it spawned, of 
course, involves a sustained historical critique of the univocity of being, nominalism, and 
voluntarism.250  While postmodern philosophers of science such as Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn 
offer helpful resources concerning the social context of the natural sciences, their conclusions 
are finally incompatible with a realist participatory ontology grounded in the Christian doctrine 
of creation.  It remains unclear how Milbank’s “narrative” construal of the natural sciences in TST 
can cohere with his and Radical Orthodoxy’s other broad commitments.251 
In this regard, while outside the peculiar milieu of conservative Evangelical Protestantism and 
the American legal system it might be easy to dismiss YECism as a distracting sideshow, 
contemporary YECism presents a more subtle epistemological challenge for any Christian 
theologian who seeks to understand the catholic (that is, “universal” in the general sense) 
Christian tradition in relation to the modern natural sciences.  Christian thinkers who reject 
YECism and accept the broad scientific consensus about the age of the universe and biological 
evolution usually insist that “evolution” is not the same thing as “evolutionism” or “scientism” – 
that is, that the empirical truths of the natural sciences do not entail commitment to a worldview 
in which these empirical facts preclude the possibility of God and of some more or less traditional 
Christian theological claims about providence, the possibility of miracles, original sin, the 
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inspiration of scripture, and so-on.252  This argument is not often well examined by its 
proponents, but when it is carefully examined, it focuses on epistemology.  Often the question is 
framed in terms of whether some form of positivism is true or whether, instead, some framework 
of belief must be prior to empiricism.  The difficult problem is that savvy YEC advocates make 
precisely the same move.  They further argue, however, that the literal inerrancy of the Bible is 
a valid and indeed essential aspect of this prior framework of epistemic belief.   
Thus the immensely popular YEC apologists and Creation Museum founder Ken Hamm always 
begins his debates (which are often offered as spectacles for consumption by church and school 
groups) with epistemological arguments.  “How do you know life arose through natural processes 
billions of years ago?,” Hamm asks his interlocutor.  “Were you there?”  He concludes with the 
coup de grâce:  “I know someone who was there, and he wrote about it in his book, and he says 
it didn’t happen that way.”253  While this is phrased with the flair of a practiced showman, it does 
imply an epistemology that is not too far removed seemingly more sophisticated postmodern 
and postliberal epistemologies.  Indeed, Hamm does not hesitate to remind us that “there are no 
pre-theoretical facts” and that “all facts are interpreted.”  The essential point is that beliefs about 
God and revelation can and should come before, supply the parameters of, and establish the 
interpretive matrix for empirical observations.  For Hamm, this means that the gap between 
“uniformitarian” science and YECism at first more of a small shift in perception than a massive 
rejection of modern science.  “Just assume for a moment,” Hamm would say, “that God exists, 
that He revealed Himself to us in the Bible and that the Bible really is true.  Could what we observe 
in nature make sense given those assumptions?”  “Yes,” Hamm would answer this question, “and 
in fact our observations would make even more sense!  Which seems more likely:  that the Grand 
Canyon began as a tiny stream trickling over solid rock over millions and millions of years, or that 
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it was produced by the worldwide flood in the days of Noah, which the Bible says cracked open 
the very foundations of the Earth?” 
We might not possess Hamm’s rhetorical talents, but we might with some discomfort hear 
ourselves making the same kind of argument:  which seems more likely, that what we have 
thought of for millennia as the human “mind” and “consciousness” and “will” are merely 
epiphenomena of a finally deterministic pattern of firing neurons, or that institutions like “the 
law” really represent the actions of free moral agents who are created in the image of and 
accountable to God?  It is simply a matter of one’s pre-empirical frame of reference.  If we assume 
naturalism, then we will interpret the findings of the neurosciences as empirical confirmation of 
the intuition that matter is all there is.  If we assume “theism,” then we will minimize the findings 
of the neurosciences or find ways to accommodate them into a “theistic” framework.  If we 
assume Christian orthodoxy, then we may simply explain “science” away as a narrative. 
This line of thought inevitably comes back around to the question of fides et ratio:  is the role of 
reason at most supportive of the inner witness of the faith prompted by the Holy Spirit, or can 
reason alone – “natural reason”  in the language of the First Vatican Council – demonstrate the 
existence of the creator God?  “Continental” and postliberal theologies that offer 
phenomenological perspectives on “faith and science” are helpful at this point, because such 
perspectives ask us what we mean by “reason.”  If “reason” entails the study of the whole 
structure of experience and consciousness, and cannot be reduced to the logic of propositional 
claims, then the supposed gap between the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit and other kinds of 
arguments may close.254  “Faith” and “reason” then are not different ways of knowing.  “Faith” 
always entails “reason” and “reason” always entails “faith.”   
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In terms of “faith and science,” a phenomenological approach would not break reality down into 
discrete units such as “evolution” and “the Fall” and then seek to explain the apparent 
contradictions between those concepts through ever finer Scholastic distinctions.  Such an 
approach would take reality as a whole, as it presents itself to us, including the reality presented 
to us through revelation and the Holy Spirit, and recognize that it is both multifaceted and 
ultimately coherent.  Indeed, the claim that creation is both “good” (implying that it is intelligible, 
beautiful, meaningful, and so-on) and “fallen” (implying that it entails death, decay and 
dissolution not inherent to its created goodness) reflects our common human experience of a 
world that is so often heartbreaking because its loveliness is glimpsed only through great pain.   
Conor Cunningham’s phenomenological reading of evolutionary biology, for example, is 
powerful, and his use of Patristic sources to narrate the Christian vision as it is both protologically 
and eschatologically centered in Christ is compelling.  There is some ambiguity, however, in the 
shape Cunningham provides that narrative at one of its most sensitive points:  the question of 
“Adam.”  Cunningham does not intend to deny the reality of Adam.  Nevertheless, most of 
Cunningham’s Patristic sources of Biblical interpretation are Eastern, and most of the 
contemporary interpreters of those sources upon whom he draws are Eastern Orthodox.255  
Indeed, he quotes Orthodox scholar Peter Bouteneff, who argues (along with many 
contemporary historical-critical exegetes of all theological stripes) that “[n]either in Paul nor in 
the rest of the Bible is there a doctrine of original guilt, wherein all are proleptically guilty in 
Adam.”256  This seems a bit tendentious, as the understanding of “original sin” – and the 
reception of Augustine, notably in regard to “original sin” – remains one of the key sticking points 
between the Christian East and West.257   
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Cunningham makes an oblique reference to this difference in a footnote:  “Yes, in the West, 
Fathers such as Augustine seem to emphasize the Fall, the advent of evil, and so on.”258  However, 
says Cunningham, “it is important to realize that Augustine, for example, developed his notion of 
original sin in a very particular context, namely, the Donatist controversy, and the Pelagian one.  
So it was to this degree polemical.”259  But it is unclear whether this contextualization of 
Augustine can do all the work Cunningham assigns to it, at least not for the Western theological 
tradition.  As late as 1950, for example, Pope Pius XII’s Encyclical Humani Generis responded to 
the developing science of human evolution with an insistence on a literal individual Adam, tied 
to an Augustinian doctrine of original sin: 
For the faithful cannot embrace that opinion which maintains that 
either after Adam there existed on this earth true men who did not 
take their origin through natural generation from him as from the 
first parent of all, or that Adam represents a certain number of first 
parents. Now it is in no way apparent how such an opinion can be 
reconciled with that which the sources of revealed truth and the 
documents of the Teaching Authority of the Church propose with 
regard to original sin, which proceeds from a sin actually 
committed by an individual Adam and which, through generation, 
is passed on to all and is in everyone as his own.260 
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Pope Pius seemed to tie this conclusion to what sounds like a fundamentalist-creationist reading 
of scripture: 
To return, however, to the new opinions mentioned above, a 
number of things are proposed or suggested by some even against 
the divine authorship of Sacred Scripture. For some go so far as to 
pervert the sense of the Vatican Council's definition that God is 
the author of Holy Scripture, and they put forward again the 
opinion, already often condemned, which asserts that immunity 
from error extends only to those parts of the Bible that treat of 
God or of moral and religious matters. They even wrongly speak 
of a human sense of the Scriptures, beneath which a divine sense, 
which they say is the only infallible meaning, lies hidden…..   
Further, according to their fictitious opinions, the literal sense of 
Holy Scripture and its explanation, carefully worked out under the 
Church's vigilance by so many great exegetes, should yield now to 
a new exegesis, which they are pleased to call symbolic or 
spiritual. By means of this new exegesis of the Old Testament, 
which today in the Church is a sealed book, would finally be 
thrown open to all the faithful. By this method, they say, all 
difficulties vanish, difficulties which hinder only those who adhere 
to the literal meaning of the Scriptures.261 
To be sure, the Catholic Catechism after the Second Vatican Council seems to sound a more 
cautious note concerning the different senses of scripture and its interpretation.262  Pope 
Benedict XVI, in a set of homilies on the Biblical creation texts, agreed with the Patristic sources 
cited by Cunningham that “the biblical creation narratives represent another way of speaking 
about reality than that with which we are familiar from physics and biology.”263  These texts, Pope 
Benedict said, “do not depict the process of becoming or the mathematical structure of matter; 
instead, they say in different ways that there is only one God and that the universe is not the 
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scene of a struggle among dark forces but rather the creation of his Word.”264  Concerning 
“original sin,” Benedict took a “relational” approach to the doctrine.265  For Benedict,  
[t]o be truly a human being means to be related in love, to be of 
and be for.  But sin means the damaging or destruction of 
relationality.  Sin is a rejection of relationality because it wants to 
make the human being a god.  Sin is loss of relationship, 
disturbance of relationship, and therefore it is not restricted to the 
individual.  When I destroy a relationship then this event – sin – 
touches the other person involved in the relationship.  
Consequently sin is always an offense that touches others, that 
alters the world and damages it.  To the extent that is true, when 
the network of human relationships is damaged from the very 
beginning, then every human being enters into a world that is 
marked by relational damage.266 
 
This approach to original sin seems a far cry from the seeming Biblical fundamentalism and 
Augustinian realism of Humani Generis.  Nevertheless, the Catechism continues to affirm that the 
Fall and original sin have a historical referent in time:  “The account of the fall in Genesis 3 uses 
figurative language, but affirms a primeval event, a deed that took place at the beginning of the 
history of man. Revelation gives us the certainty of faith that the whole of human history is 
marked by the original fault freely committed by our first parents.”267  The Catechism further 
refers to the transmission of original sin by propagation:   
the transmission of original sin is a mystery that we cannot fully 
understand. But we do know by Revelation that Adam had received 
original holiness and justice not for himself alone, but for all human 
nature. By yielding to the tempter, Adam and Eve committed a 
personal sin, but this sin affected the human nature that they 
would then transmit in a fallen state.  It is a sin which will be 
transmitted by propagation to all mankind, that is, by the 
transmission of a human nature deprived of original holiness and 
justice. And that is why original sin is called "sin" only in an 
analogical sense: it is a sin "contracted" and not "committed" - a 
state and not an act.268 
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This trepidation about the role of Adam is also evident in conservative evangelical and Reformed 
protestant thought, even outside the confines of literalistic fundamentalism.  For example, in a 
recent book on “Adam, the Fall, and Original Sin,” within a generally thoughtful collection of 
essays by evangelical and Reformed scholars, the author of a chapter on the science of human 
evolution felt compelled to publish pseudonymously, no doubt for fear of his position at an 
evangelical or Reformed school.269  In a thoughtful essay in that same volume Hans Madueme 
lays out the problem and offers some possible solutions.270  Like Pope Pius in relation to Catholic 
theology, Madueme argues that a literal Adam and a literal fall are essential to Reformed 
orthodoxy.271 
Thus, it is unclear whether Cunningham’s effort to employ a phenomenological method that 
exceeds the limits of both the ultra-Darwinists and the creationists succeeds.  Perhaps it succeeds 
if one opts for an Eastern Orthodox account of the Fall and original sin that draws primarily on 
some of the Eastern Fathers, or for a neo-orthodox account that views Adam and the Fall as 
entirely non-historical (as does, for example, David Kelsey).  But, it seems, the scientific 
understanding of biological stands in considerable tension with the Western-Augustinian 
Christian tradition, as evidenced in documents such as Humani Generis and the Catholic 
Catechism as well as in contemporary conservative Reformed theologians who continue to insist 
that a “literal” Adam is essential to Christian theology.272   
Perhaps another of Cunningham’s comments towards the end of the final chapter of DPI hints at 
a solution, or at least at a way of managing some of these tensions:  “We all stand before the law; 
such is the lot of man.”273  As Cunningham notes, “even if we know of laws, we don’t think they 
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are the Law but are rather somewhat arbitrary – cultural products, or fruits of evolution, and 
therefore relative.”274  Indeed, “in the Judeo-Christian tradition there was a time before the Law 
of Moses, a time before the Decalogue.”275   Yet, he continues, “from the time of Adam, there 
was prohibition.”276  Perhaps “the Law” is the “missing link” between Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, 
and Augustine, the methodological basis for narrating the true harmony of “faith” and “science.”  
As Pope Benedict suggested, perhaps the loss of relational friendship occasioned by the Fall is 
precisely the loss of the Law, and perhaps Christ’s fulfillment of the Law is what enables us to 
overcome the ban of exclusion from our humanity and recover our participation in the law of 
love.  “Law” might be the thread by which Christian theology “out-narrates” and out-argues 
reductive naturalism in a rich tapestry of human culture that participates in God’s gracious gift 
of creation and redemption.     
Traditional Christian (and Jewish and Islamic) theology asserts that God has revealed Himself to 
specific individuals at unique moments in history, and that these moments of revelation can 
establish a new elect people and by extension a new relationship between God and humanity:  
the covenant with Noah, the call of Abraham, Moses at the burning bush and his receipt of the 
Torah, the anointing of David, the baptism of Jesus, the conversion of the Apostle Paul.  There 
was also such a moment of revelation to “Adam:”  when God disclosed to humanity the law of 
the two trees in the Garden.  This act of God’s self-disclosure, I argue, is an important part of 
what sets Adam apart from the broader stream of human biological evolution.  Based on what 
we know about neural plasticity and epigenetic inheritance, we might even suggest that this 
encounter subtly but profoundly changed us biologically, even if Adam and his heirs undoubtedly 
remained embedded in the genetic flow among other contemporary homo sapiens, homo 
neanderthalis, and perhaps other species.277 
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As John Milbank notes in his most recent work, modernity tends to view “law” as Leviathan:  a 
form of repression against our “true” animal nature.278  Law can, of course, be repressive if it is 
not rooted in justice.  But law as law is essential to freedom.  Law sets the conditions for freedom.  
Indeed, the universe itself requires “law” as a condition of its existence.  The “laws of nature” 
might represent the most basic potentials of being and existence.279  We could even speak of a 
sort of “law” through which the most basic potentials of the being and existence of God can be 
expressed:  the “law” of inner-Trinitarian relations.  If each of the three persons of the Trinity is 
uniquely a “person,” as orthodoxy holds, then there are “boundaries” to each of their 
personhood.  Likewise, if each of the three persons of the Trinity interpenetrate each other and 
are of one substance, as orthodoxy also holds, then there is a “boundary” to their unity.  This is, 
of course, an analogical use of the term “law,” and we must not think of this sort of “law” as an 
imposition upon the being of God.  Rather, these “laws” comprise a set of relationships that 
proceed from the being of God.280  As such, they are an essential aspect of God’s self-donation in 
creation, and comprise the most basic potentials of creation itself.  At its heart this law is the law 
of ecstatic, self-giving love.  The most basic law of “nature,” and the most basic law of “politics,” 
is the law of love. 
The argument I am foreshadowing here could be considered a variant of the “moral argument” 
for God’s existence.281  I wish to distance myself somewhat from such arguments, however, in 
that they tend to argue from the phenomenon of an intuitive “moral sense” in humans to God’s 
existence as the source of that intuition.  My claim is more “Augustinian” – and, I would suggest, 
more fully “Thomistic” – than most contemporary versions of the moral argument.  It is not so 
much our knowledge of objective moral truth that points toward God, but our knowledge that 
we are separated from the final, objective truth towards which our moral inclinations pull us:  
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that is, towards God, who is love.  Moreover, it is in understanding this lack that we truly begin 
to know ourselves both as adamah and as “in Adam.”282  One important way in which we can 
know our sense of lack in this regard is real comes from God’s disclosure of the positive law in 
the Divine command and in the uniquely human practice of formulating codes of positive law.  
This way of framing the moral claim, I argue, is more consistent with the historic, orthodox 
Christian tradition than many modern formulations.  Indeed, it is precisely the claim made by St. 
Paul in his letter to the Romans: 
Therefore, just as through one man sin entered into the world, and 
death through sin, and so death spread to all men, because all 
sinned—for until the Law sin was in the world, but sin is not 
imputed when there is no law. Nevertheless death reigned from 
Adam until Moses, even over those who had not sinned in the 
likeness of the offense of Adam, who is a type of Him who was to 
come.283 
But if the phenomenon of “law” can be reduced to neurobiology, as some neurolaw scholars 
argue, this story loses all purchase.  If “law” is a phenomenon of human experience that shows 
how humans are related to a transcendent source, I can extend Cunningham’s argument about 
why Christian theology and biological evolution are compatible, and indeed about why evolution 
is impossible without God.  If “law” is merely an epiphenomenon of neurobiology, I have no 
argument.  The remaining chapters of this Dissertation attempt to show why “law” cannot be 
reduced to mere neurolaw, why this impossibility shows that human beings must be related to a 
transcendent source, and how Christian theology makes good sense of these claims.  In the next 
Chapter, I survey various strands of traditional Christian (and Jewish) theology concerning law.  
In Chapter 3, I consider perspectives from paleoanthropology and neurobiology on the 
development of human agency and “mind” which could undermine my theological claims.  I begin 
to argue in Chapter 3, however, that efforts by scientists working in these disciplines to eliminate 
the concepts of transcendent agency that underpin traditional notions of “law” are unsupported 
and self-defeating.   
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Chapter 2:  Law and Christian Theology 
Christian theology, with its roots in the Torah and the Hebrew prophetic and wisdom literature, 
has always been interested in the concept of law.  This Chapter shows how Christian concepts of 
law traditionally have been tied to the doctrines of God and creation and in particular to a 
participatory ontology of creation.  Because God is a God of order, He orders His creation, and 
He commands His creatures in accordance with His internal order.  But God’s orderliness is not 
an order imposed from “above” God by a power beyond Himself.  Rather, God’s order is His being, 
which is his life of perichoretic Triune love.  The fundamental law of creation therefore is one of 
participation in God’s Triune love.  The materials in this chapter lay the groundwork for a negative 
critique of reductive neurolaw (Chapter 3) and for a positive articulation of a theory of natural 
law in light of the methodological perspective adopted in Chapter 1. 
1. The “Law” of Inner-Trinitarian Relations 
It is unusual to speak of the relationship of the members of the Trinity as a form of “law.”  Our 
inclination is to think of “law” as something imposed from the outside by an authority.  We 
cannot, of course, speak of God as though there is some such authority outside God.  But “law” 
can also comprise an inherent property of a thing.  I will argue, for example, that the moral or 
“natural” law and the laws of nature are inherent properties of creation.  These “laws” are not 
imposed from above but either simply are, or emerge as properties from lower-level structures 
and interactions. 
What theology says about inner-Trinitarian relations is analogous to such an inherent or 
emergent property of law.  We must be careful here to stress the analogical nature of this claim.  
God is not a thing in the universe.  God is not merely “an immensely wise and powerful being,” 
not even the most wise and powerful being imaginable, for then “God” would remain a being as 
frogs and birds and humans are beings.284  Nor do attributes or “properties” of God emerge over 
time, as process theologians suggest.285  Rather, “God is not only the ultimate reality that the 
intellect and will seek but is also the primordial reality with which all of us are always engaged in 
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every moment of existence and consciousness, apart from which we have no experience of 
anything whatsoever.”286  It is as this transcendent “primordial reality” that God simply is the 
“three persons in one essence” of classical Christian theological grammar. 
The Athanasian Creed is a widely used formulation of that grammar, particularly in the Western 
church.  Its formulations are given as law-like statements: 
But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit is 
all one, the glory equal, the majesty coeternal. 
Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Spirit. 
…. 
The Father is made of none, neither created nor begotten. 
The Son is of the Father alone; not made nor created, but begotten. 
The Holy Spirit is of the Father and of the Son; neither made, nor 
created, nor begotten, but proceeding. 
So there is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; 
one Holy Spirit, not three Holy Spirits. 
And in this Trinity none is afore or after another; none is greater or 
less than another. 
But the whole three persons are coeternal, and coequal. 
So that in all things, as aforesaid, the Unity in Trinity and the Trinity 
in Unity is to be worshipped.287 
All of these statements imply corresponding negatives.  The Father, Son and Holy Spirit cannot 
differ in Godhead, glory, majesty, greatness, eternality or equality.  The Son cannot proceed from 
the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit cannot proceed from the Son alone, and the Father cannot proceed 
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from any other.288  To state otherwise is to worship three gods rather than one, or a god of one 
prosopon rather than the Trinity.  If God were otherwise, it would not be God. 
Other “laws” concerning God flow from these “laws” of the Trinity.  The persons of the Trinity 
enjoy perfect, eternal fellowship with each other, and therefore “God is Love” (θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν) 
(1 John 4:8) (emphasis added).  The persons of the Trinity inhere in and are utterly transparent 
to each other, and therefore “God cannot lie”  (ἀψευδὴς θεὸς – literally “unlying God”) (Titus 
1:2) (emphasis added).  These are not just accidental, contingent attributes of a more 
fundamental substance, such the way the claim “I am a Caucasian” relates to the expression of 
my genes in the pigmentation of my skin.  To say that “God is love and is truth and is just and is 
holy” is finally to say the same thing, that “God is God,” which is what God “names” Himself:  “I 
AM WHO I AM,”  ֶאהֶיְהֶא רֶשֲא הֶיְה, ʾehyeh ʾašer ʾehyeh (Exodus 3:14).289 
2. The Laws of Divine Command 
That God issues commands in the form of “law” is clear in scripture.  In the Bible’s second creation 
narrative, God gives the man (the adam) four gifts, all of them embodied in trees:  beauty, food, 
life, and freedom.  The story tells us that “all kinds of trees grew out of the ground,” including 
“trees that were pleasing to the eye and good for food,” the “tree of life,” and the “tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil”.290  These latter two trees, embodying  life and freedom, were 
placed in the center of the garden.291   
Another gift accompanied the “tree of the knowledge of good and evil”:  the gift of Law.  This gift 
of law is the first command God gives to the man:  “You are free to eat from any tree in the 
garden; but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat 
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290 Gen. 2:8-9 (NIV). 
291 Gen. 2:9 (NIV). 
70 
 
from it you will certainly die.”292  The law God gave to the man was a precious gift because it 
would serve all of the other gifts.  In his commentary on this passage in Genesis, R.R. Reno notes 
that  
Human beings are the most trainable of all animals, and therefore 
we are the most capable of developing into highly focused, 
purposeful creatures.  This is why the ideal of self-possession and 
freedom depends upon the capacity for obedience.  One must be 
able to accept instruction from another in order to begin the 
process of training that leads to genuine self-command.  A person 
in bondage to passing impulses is hardly free in any desirable 
sense.293 
The man’s exercise of the gift of free will to choose to eat of the “knowledge of good and evil,” 
God warned, would lead to death – the ultimate destruction of beauty, food, life, and freedom.  
An intimate acquaintance with evil, the kind of “knowledge” that arises from the sexual union of 
a man and wife, is a bondage to the dark nothing of death.  Law is the boundary God set in the 
Garden against nihilism.  As Reno notes, “[i]n this sense, the scriptures echo Aristotle:  the 
untrained soul is unformed and dissipated.”294  God’s Law, given in the Garden, trains us to 
achieve the ends for which we were created. 
The same pattern is recapitulated in the Biblical flood narrative.  There, God nearly destroys the 
entire creation because there is no other way to check human violence.295  When the floodwaters 
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recede and creation is restored, God establishes another covenant with humanity through Noah.  
It is a gift of re-creation, and that gift is accompanied by law.  This includes a negative command: 
you must not eat meat that has its lifeblood still in it.  And for your 
lifeblood I will surely demand an accounting. I will demand an 
accounting from every animal. And from each human being, too, I 
will demand an accounting for the life of another human being.  
“Whoever sheds human blood, 
    by humans shall their blood be shed;  
for in the image of God  
    has God made mankind.296 
It also includes a recapitulation of the positive command given in the Garden:  “As for you, be 
fruitful and increase in number; multiply on the earth and increase upon it.”297  Thus there was 
law when the waters of chaos receded after the Flood and God reaffirmed His commitment to 
the creation. 
The pattern is again recapitulated in the giving of the Decalogue.298  God delivered Israel from 
slavery in Egypt and established His people in unique covenantal relationship by giving them law.  
The authority of the Decalogue is rooted in God’s person as He has acted in relation to Israel:  “I 
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(Grand Rapids:  Eerdmans 2003).  This sort of reading, in fact, seems more true to the Fathers than modernist 
“scientific” readings, even if the Fathers generally would have had no reason to question the “historical” basis for 
the literal sense of the flood narrative.  See Bouteneff, Beginnings:  Ancient Christian Readings of the of the Biblical 
Creation Narratives.   
296 Gen. 9:4-6. 
297 Gen. 9:7. 
298 See Exodus 20:1-17. 
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am the LORD your God, who brought you out of Egypt, out of the land of slavery.”299  The Law as 
gift was a central theme in Israel’s worship:   
The law of the Lord is perfect, 
refreshing the soul. 
The statutes of the Lord are trustworthy, 
making wise the simple. 
The precepts of the Lord are right, 
giving joy to the heart. 
The commands of the Lord are radiant, 
giving light to the eyes. 
The fear of the Lord is pure, 
enduring forever. 
The decrees of the Lord are firm, 
and all of them are righteous.300 
 
In the exilic and post-exilic literature, when Israel’s prophets sought to explain the Nation’s defeat 
by Assyria and Babylon, the central reasons for this disaster were idolatry and the failure to live 
by the Law’s requirements for justice, conditions that were closely linked.  This is the cry of the 
prophet Micah: 
Hear this, you leaders of Jacob, 
    you rulers of Israel, 
who despise justice 
    and distort all that is right; 
 who build Zion with bloodshed, 
    and Jerusalem with wickedness. 
Her leaders judge for a bribe, 
    her priests teach for a price, 
    and her prophets tell fortunes for money. 
Yet they look for the LORD’s support and say, 
    “Is not the LORD among us? 
    No disaster will come upon us.” 
 Therefore because of you, 
    Zion will be plowed like a field, 
                                                     
299 Gen. 20:2.  The Bible’s narratives concerning Israel in Egypt and the Exodus also, of course, present intractable 
historical-critical problems.  See the discussion in Note 273 above for some hermeneutical considerations. 
300 Psalm 19:7-9. 
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Jerusalem will become a heap of rubble, 
    the temple hill a mound overgrown with thickets.301 
In particular, the center of this collapse was the failure to take the law deeply to heart, as 
evidenced by mistreatment of the poor, the widow, and the stranger.  The prophet Jeremiah 
offered this indictment:  “Also on your skirts is found the lifeblood of the innocent poor. . . .”302  
Not merely superficial acknowledgement of the Law, but the internalization of its principles, was 
what God desired of the Nation: 
This is what the LORD Almighty, the God of Israel, says: Reform your 
ways and your actions, and I will let you live in this place. Do not 
trust in deceptive words and say, “This is the temple of the LORD, 
the temple of the LORD, the temple of the LORD!”  If you really 
change your ways and your actions and deal with each other justly, 
if you do not oppress the foreigner, the fatherless or the widow and 
do not shed innocent blood in this place, and if you do not follow 
other gods to your own harm, then I will let you live in this place, in 
the land I gave your ancestors for ever and ever. But look, you are 
trusting in deceptive words that are worthless. 
 Will you steal and murder, commit adultery and perjury, burn 
incense to Baal and follow other gods you have not known, and 
                                                     
301 Micah 3:9-12.  The historical context of Micah’s speeches is unclear.  See David H. Master, “Micah,” in John H. 
Walton, ed., Zondervan Illustrated Bible Backgrounds Commentary, Vol. 5 (Grand Rapids:  Zondervan 2009).  Micah 
1:1 states that Micah received his call “during the days of Jotham, Ahaz and Hezekiah, kings of Judah.”  Micah 1:1 
(NASB).  Some scholars suggest Micah may have lived during the last years of Jeroboam II in the north and the 
early years of Jotham in Judah.  Master, “Micah,” at 122.  Others relate Micah’s oracles to the Syro-Ephraimite war 
in 735-734 B.C., the destruction of Samaria in 722/21 B.C., or events connected with King Hezekiah in 712 or 701 
B.C.  Ibid. at 122-23.  In any event, it is clear that Micah was written during a period of significant political and 
economic upheaval.  Master suggests that “[a]s the Phoenicians began their push westward across the 
Mediterranean, they created enormous trading networks enhanced by increasingly efficient transportation 
strategies.  Throughout the eight century, the Phoenecian desire for agricultural produce for trade drove famers 
throughout the region to adopt ‘more efficient’ (and likely more ruthless) methods.”  Ibid. at 123.  Thus, for 
Master, Micah’s oracles may represent a call for justice and mercy for those affected by these massive social and 
economic changes.  See Ibid. 
302 Jer. 2:34 (NASB).  As Steven Voth has noted, “Jeremiah was born into a world of violent changes and intense 
power struggles.”  Steven Voth, “Jeremiah,” in in John H. Walton, ed., Zondervan Illustrated Bible Backgrounds 
Commentary, Vol. 4 (Grand Rapids:  Zondervan 2009).  The context of Jeremiah is the fall of Jerusalem to the 
Babylonians in 586 B.C.  Ibid. at 232.  This event produced “a profound an irreversible scar in the life and identity of 
ancient Israel.”  Ibid. at 230.  As Richard Hays has noted, the trauma of this event, along with the hope expressed 
by Jeremiah at the very end of his prophetic text (Jeremiah 31), echo through the texts of the Gospels:  “the echo 
of Jeremiah 31 offers comfort, beckoning God’s people to lean forward into the hope of the days that are surely 
coming when God – in the person of Jesus – will have mercy, bringing back the exiles, and write the Law on their 
hearts.”  Richard B. Hays, Reading Backwards:  Figural Christology and the Fourfold Gospel Witness (Waco:  Baylor 
Univ. Press 2014), 43. 
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then come and stand before me in this house, which bears my 
Name, and say, “We are safe”—safe to do all these detestable 
things? Has this house, which bears my Name, become a den of 
robbers to you? But I have been watching! declares the LORD.303 
The consequence of this departure from God and His law was a de-creation, a return to the primal 
chaos, an abolition of humanity: 
I looked on the earth, and behold, it was formless and void; 
And to the heavens, and they had no light. 
 I looked on the mountains, and behold, they were quaking, 
And all the hills moved to and fro. 
 I looked, and behold, there was no man, 
And all the birds of the heavens had fled.304 
The intertestamental literature, particularly the books of the Macabees, apocalyptic texts such 
as 1 and 2 Enoch and the Qumran documents, likewise testify to the enduring sense that, even 
as the Second Temple is built in Jerusalem, the nation remains in exile because of its failure to 
keep Torah.305  This is the background into which Jesus of Nazareth was born and began his 
ministry.   
Jesus, like the prophets before him, defined the true observance of the Law as an inward 
transformation that issues in worship of God and regard for others:  “Hear, O Israel!  The Lord 
our God is one Lord; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your 
soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength” and “You shall love your neighbor as 
yourself.”306  It is often suggested that Jesus upset the “legalism” of strictly observant Jews 
(including the Pharisees) by flaunting rules like the restriction on harvesting food or healing 
people on the Sabbath.  But Jesus stood in the tradition of the Hebrew prophets and of other 
Second Temple Jewish reformers in emphasizing that the central focus of the Torah was the 
reformation of the heart reflected in the basis for the entire Law, the Shemah.  This is evident 
                                                     
303 Jer. 7:3-11 (NIV). 
304 Jer. 4:23-25 (NASB).  The reference to the earth as “formless and void” – ṯō·hū wā·ḇō·hū – is a quotation from 
Gen. 1:2.  For a beautiful musical rendition of this passage, see the accompagnato in Part One of Handel’s Messiah. 
305 See Shaye D. Cohen, From the Maccabees to the Mishnah (Westminster John Knox 2d ed. 2006); George W.E. 
Nicklesburg, Jewish Literature Between the Bible and the Mishnah (Fortress Press 2d ed. 2011).  
306 Mark 13:29-31 (NASB).   
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most centrally in The Sermon on the Mount, in which Jesus, as the New Moses, interprets the 
Torah through the foundational Law of Love.  The Sermon on the Mount is not in any way a 
rejection of the Divine Command in the Torah.  The Sermon, rather, is Jesus’ restatement of the 
Divine Command. 
As Christianity began to separate from Judaism in the first century, and particularly as more non-
Jews became Christians, the early Church confronted the problem of how to interpret and apply 
the Torah.307  Factions developed concerning whether Gentile Christians were required to 
observe the Torah’s rules concerning circumcision and diet, as reflected in Acts 15.  Jesus’ saying 
Matthew 5:17-19 seems to represent the sentiments of the pro-Torah faction: 
Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I 
have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them. For truly I tell 
you, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not 
the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law 
until everything is accomplished.  Therefore anyone who sets aside 
one of the least of these commands and teaches others accordingly 
will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices 
and teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of 
heaven.308 
However, as church historian John McGuckin notes, even Matthew’s Gospel knocks against the 
legalism of the Pharisees in favor of “a new philosophy of law.”309  So the concluding line of the 
pericope from Matthew:  “For I tell you that unless your righteousness surpasses that of the 
Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you will certainly not enter the kingdom of heaven.”310  In 
both Matthew and Mark’s Gospels, McGuckin suggests, “[t]he old law of external observances is 
. . . contrasted with a new spirit of seeking the inner intentionality of law:   access to God’s will 
                                                     
307 See John A. McGuckin, The Ascent of Christian Law:  Patristic and Byzantine Formulations of a New Civilization 
(St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press 2012),, 17-18. 
308 Matt. 5:17-19 (NIV).  See commentary on this text in The Jewish Annotated New Testament (Oxford: OUP 2011). 
309 McGuckin, The Ascent of Christian Law,, 18. 
310 Matt. 5:20.  Commenting on this passage, Chyrsostom said “[n]ote how Jesus also in this passage commends 
the old law.  He does so by comparing it with the new, a comparison that implies that is is of the same family, so to 
speak.  More or less, it does share many family resemblances.  He does not find fault with the old law but in fact 
makes it more strict.  Had it been evil, Jesus would not have accentuated it.”  Ancient Christian Commentary on 
Scripture, New Testament Vol. Ia, 98 (Downers Grove:  IVP 2001). 
76 
 
and the implementation of behavior that is acceptable.”311  Thus, says McGuckin, “the Church of 
the first century became a strong movement to call for a radical reconstitution of the Torah, 
giving primacy to the scholia of Jesus himself as now collected in the Gospel texts, affording him 
a far higher status as Law-Giver than Moses.”312   
Still, McGuckin notes, the early Church understood that the Law is not abrogated in Jesus, but 
rather is “radical[ly] renovated.”313  First century Christians asserted “that Jesus was the heart 
and center of all law … the Church elevate[d] Jesus as its Lawgiver in preference to Moses.”314 
This new philosophy of law, McGuckin believes, led to the Church’s separation of the 
“ceremonial” and “moral” law (reflected, for example, in Paul’s letter to the Galatians) and its 
prioritization of the sayings of Jesus as the hermeneutical lens for reading Israel’s scriptures – a 
“New Constitution” in Christ.315  But this New Constitution was of the living Christ, “a living and 
ongoing principle, not merely a dead reference to a body of literature.”316  McGuckin discerns 
here “a specifically Aristotelian principle in relation to the interpretation of law:  that the ‘mind 
of the Lawgiver’ must be consulted in all matters of legal interpretation and development of first 
principles.”317 
                                                     
311 McGuckin, The Ascent of Christian Law, 18-19. 
312 Ibid. at 19.  See also Robert Louis Wilken, The Spirit of Early Christian Thought (New Haven:  Yale Univ. Press 
2003).  As Wilken notes, “[e]arly Christian thought . . . was as much an attempt to penetrate more deeply into the 
mystery of Christ, to know and understand what was believed and handed on in the churches, as it was to answer 
the charges of critics or explain the faith to outsiders.”  Ibid. at 3. 
313 McGuckin, The Ascent of Christian Law, 19.  One way in which this occurred, which is not emphasized by 
McGuckin, was in Justin’s supposed separation of the ceremonial and moral law, and in the allegorizing of the Old 
Testament law in relation to the witness of the Old Testament prophets.  See Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian 
Tradition:  A History of the Development of Doctrine, Vol. 1, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600) 
(Chicago:  Univ. Chicago Press 1971), pp. 15-21.  Pelikan suggests that “[a]lthough the law and the prophets 
belonged together in the language of Jewish theology, Christian theology identified its cause with that of the 
prophets against the law.”  Ibid. at 18.  Nevertheless, Pelikan observes, “the most important early heresies were 
not Jewish, but anti-Jewish in their inspiration.”  Ibid. at 71.  The early church therefore rejected Marcion’s efforts 
to deny that the Old Testament law was part of scripture.  Ibid.  at 71-81.  Marcion’s followers had even attempted 
to amend Matt. 5:17 to read “’I have not come to fulfill the law but to abolish it.’”  Ibid. at 76. 
314 McGuckin, The Ascent of Christian Law, 19. 
315 Ibid.,, 19-20.  See also Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, 71-81. 
316 Ibid., 20.  As Wilken notes, for the early Church, “[t]he Christian gospel was not an idea but a certain kind of 
story, a narrative about a person and things that had actually happened in space and time.”  Wilken, The Spirit of 
Early Christian Thought, 15. 
317 Ibid. 
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In its first centuries the Church did not produce any extensive written law codes.  This is not 
surprising, given the Church’s initial position as an apocalyptic movement often subject to 
persecution by the Roman authorities.318  As McGuckin notes, “[t]o have told any writer of the 
New Testament that the icon of the Lord would be set up in the imperial palace would have 
drawn out merely disbelieving laughter.”319  Nevertheless, some of the early epistolary literature 
in the New Testament, particularly the deutero-Pauline epistles, as well as some of the very early 
Patristic literature, begin to establish rules for conduct in the Church that represent a sort of 
internal law.320   
An interesting example of this process is the Epistle of 1 Timothy, probably composed in Paul’s 
name within a Pauline Christian community sometime after Paul’s death.321  The introduction to 
1 Timothy criticizes a group of troublemakers who have deviated from instruction based in “love 
that comes from a pure heart, a good conscience, and sincere faith.”322  The false teachers have 
“turned to meaningless talk, desiring to be teachers of the law, without understanding what they 
are saying or the things about which they make assertions.”323  They “occupy themselves with 
myths and endless genealogies that promote speculations” instead of offering “the divine 
training that is known by faith.”324 
                                                     
318 Ibid., 21. 
319 Ibid., 21. 
320 Ibid., 21-25. 
321 See, e.g., Richard Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament:  A Contemporary Introduction to New 
Testament Ethics (HarperOne 1996); Introduction to 1 Timothy, The Jewish Annotated New Testament (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2011); Luke Timothy Johnson, The Writings of the New Testament, Third. Ed. (Minneapolis:  Fortress 
Press 2010), 375-375-383, 389-395.  Douglas A. Campbell, Reframing Paul:  An Epistolary Biography (Grand Rapids:  
Eerdmans 2014), 367-368. 
322 1 Tim. 1:5 (NRSV).  Luke Timothy Johnson suggests that the opponents of Pauline teaching addressed in 1 
Timothy likely probably represent “the sort of elitist esoteric groups we so often encounter in the religiosity of the 
Hellenistic world,” for example Gnostics.  Johnson, The Writings of the New Testament, 390.  Risto Saarinen 
similarly notes that the “myths” of the false teachers “may refer to many kinds of Hellensistic myths, for instance, 
pagan gods, stories of the origin of the world, esoteric and gnostic teachings in both Judaism (Titus 1:14) and other 
circles.”  Risto Saarinen, Brazos Theological Commentary on the Bible, The Pastoral Epistles with Philemon & Jude 
(Grand Rapids:  Brazos Press 2008), 33. 
323 1 Tim. 1:6-7 (NRSV). 
324 1 Tim. 1:4.  (NRSV).  Saarinen suggests that “[t]he apostle’s warning against myths and genealogies is directed 
against the intellectual and imaginative stimulation they provide:  one should not believe in imagined stories, but 
had better trust the sound doctrine handed over ty reliable witnesses.”  Saarinen, Brazos Theological Commentary, 
33. 
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The problem, the author says, is not the law, but manner in which the false teachers use the law: 
Now we know that the law is good, if one uses it legitimately.  This 
means understanding that the law is laid down not for the innocent 
but for the lawless and disobedient, for the godless and sinful, for 
the unholy and profane, for those who kill their father or mother, 
for murderers, fornicators, sodomites, slave traders, liars, 
perjurers, and whatever else is contrary to the sound teaching that 
conforms to the glorious gospel of the blessed God, which he 
entrusted to me.325 
Here the writer sounds like Oliver Wendell Holmes:  the “law” has nothing but a negative role, 
although the reference here seems to be to the Torah and not to the Roman civil law in general.326  
But the author then recites principles of right order that mirror Roman household codes, 
including prayer for the civil authorities: 
First of all, then, I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions 
and thanksgivings be made for everyone, for kings and all who are 
in high positions, so that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in 
all godliness and dignity.  This is right and is acceptable in the sight 
of God our Savior, who desires everyone to be saved and to come 
to the knowledge of the truth.327 
The civil authorities, it seems, are thought to have some positive role in facilitating good order, 
although this also might consist primarily in restraining evil people.  Civil order will facilitate 
churchly order, including modesty in dress, the subordination of women to male authority, the 
roles of Bishops and Deacons, respect for elders, the maintenance of a widow’s list (under very 
specific conditions), and slaves’ respect for their masters.328   
                                                     
325 1 Tim. 1:8-11 (NRSV). 
326 See The Jewish Annotated New Testament, text note to 1 Tim. 1:7-8.  Richard Hays sounds a similar note about 
the author of this text:  “it is hard to avoid the impression that the vision of the Christian life in 1 Timothy is 
characterized by conformity to fixed convention of respectable, law-abiding behavior.  The characteristic Pauline 
themes of freedom, suffering with Christ, costly love for the sake of the community, and living in the creative 
tension between the ages have been drastically deemphasized, if not entirely abandoned.  In their place we find 
the modest, mundane virtues of the orderly household.”  Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, 70.   
327 1 Tim. 2:1-4. 
328 1 Tim. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.  Hays suggests that “[p]erhaps the moral vision of the pastorals was inevitable (and even 
necessary) for the church at the end of the first century to achieve social cohesion and to survive external 
pressures.”  Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, 71.  Douglas Campbell argues that 1 Timothy’s 
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New Testament scholars note that the deutero-Pauline 1 Timothy contrasts in some ways with 
the theology of law in the clearly authentic Pauline letters of Romans and Galatians.  Both in 
Romans and Galatians, Paul pictures the Torah as a negative propaedeutic that leads to a new 
kind of freedom.329 
For example, in Romans 3:19, Paul says, “[n]ow we know that whatever the law says, it speaks to 
those who are under the law, so that every mouth may be silenced, and the whole world may be 
held accountable to God.”330  Similarly, in Galatians 3:2-3, Paul poses an exasperated question to 
the Galatian Christians:  “The only thing I want to learn from you is this:  did you receive the Spirit 
by doing the works of the law or by believing what you heard?  Are you so foolish?  Having started 
with the Spirit, are you now ending with the flesh?”331  In fact, Paul tells the Galatians, “all who 
                                                     
emphasis on law and household order represents a response, in part, to Marcionism.  Campbell, Reframing Paul,, 
368. 
329 See Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, 70.   
330 Romans 3:19 (NRSV).  Frank Thielman notes that “Paul’s use of the term law in the argument in Romans is 
perhaps the most perplexing element in a notoriously complex letter.”  Frank Thielman, Paul & The Law:  A 
Contextual Approach (Downers Grove:  IVP 1994), 165. 
331 Gal. 3:2-3 (NRSV).  Martin Luther commented on this passage with characteristic starkness:  “Right here we 
have one more difference between the Law and the Gospel. The Law does not bring on the Holy Ghost. . . . The 
Law and the Gospel are contrary ideas. They have contrary functions and purposes. To endow the Law with any 
capacity to produce righteousness is to plagiarize the Gospel. The Gospel brings donations. It pleads for open 
hands to take what is being offered. The Law has nothing to give. It demands, and its demands are impossible.”  
Martin Luther, Commentary on Galatians, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, available at 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/luther/galatians.vi.html.  Augustine, in contrast, commenting on this passage, 
distinguished the “moral” and “ceremonial” law:  “so that this question may be carefully treated and no one may 
be deceived by ambiguities, we must first understand that the works of the law are twofold:  for they reside partly 
in ceremonial ordinances and partly in morals.”  Augustine, Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, in Ancient 
Christian Commentary on Scripture VIII, 35.  Augustine argued that the Jewish ceremonial law had become 
incomprehensible and therefore brought confusion.  Ibid.  But the Christian sacraments, Augustine claimed, “when 
it is understood .  . . produces spiritual joy and is celebrated gladly and in due season [and] is applied either to the 
contemplation of truth or to good morals.”  Ibid.  For Augustine, “[t]he contemplation of truth is founded in the 
love of God alone, good morals in the love of God and the neighbor, and on these two precepts depend the whole 
Law and the Prophets.”  Ibid.    Luther is certainly correct over Augustine in recognizing that Torah cannot 
arbitrarily be divided into “ceremonial” and “moral” components, and Augustine’s claim that the Christian 
sacraments are somehow more accessible than the Jewish “ceremonial” law is an obvious case of special pleading.  
Nevertheless, Augustine’s focus on the internal in contrast to the external role of Torah and Sacrament is on point, 
and permits also a more favorable reading of Luther:  no one is justified by external adherence to the Law, but 
rather, as a person by faith is drawn into right worship of God, he or she experiences transformative grace that 
provides the freedom to live an authentically human life.  N.T. Wright aptly frames this in a narrative key:   
Paul’s overall point, throughout Galatians 3 and 4, is narratival . . . .  Once you understand how 
the story works, the great covenant story from Abraham to the messiah, you can see (a) that the 
Torah was a necessary, God-given thing, with it is own proper role within that story, and (b) that 
the God-given role of Torah has now come to a proper and honourable end – not that there was 
anything ‘wrong’ with it, but that it was never designed to be permanent.  The latter is what Paul 
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rely on the works of the law are under a curse.”332  The law “was added because of transgressions, 
until the offspring would come to whom the promise had been made….”333 
But, Paul continues in Romans, the law is not abolished, but is fulfilled by the “law of faith.”334  
“Do we then overthrow the law by this faith?,” Paul asks, to which he responds “By no means 
(μὴ γένοιτο)!  On the contrary, we uphold the law.”335  Likewise, in Galatians, Paul says “Is the 
law then opposed to the promises of God?  Certainly not (μὴ γένοιτο)!”  The law was a 
                                                     
specially needs to stress, but the former point is vital (despite the long and loud chorus of 
dualistic readers) to avoid any slide towards Marcionism. . . . Galatians 3 is not, then, an 
argument hinging on the theological contrast between ‘grace’ and ‘law’, or even the 
psychological contrast between the struggle to please a legalistic God and the delight of basking 
in the undeserved pleasure of a gracious one.  Those contrasts are indeed present as resonances, 
and later theologians were not wrong to draw out such implications.  But the point at which 
those extra meanings took over and became central, displacing the actual argument Paul was 
mounting, was the point at which the exegetes ceased to listen to him and began to listen 
instead to the echo of their own voices bouncing off the text. 
N.T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, Book II (Minneapolis:  Fortress Press 2013), 863. 
332 Gal. 3:10.  Thielman states that “when Paul says that those who rely on works of the law are under a curse, he is 
not saying anything particularly controversial for a Jew.”  Thielman, Paul & The Law, 127.  At least some 
contemporary Jewish interpreters disagree.  The Jewish Annotated New Testament, for example, states that 
“Paul’s negative assessment of the Torah and those who follow it is striking:  he insists that the Torah does not 
come from God (3:19-20); no longer has a salvific role, and perhaps never did (3:21-22); and its observance is akin 
to the worship of the Greek gods (4:9-10).”  Jewish Annotated New Testament, 332.  Johnson, however, consistent 
with many contemporary interpreters of Paul, notes that Paul’s focus is not on faith in Christ in contrast to 
observance of Torah, but on the adequacy of Christ as the faithful one who fulfilled Torah.  Johnson, The Writings 
of the New Testament, 296.  Johnson says that, for Paul in Galatians, Torah “is both annulled and fulfilled by the 
Messiah.  It is annulled as an absolute norm for God’s activity and human righteousness.  If the only measure of 
righteousness is Torah, then Jesus cannot be the source of God’s life.  This is because Jesus is unrighteous 
according to that norm:  He is a ‘sinner,’ one who is ‘cursed by God’ because he ‘hangs on a tree’ (Deut. 21:23).”  
Ibid. at 296.  But, Johnson continues, “[b]ecause it was always more than law – being God’s revelation and wisdom 
– Torah is also fulfilled in the Messiah.  Paul cannot even speak of righteousness without using Torah’s narratives 
and prophecies. . . .  God did something new in Jesus’ death:  he revealed righteousness outside the norm of Torah.  
This calls for a new response of faith, which shows that Torah as the bearer of promise is also fulfilled.”  Ibid. 
333 Gal. 3:19. 
334 Romans 3:27.  In his Commentary on Romans, Karl Barth characterized Paul’s teaching in this chapter as a 
dialectic that drives us away from any sort of self-reliance.  Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (London:  OUP, 
Trans. from 6th ed., 1968), 110.  As Barth notes, "The man who boasts that he possesses something which justifies 
him before God and man, even if that something be his own insecurity and brokenness, still retains confidence in 
human self-justification."   Ibid.  N.T. Wright, perhaps influenced by Barth’s later work on the doctrine of election, 
suggests that Paul’s theology, particularly as expressed in Romans 3:27 to 4:25, centers on “the redefinition, in and 
around Jesus the Messiah, of the Jewish doctrine of election, rooted in the covenant theology of Genesis and 
Deuteronomy and worked out through Jesus’ saving death and resurrection.”  Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of 
God, Vol. II, 846. 
335 Romans 3:31.  N.T. Wright suggests that Paul’s “covenantal perspective on election, and its redefinition through 
Jesus the Messiah, provides the larger category within which ‘juridicial’ and ‘participationist’ categories can be held 
together in proper Pauline relation.”  Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, Vol. II, 846. 
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“disciplinarian (παιδαγωγὸς) until Christ came, so that we may be justified by faith.”336  The 
Greek term παιδαγωγὸς  refers to a pedagogue, a tutor hired by the head of a household to 
instruct young boys in life and morals.337  But now, Paul tells the Galatians, we are no longer 
young boys in the household, who are “no better than slaves.”338  “As many of you as were 
baptized into Christ,” he says, “have clothed yourselves with Christ,” and thus “[t]here is no 
longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male or female; for you 
are all one in Christ Jesus.”339 
Yet Paul does not advocate antinomian freedom.  “What should we say?  That the law is sin?,” 
he asks rhetorically, to which he offers his familiar refrain:  “By no means (μὴ γένοιτο)!”  The 
law demonstrated to Paul the depth of his sin, but his sin was his own, within himself, and not 
inherent in the law.340  In response to this dilemma, Paul offers his great cri do coeur:  
So I find it to be a law that when I want to do what is good, evil lies 
close at hand.  For I delight in the law of God in my inmost self, but 
I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind, 
making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members.  
Wretched man that I am!  Who will rescue me to from this body of 
death?  Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord!  So then, 
with my mind I am a slave to the law of God, but with my flesh I am 
a slave to the law of sin.341 
In fact, then, there is no conflict in Paul’s theology of law between “law” and “freedom.”342  The 
pedagogue of the law moves him to understand his own sin, his own inner rejection of the 
                                                     
336 Gal. 3:24. 
337 See Strong’s Concordance, 3807. 
338 Gal. 4:1. 
339 Gal. 4:28.  N.T. Wright notes that Paul’s theology concerning the relation of Jews and Gentiles and the role of 
Torah is rooted in monotheism.  “Paul returns,” Wright says, “to the most foundational confession of the Jewish 
faith, the Shema:  since God is one, he is God of Gentiles as well as Jews.  Monotheism undergirds not only 
election, but also the christologically redefined election:  this God will justify circumcision on the basis of pistis 
[faith], and uncircumcision through pistis.”  Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, Vol. II, 848. 
340 Romans 7:13-25. 
341 Rom. 7:21-25. 
342 As the notes above on Paul’s discussion of Torah suggest, I am broadly sympathetic to the “New Perspective” 
reading of Paul that centers on God’s election of a people for participation in His mission of redemption – the Jews, 
first, through Torah, and the Gentiles as well, through Christ’s faithful fulfillment of Torah.  See generally N.T. 
Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, Vol. II, 846-48.  My appreciation for the “New Perspective,” however, 
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fundamental law of love, which paradoxically frees him to take on the nature of the only one who 
was able to fulfill the law:  Christ.  And in Christ Paul is finally free to love. 
Thus, Paul says to the Galatians, “do not use your freedom as an opportunity for self-indulgence, 
but through love become slaves to one another.  For the whole law is summed up in a single 
commandment:  ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.’”343  A person who is “led by the Spirit” 
is “not subject to the law” but displays the “fruit of the Spirit”:  “love, joy, peace, patience, 
kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control.”344  “There is no law against such 
things,” Paul says.345  Yet, a person who does the “works of the flesh,” which Paul says are 
“obvious” – “fornication, impurity, licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousy, 
anger, quarrels, dissensions, factions, envy, drunkenness, carousing and things like these” – “will 
not inherit the kingdom of God.”346 
The notion of “law” in the Gospels and in Paul obviously is complex.  In contrast to the hard 
distinctions found in some later Christian theologies, particularly in the Lutheran strand of the 
Reformation, however, contemporary Biblical scholarship generally recognizes that both Jesus 
and Paul were thoroughly Jewish and that neither of them rejected Torah.347  Jesus’ “fulfillment” 
of Torah in the Sermon on the Mount, says Jonathan Klawans, represents rabbinic tradition that 
sought the meaning of Torah beyond its plain literal sense.348  And Paul, Mark Nanos tells us, 
“saw himself wholly within Judaism, as one who was assigned a special role in the restoration of 
Israel and the nations.”349  Paul “was a reformer,” Nanos says, “one who sought to redress what 
                                                     
supplements, rather than supplants, more “existential” readings of Paul, in particular by Barth but also by 
Augustine and, to a degree, Calvin and Luther. 
343 Gal. 5:13-14. 
344 Gal. 5:22-23. 
345 Gal. 5:23. 
346 Gal. 5:19-21.  Augustine noted the tension in this section of Galatians between law and human freedom, which 
is a central theme of this Dissertation.  As Augustine noted, “People think that the apostle here denies that we 
possess free will.  They do not perceive what he is saying to them:  If they refuse to hold fast to the grace they have 
received, through which alone they are able to walk in the Spirit and avoid fulfilling the desires of the flesh, they 
will not be able to do as they wish. . . .  It is love that ‘fulfills the law.’”  But ‘the wisdom of the flesh’ by following 
temporal goods opposes spiritual love.  How can it be made subject to the law of God (that is, freely and 
obediently fulfill righteousness and not be opposed to it) when even as it tries it must be vanquished?”  Augustine, 
Comentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, in Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture VIII, 81. 
347 See, e.g., The Jewish Annotated New Testament, Essays, “The  Law” and “Paul and Judaism.” 
348 Ibid., 516. 
349 Ibid. at 552. 
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he believed to be an oversight….; he was not the founder of a new religion, even if things turned 
out otherwise.”350  Early Christianity and rabbinic Judaism after the destruction of Herod’s 
Temple began to part ways over the universality of this claim for Gentiles who did not observe 
all the requirements of Torah, and this is evident in the Acts and the Pauline and Petrine epistles 
as the wrestle with the problem of table fellowship.351  Nevertheless, both Jesus and Paul 
advocated a theology of Torah that was shared by other pious Jews:  the Torah should not be 
understood as a set of arbitrary rules, but rather as a teacher, a pedagogue, that facilitates inner 
transformation and a culture of shalom.352   
3. Law, the Soul and the Christian Tradition:  Tertullian 
It was not until the growing Christian movement had to respond to persecution from the Roman 
state that Christian thinkers begin to articulate a more comprehensive theory of both internal 
(synodical) and secular (civil) law.  A great early thinker here is Tertullian.  In his defense of 
Christians against the charges of atheism, cannibalism, incest and the dissolution of the bonds of 
the Roman empire, the Apoligeticus, Tertullian called the Roman judicial system to task for not 
affording Christians and Christianity a fair hearing.353  Tertullian’s concept of justice emphasized 
fair and neutral procedures regardless of the nature of the charge or the accused: 
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McGuckin regarding first century Christian understandings of Torah.  McGuckin agrees that “[i]t is not an 
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second century Church as it became further distinguished from rabbinic Judaism.  Ibid. at 65.  The household codes 
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law as grounded in auctoritas and not merely in potestas.  The same broadly held true, McGuckin shows, in the 
development of Christian synodical and conciliar practices through the fourth century.  Ibid. at 62-94. 
353 See public domain translation available at 
http://www.tertullian.org/articles/mayor_apologeticum/mayor_apologeticum_07translation.htm. 
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supposing it to be true that we are criminals of deepest dye, why 
are we treated differently by you from our fellows, I mean all other 
criminals, since the same guilt ought to meet with the same 
treatment? When others are called by whatever name is applied to 
us, they employ both their own voices and the services of a paid 
pleader to set forth their innocence. They have every opportunity 
of answering and cross-questioning, since it is not even legal that 
persons should be condemned entirely undefended and unheard. 
But the Christians alone are not permitted to say anything to clear 
themselves of the charge, to uphold the truth, to prevent injustice 
in the judge.354 
These procedural omissions, Tertullian argued, were tied to a substantive failure.  The Roman 
authorities were not interested in whether the charges against Christians were true.  Rather, 
“[t]he one thing looked for is that which is demanded by the popular hatred, the confession of 
the name, not the weighing of a charge.”355   The Roman magistrates never determined “how 
many slaughtered babes each had already tasted, how many times he had committed incest in 
the dark, what cooks, what dogs had been present (on the occasion).”356   Instead, the corrupt 
system pressed for a confession or denial of “the name” of Christ, often through torture, and that 
confession or denial determined the entire case.  His appeal therefore was to a higher concept 
of justice and what today we call “freedom of religion,” rooted in fairness and truth, that 
transcended the raw power of the Roman state.  Of course, Tertullian went on in the Apologeticus 
to refute these slanderous claims against the Christians, although it is unlikely his theoretical 
framework appealed to many Patrician Romans for whom the Empire’s success was indissolubly 
                                                     
354 Ibid., Chap. II.  In some ways consonant with contemporary missional theologies, such as that of N.T. Wright 
mentioned in the previous notes, Tertullian emphasized that Christian communities should be tolerated by the 
state because “God gave Christians as his gift to the world. . . .”  Eric Osborn, Tertullian, First Theologian of the 
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355 Apologeticus, Chap. II. 
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tied to the ancient pagan traditions (even if, for many of that class, the content of the pagan 
rituals were held as little more than superstition). 
Tertullian did not directly connect this concept of transcendent law to the soul, but he writes 
extensively about the soul in his Treatise on the Soul.357  This is one of Tertullian’s post-Montanist 
treatises, and it reflects his characteristic contrast between Christian faith and Greek reason:   
For by whom has truth ever been discovered without God?  By 
whom has God ever been found without Christ?  By who has Christ 
ever been explored without the Holy Spirit?  By whom has the Holy 
Spirit ever been attained without the mysterious gift of faith?  
Socrates, as none can doubt, was actuated by a different spirit.  For 
they say the at demon clave to him from his boyhood….358 
Tertullian argued that the soul is created at birth, that it has a corporeal nature, and that the 
term “spirit” is not a separate element of the person but merely describes the operation of the 
soul.359  In some of these arguments he sounds like a modern biologist, albeit transposing “soul” 
for “genes.”  For example, he favorably cited the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes:  “Cleanthes too, 
will have it that family likeness passes from parents to their children not merely in bodily features, 
but in characteristics of the soul; as if it were out of a mirror of (a man’s) manners, and faculties, 
and affections, that bodily likeness and unlikeness are caught and reflected in the soul also.”360  
Tertullian further asserted that the soul is the ruling power of the person and that it resides 
physically in the heart.361  Perhaps we could transpose “heart” for “brain” and render Tertullian 
as a proto-neurobiologist!   
But Tertullian was no materialist.  The soul, he asserted, is “rational” by nature, because 
rationality is “impressed upon it from its very creation by its Author, who is Himself essentially 
                                                     
357 Tertullian, A Treatise on the Soul, available at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0310.htm. 
358 Ibid., Chapter 1. 
359 Ibid., Chapters 4, 6, 11. 
360 Ibid., Chapter 5. 
361 Ibid., Chapter 15.  Osborn notes that Tertullian’s sense of tension or antithesis in human nature between good 
and evil is reflects Tertullian’s background in Stoicism.  Osborn, Tertullian, First Theologian of the West, 163 
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rational.”362  Human beings, of course, are not always rational, which Tertullian ascribed to the 
influence on the soul of Adam’s transgression, “which thenceforward became inherent in the 
soul, and grew with its growth, assuming the manner by this time of a natural development, 
happening as it did immediately at the beginning of nature.”363  The irrationality of the human 
soul as presently observed is not attributable to God:  “[a]ll sin,” Tertullian said, “is irrational:  
therefore the irrational proceeds from the devil, from whom sin proceeds; and it is extraneous 
to God, to whom also the irrational is an alien principle.”364  Tertullian further linked the senses 
to the soul and argued that the senses therefore cannot deceive, unless they are disordered or 
imposed upon from the outside.365  Again, consistent with his debt to Stoicism, Tertullian sounds 
something like a modern empiricist.   
Yet, because the soul is by nature rational, for Tertullian it is nothing like our modern concepts 
of “selfish genes” or neurobiological fiat.  The soul’s rationality is also the human being’s 
freedom.  The soul, and thus the person, may function in accordance with its natural capacities 
and thereby the person may be governed by reason, or the soul may (dis)function in accordance 
with the irrationality of sin: 
The soul, then, we define to be sprung from the breath of God, 
immortal, possessing body, having form, simple in its substance, 
intelligent in its own nature, developing its power in various ways, 
free in its determinations, subject to be changes of accident, in its 
faculties mutable, rational, supreme, endued with an instinct of 
presentiment, evolved out of one (archetypal soul).366 
This suggests a connection between Tertullian’s Apologeticus on law and religious freedom and 
his understanding of the soul.  Human beings are capable of exercising the higher law of reason, 
informed particularly by their (in Tertullian’s view) generally reliable senses, all of which vest in 
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Osborn, Tertullian, First Theologian of the West, 163. 
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365 Ibid., Chapter 17. 
366 Id, Chapter 22.  As Osborn notes, Tertullian’s emphasis on human freedom underpins Tertullian’s “defence of 
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the soul.  For Tertullian, this, and not the irrationality of mere prejudice that refuses to examine 
the facts of the case, should form the basis of civil law. 
4. Law, the Soul and the Christian Tradition:  Lactantius 
Lactantius was a second great early exponent of a Christian vision of law and justice.  He had 
been an official in Diocletian’s court and wrote his Divine Institutes, and particularly the section 
On Justice, in response to the great persecution under Diocletian.367   
Lactantius’ primary concern in On Justice was to demonstrate that the Christians, in fact, are the 
“true” Romans.368  The Roman ideal was grounded in a sense of justice.  As Lactantius noted, 
justice “is either by itself the greatest virtue, or by itself the fountain of virtue, which not only 
philosophers sought, but poets also, who were much earlier, and were esteemed as wise before 
the origin of the name of philosophy.”369  Without virtue, justice gives way to mere authority and 
power.   
Lactantius recited portions of Aratus’ poem Phaenomena – the same poem reference by the 
Apostle Paul in Athens – which conjures a golden age of justice and virtue.370  The golden age was 
lost, however, when people began to lust after power and possessions.  When lust replaced 
virtue, law became separated from justice.371  Now the governing authorities prevailed “as much 
by authority as by strength, or resources, or malice.”372  Having lost all traces of humanity, equity 
                                                     
367 McGuckin, The Ascent of Christian Law,, 110-112. 
368 Ibid. 
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Empire:  Lactantius & Rome (Ithica:  Cornell Univ. Press 2000), 56-57. 
371 Lactantius, On Justice, Chapter 6. 
372 Ibid. 
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and pity – which Lactantius identified as the “offices” of justice – the rulers instead “began to 
rejoice in a proud and swollen inequality, and made themselves higher than other men, by a 
retinue of attendants, and by the sword, and by the brilliancy of their garments.”373  But Christ, 
Lactantius argues, restored justice, and in the Christians the fruits of virtue that support the 
flourishing of the civitas, can be realized.374 
Lactantius’ appeal on behalf of the Christians was thus in part pragmatic:  if the Empire is to 
return to its golden age, Christians should be protected and not persecuted.  But he also reached 
for a transcendent feature of justice:  equality.  “Although justice embraces all the virtues 
together,” he says, “yet there are two, the chief of all, which cannot be torn asunder and 
separated from it – piety and equity.”375  Equity is inherent to human nature:  “[f]or God, who 
produces and gives birth to men, willed that all should be equal, that is, equally matched.  He has 
imposed on all the same condition of living; He has produced to all wisdom; He has promised 
immortality to all; no one is cut off from His heavenly benefits.”376  This means that social 
distinctions are erased:  “[i]n His sight no one is a slave, no one a master; for if all have the same 
Father, by an equal right we are all children.”377  Lactantius admitted that such social distinctions 
persist even among Christians but, he says, “we measure all human things not by the body, but 
by the spirit,” so that “although the condition of bodies is different, yet we have no servants, but 
we both regard and speak of them as brothers in spirit, in religion as fellow-servants.”378 
Justice, then, for Lactantius, was closely connected to inward desire.  A just man, he said, “is 
neither at enmity with any human being, nor desires anything at all which is the property of 
another.”379  Mere animals cannot be “just” because they cannot discipline their desires.  In 
animals, Lactantius argued, “[b]ecause they are destitute of wisdom, nature is the provider of 
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supplies for itself.  Therefore they injure others that they may profit themselves, for they do not 
understand that committing an injury is evil.”380  A man, however, “who has the knowledge of 
good and evil, abstains from committing an injury even to his own damage, which an animal 
without reason is unable to do; and on this account innocence is reckoned among the chief 
virtues of man.”381 
Lactantius’ emphasis on piety and equity as the keys to justice undergirded his argument for 
religious freedom.  If piety and virtue should be encouraged, and if all people are equal under the 
law, Lactantius asked, “who is so arrogant, who so lifted up, as to forbid me to raise my eyes to 
heaven?  Who can impose upon me the necessity either of worshipping that which I am unwilling 
to worship, or of abstaining from the worship of that which I wish to worship?”382  This, Lactantius 
claimed, is another way in which the Christians are the true harbingers of justice, the true 
Romans:  “we, on the contrary, do not require that any one should be compelled, whether his is 
willing or unwilling, to worship our God, who is the God of all men; nor are we angry if any one 
does not worship him.”383   
5. Law, the Soul and the Christian Tradition:  Augustine 
Augustine’s political theology, as expressed in his City of God and elsewhere, of course became 
a central pillar of Western Christendom.384  Augustine, like Lactantius and Tertullian, understood 
that there is a spiritual or natural law, built into the creation by God, which is the true source of 
righteousness.  For example, he noted in the Confessions that, when he was a Manichean, he 
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did not know either that true inward righteousness takes as its 
criterion not custom but the most righteous law of almighty God, 
by which the morality of countries and times was formed as 
appropriate to  those countries and times, while God’s law itself 
has remained unchanged everywhere and always, not one thing in 
one place and something different elsewhere.385 
If God’s eternal law is unchanging, Augustine wondered, why are there obvious differences 
among the laws of various cultures throughout history?  Is justice “fickle and changeable?”386  No, 
Augustine answered, “but the epochs over which she rules do not all unfold in the same way, 
precisely because times change.”387  At various times and places, some particular applications of 
the eternal law might become more or less apparent and feasible.388  Moreover, God’s eternal 
law stands above the laws of any temporal king.389  If God’s law conflicts with the law of a human 
king, the human law should change.  “As in the hierarchy of human society a more powerful 
official is placed above one of lesser rank and is to be obeyed,” Augustine said, “so God stands 
above all.”390  To obey God’s eternal law even if it conflicts with civil law “does not undermine 
the community,” but rather ultimately strengthens the community in its proper relation to 
God.391 
At times God’s law might seem opaque or confusing.392  Yet God’s law, for Augustine, was not 
merely an arbitrary decree.  A breach of God’s law does not harm God Himself.  “But how can 
our vices touch you, who are incorruptible?,” Augustine asked rhetorically; “[w]hat crimes can 
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be committed against you, who are immune from harm?”393  His answer was that since the 
eternal law is part of God’s good ordering of creation, breaches of that law destroy the human 
soul: 
For even when people sin against you, they are maliciously 
damaging their own souls.  Iniquity plays itself false when it 
corrupts and perverts its own nature, to which you gave life and 
order, or when it makes intemperate use of lawful things, or again 
when it burns with desire for other things not permitted, lusting to 
enjoy them in a way contrary to nature.394 
The eternal law, built into the soul, therefore helps order human desires towards their proper 
end.   
But if the rational soul inclines human beings to God, why do we end up with sin and violence?  
We think we have made ourselves free of the law, masters over it.  But our quest for freedom 
binds us to slavery.  This is why Augustine connects the need for a King – human law – to sin.  
Without sin, man would live by the divine law and would not become subject to other men.  
Because of sin, Augustine argued, men need the scourge of human law: 
And beyond question it is a happier thing to be the slave of a man 
than of a lust; for even this very lust of ruling, to mention no others, 
lays waste men's hearts with the most ruthless dominion. . . . And 
therefore the apostle admonishes slaves to be subject to their 
masters, and to serve them heartily and with good-will, so that, if 
they cannot be freed by their masters, they may themselves make 
their slavery in some sort free, by serving not in crafty fear, but in 
faithful love, until all unrighteousness pass away, and all 
principality and every human power be brought to nothing, and 
God be all in all.395 
Human principalities, powers and laws, for Augustine, were temporary restraints.396  There is one 
path to freedom from this cycle of enslavement:  love.  For Augustine, the fulfillment of love, 
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when God is all in all, marks the end of positive law.  Love does not impose.  Positive law, in 
contrast, is a relation of imposing power. 
Nevertheless, for Augustine, at times, the law must be coercive, since human desires are prone 
to distortion.  If in our “curiosity” we twist our desires towards evil, the law operates to thwart 
those twisted desires and reign in such “curiosity”: 
It is evident that the free play of curiosity is a more powerful spur 
to learning . . . than is fear-ridden coercion; yet in accordance with 
your laws, O God, coercion checks the free play of curiosity.  By 
your laws it constrains us, from the beatings meted out by our 
teachers to the ordeals of the martyrs, for in accord with those laws 
it prescribes for us bitter draughts of salutary discipline to recall us 
from the venomous pleasure which led us away from you.397 
But here the sense of “law” employed by Augustine is largely internal:  it is God’s law that 
constrains us internally and the scourge of persecution that purifies us.  We will see in a later 
section the problematic way in which Augustine applied his concept of positive law to religious 
dissent against the Donatists. 
6. Law, the Soul, and the Christian Tradition:  Aquinas 
A final stop on this brief tour of classical Christian concepts of law is with one of the most 
important figures for “natural law” theorists:  Thomas Aquinas.  Aquinas devoted a portion of the 
Summa to a “Treatise on Law,” demonstrating how important the concept of law had become to 
Western Christian society.   Aquinas most fully developed the link between “law” to the capacity 
for reason.  Law, for Thomas, is a means by which God instructs rational human creatures.398  
                                                     
are constitutionally prone to conflict: the authority to coerce them. This authority is common to those in positions 
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Thomas defined “Law” as “a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or 
restrained from acting.”399  The essential rule and measure for human action – the “law” of 
human action – for Thomas, is reason, “since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which 
is the first principle in all matters of action. . . .”400   
At times, Thomas sounds like a modern positivist.  Thomas agreed that positive law generally is 
unnecessary for virtuous people who seek to follow the light of reason, but that the bad person 
requires further discipline:  “[m]en who are ill disposed are led willingly to virtue by being 
admonished better than by coercion; but men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless 
they are compelled.”401  Yet Thomas clearly tied law to a transcendent end, which is embodied 
in statutes that are broadly applicable to the entire community.402  In contrast, for Holmes, the 
purpose of law is to engineer the result the judge desires by establishing rules and procedures 
that will change the bad man’s behavior.  There is no transcendent justice in this system, nor is 
there love.  There are only outcomes that the enforcer of the law – the judge – desires, and 
technocratic means towards reaching those ends.   
For Thomas, then, all true “law” is a participatory relation.  “Law,” he says, “is in all those things 
that are inclined to something by reason of some law:  so that any inclination arising from a law, 
may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were.”403  This is true not only of the 
“natural law” that is built into the creation, but also of positive law enacted at the command of 
a human sovereign.  Thomas argued that  
In order that the volition of what is commanded may have the 
nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason.  
And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the 
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sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign’s will would 
savour of lawlessness rather than of law.404 
The rule of reason, Thomas insisted, demonstrates that good or just laws must be directed 
towards the proper end of reason:  the “common good,” which is “universal happiness.”405  A 
putative law that is not directed towards the common good is “devoid of the nature of a law.”406   
The “common good” in the broadest sense – “the whole community of the universe” – in Thomas’ 
thought, is governed by God.407  Although God promulgates particular laws, “the end of the 
Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself.”408  Moreover, all 
created things “partake somewhat of the eternal law,” which is “imprinted on them” and which 
provides them with “their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends.”409  Thomas notes 
that “[e]ven irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal Reason,” but that only 
rational creatures participate in the Eternal Reason “in an intellectual and rational manner.”410  
Therefore, Thomas said, “the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is properly 
called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason….”411  Human law participates in Divine 
law, in the life of God Himself, to the extent that human practical reason concerning specific cases 
comports with speculative reason concerning the natural law imprinted on us as creatures.412  
The construction of positive law is a form of participation in God whereby the general principles 
of eternal law are applied to contingent cases through the exercise of practical reason.413 
This brief survey of Biblical and classical Christian sources shows that, in the Christian tradition, 
humanity is Homo Juridicus.414  We are creatures of law.  As Legal historian Harold Berman notes, 
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in his magisterial study “Law and Revolution,” early European Christian law was a means of 
reconciliation.415  Law, he says, “was conceived primarily as a mediating process, a mode of 
communication, rather than primarily as a process of rulemaking and decisionmaking. . . . 
Christianity treated even a king as a human being, subject like every other human being to 
punishment by God for his sins and only able to be saved by God’s grace.”416  In contrast, the 
familiar refrain of the Biblical Book of Judges highlights what happens when law’s legitimacy is 
eroded:  “In those days Israel had no king; everyone did as he saw fit.”  (Judges 21:25).  Modern 
people are inclined to affirm this as good, but as the story of the Levite and his concubine in 
Judges 19 makes clear, the fruits of this circumstance are betrayal, rape, oppression and 
violence.417 
Chapter 3:  Paleo-Law:  Have We Always Been Human? 
As Chapter 2 argues, Christian theologies of law are rooted in peace.  Law derives from the order 
of God’s being, which is an order of love.  When creatures participate in God’s love, they live 
according to God’s law, and there is justice and peace.  When creatures (particularly humans) 
deviate from God’s law, there is dissolution and violence.   
But legal philosophy has long been vexed by the problem of violence.  If “law” is merely the 
imposition of one person or group’s will upon another person or group, then “law” is an empty 
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term that merely signifies a kind of power maintained by violence.  The classical response to this 
problem, which is the response of traditional Christian theology discussed in Chapter 2, is to refer 
to a concept of “natural” law rooted in a Divine source.  The debate about whether or not there 
is any sort of “natural” law – including whether the concept of “natural” law makes any difference 
or merely relocates the problem of violence from other humans to “nature” or “God” – is ancient 
and predates Christian sources.  But it is only in the past hundred years or so that the modern 
natural sciences have begun to illuminate the even deeper antiquity and diversity of human 
evolution.  If we wish to address the problem of “natural” law today, we must ask whether human 
evolutionary history undermines the kinds of founding myths (the Garden of Eden, the Athrasis 
Epic, the Timaeus, and so-on) that supported claims about “natural” law made by many pre-
modern writers.  What can paleoanthropology and evolutionary neurobiology tell us about 
human “law?”  Is “law” just an artifact of evolution’s bloody flow?  This chapter reviews and 
reviews and critiques the narrative of human cultural evolution as told by some of its best known 
narrators.  It is important to understand this background narrative because it provides the 
“creation myth” for modern sociobiological and neurobiological ethical programs, including 
neurolaw. 
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1. The Evolution of “Human” Culture:  The First and Last Human 
 
Paleoanthropologists differ sharply about the nature and cause of the differences between homo 
sapiens sapiens – us – and the many human / hominid species that also form the human 
evolutionary tree.418  Indeed, the ambiguity extends even to the use of the word “human.”   
The fascinating and beautifully produced book The Last Human, for example, offers photographs 
of forensic reconstructions based on fossil samples of twenty-two species of hominids dating 
back to over seven million years, as well as narratives of the possible lifeways of these 
creatures.419  As the narratives proceed through the twenty-two species, the language subtly 
changes from “man-ape” to “apeman” to “man.”   
For the earliest species profiled, Sahelanthropus tchadensis, Orrorin tugenensis, and Ardipithecus 
ramidus and kadabba, the lifeway narrative evokes the “man-ape”: 
On reaching the crown of a yellow-wood tree the man-ape began 
bending back branches.  He softly hooted to himself for there were 
no other man-apes in sight.  Just when he felt the nest was right, 
he laid in it belly-up watching the sky darken, and waiting for the 
night. As the sun disappeared into the horizon, a small gust of wind 
licked up from the east.  The light drizzle that began shortly after 
the wind died prompted the man-ape to break back small branches 
with leaves and cover his body.  Feeling comfortable with his new 
blanket, he quickly fell asleep.420 
A photo of the “man-ape” Sahelanthropus tchadensis suggests that the subject “contemplatively 
surveys the African landscape some seven million years ago.”421 
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The lifeway narratives shift to the term “man-ape” with Australopithecus anamensis, 
Kenyanthropus platyops, Australopithecus afarensis, which lived in the African Great Rift Valley 
about four million years ago.422  So, for example, 
Standing in the crook of a tree, a female man-ape reached up for 
unripe figs.  Leaf monkeys jumped back and forth in the smaller 
branches of the tree crown dropping partly eaten figs on the man-
ape below.  One leaf monkey descended down to the man-ape’s 
eye-level.  Facing the man-ape, it chattered and squealed at her 
relentlessly.  Harassed by the noise and debris, the man-ape 
descended the tree first.  Remaining on two legs, she leisurely 
walked to another tree and picked the fruit from the lower 
branches.423 
One of the species mentioned here Australopithecus afarensis, is that of “Lucy,” a famous and 
important specimen that exhibits the smaller braincase of an ape with a bipedal upright walking 
posture – a transitional form.  A photograph of a reconstructed Lucy shows her, as the caption 
states, as she “searches desperately through the savannah for her missing three year old 
daughter.” 
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With two other Great Rift Valley species, Paranthropus aethiopicus, and Australopithecus garhi, 
both of which lived about two million years ago, the descriptor shifts to from “man-ape” to 
“apemen.”  Thus: 
With the evening quickly approaching, the apemen constructed 
nests from shrubs and herbs growing on the shaded woodland 
floor.  Some of the youngsters made their nests in small trees above 
where the adults slept.   
Sitting up in her nest with the stick still in her hand, the apemen 
stared suspiciously at a small sapling within arm’s reach.  Cocking 
the stick with her right and bending the sapling with her left, she 
carefully inspected the foliage for snakes.  When none were found, 
she put the stick down and stripped the sapling’s bark.  Getting at 
the underlying pith, she enjoyed a final bite before turning in for 
the night.424 
A photograph of a reconstructed Paranthropus aethiopicus shows him looking contentedly in the 
direction of the camera, with what appears to be the hint of a smile.  The caption tells us that, 
“[a]mused by the playfulness of his children, an adult Paranthropus aethiopicus watches 
protectively and lovingly.”425 
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With the introduction of the Homo genus the lifeway narratives drop the “ape” and use the  terms 
“man” and “pygmy.”426  The narrative preceding Homo rudolfensis describes a wary encounter 
between men and baboons: 
A man, knee-high in water, was standing on two legs pulling plants 
out by the roots and tossing them only land.  Five other men sat 
immobile below a patch of bush-willow trees, watching and trying 
to avoid the rain.  A troop of baboons watched the men at a safe 
distance.427 
A close-up of Homo rudolfensis, which lived near Lake Turkana about 1.9 million years ago, allows 
us to peer deep behind his eyes – dare we say into his soul?:  “Thoughts of tomorrow,” the 
caption says, “underlie the intelligent gaze of Homo rudolfensis.”428 
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For Homo habilis, the terminology shifts to “pygmy,” reflecting the problems 
paleoanthropologists have faced in classifying this species.429  The narrative evokes a pygmy 
searching for food along the shore of a “grey blue” lake “lined by the pink hues of hundreds of 
flamingoes”:  “Not discouraged by failure, the pygmy walked along the shore looking for other 
opportunities.  Not finding any, he thought about all the food in the highland forest.  It was early 
in the morning and the forest was close enough to make it there and back in a single day.”430  A 
photo reconstructing Homo habilis, which lived about 1.5 to 1.8 million years ago, suggests that 
“A brilliant African sky offers a visual wonder for a curious female homo habilis.”431 
 
 
The title of “human” is first given with the introduction of Paranthropus bosisei, a stout species 
found in various African sites dating to 1.4 to 2.3 million years ago, and Homo Ergaster, Homo 
georgicus, Homo erectus, Homo pekinensis, and Homo floresiensis, with dates ranging from over 
1 million years ago (H. Ergaster) to only hundreds or tens of thousands of years ago.432 So: 
A group of apemen, a gelada baboon troop, and two humans fed 
together on herbs and grasses along the shore, keeping a safe 
distance from the ramp-like hippo trails descending into the lake.  
With many of the grasses mature and turned to seed, the apemen 
concentrated on these, using their front teeth to strip the seeds 
from the tall tufts.  Willing to brave their proximity to the hippo 
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trail, the humans fed on the rootstocks of a small patch of sedges 
exposed by the receding shoreline.  When an apeman came to feed 
next to them, the two humans became visibly uneasy, increasing 
their eye movements and averting a fixed gaze.433 
And:   
A shrill, squeaking cry caught the attention of two young men 
walking into the high veldt.  They stopped, turned and looked 
around, but they saw nothing.  Glancing at each other with quizzical 
looks they continued on their way.434 
And yet more evocatively: 
She didn’t remember why, but at the time she was crying.  Maybe 
she was sick or just hungry.  The old woman held her in her arms, 
rocked her back and forth, and hummed.  She placed some cherries 
in her hand.  Eating them made here stop crying, and she felt 
better.  Those were the earliest memories she had.435 
The photographic reconstructions also become even more compelling.  The caption explains, 
“After being separated from his group for several days, a young Homo ergaster, Nariokotome 
Boy, rejoices at seeing the familiar faces of his family.”436 
 
 
                                                     
433 Ibid.,, 131-132.  One cannot help but notice the cadence of an old joke form:  “A group of apemen, a gelada 
baboon troop, and two humans walk into a bar….” 
434 Ibid.,, 139. 
435 Ibid.,, 149. 
436 Ibid., 147. 
The Last Human, p. 147 
103 
 
And here Peking Man (H. pekinensis), which lived from 250,000 to 600,000 years ago, is pictured 
“Stalking his prey.”437  
 
 
 
The broad outlines of the story told in The Last Human reflect the clear pattern of the evidence 
contained in fossils and genes:  over millions of years, a variety of hominid forms flowered on the 
human evolutionary tree (or bush), many of which were evolutionary dead ends; moving forward 
in time towards the present, the morphology of some of these now-extinct species often appears 
closer to that of anatomically modern humans; and finally there remains one branch now 
occupied by only one species – us.   
But where the narratives in The Last Human fill in cultural and mental landscapes of these 
creatures, which cannot be inferred so directly from bones, an emphasis on conscious awareness, 
agency, aesthetics, and values emerges that seems hard to justify.  Note the adverbial phrases 
and richly anthropomorphic descriptions:  “Feeling comfortable with his new blanket”; 
“contemplatively surveys”; “leisurely walked”; “searches desperately”; “enjoyed a final bite 
before turning in for the night”; “[a]mused by the playfulness of his children”; “watches 
protectively and lovingly”; “not discouraged by failure”; “curious”; “quizzical”; “thoughts of 
tomorrow”; “intelligent”; “earliest memories”; “rejoices.”  From these narratives, it seems that 
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everything – every one – from Sahelanthropus tchadensis seven million years ago on – was 
capable of intentions, plans, memories, and even virtues such as courage, joy and love. 
In fact, no paleoanthropologist thinks our hominid forebears possessed these characteristics in 
the way we homo sapiens sapiens possess them.  We may assume, with good reason, that things 
like what we now identify as “human” intentions, plans, memories and virtues were present in 
varying degrees in our ancestors, if nothing else in virtue of the fact that they are ancestral to us.  
And we can observe in the archeological record the technologies employed by some of these 
ancestors, in the form of different kinds of stone toolkits.  Yet there is no evidence that any of 
our distant hominid ancestors, or even our more recent early human forebears, possessed 
anything near the flower of what we now call “human culture.”  While the recovery of hominid / 
early human stone toolkits dating back millions of years is endlessly fascinating, modern chimps 
have been observed sharpened sticks and stone anvils as tools.  Tool use itself therefore is not a 
distinguishing feature of humanity.  The technology inherent in the Oldowan toolkit, dating back 
at least 2.6 million years, surpasses anything known to be used today by chimpanzees, but by 
upper paleolithic standards it was simple:  a hammerstone was used to strike a stone core, which 
produced sharp flakes.438   
The Acheulean toolkit, which appears in the archeological record about 1.76 million years ago, 
employed a two-stage technology, in which larger flakes stricken from the core were further 
refined by striking smaller flakes from their edges.439  The resulting took is called a “handaxe,” 
which misleadingly conjures to mind something a notched and grooved head attached to a 
wooden handle.  In fact, the Acheulean handaxe is simply a large flaked stone that can be held in 
the hand, as shown below:440 
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The Acheulean toolkit remained unchanged for well over one million years, without being 
supplemented by other technologies.441 
By about 400,000 to 200,000 years ago, the “prepared core technique” was developed, whereby 
a variety of flakes could be produced from a core with one strike.442  This more precise technique 
facilitated the production of “points,” which were attached to shafts in order to make spears, 
such as this point from Ethiopia dating from just over 100,000 years ago: 443   
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The toolkits also diversified to include scrapers and awls for working hides and wood.444  Still, the 
range of tools remained limited and there is no evidence of rapid innovation. 
By the Upper Paleolithic (Europe) or Late Stone Age (Africa), however, there is evidence of far 
greater diversity and innovation.  As the Smithsonian Institute’s web resource notes,  
These toolkits are very diverse and reflect stronger cultural 
diversity than in earlier times. The pace of innovations rose. Groups 
of Homo sapiens experimented with diverse raw materials (bone, 
ivory, and antler, as well as stone), the level of craftsmanship 
increased, and different groups sought their own distinct cultural 
identity and adopted their own ways of making things.445 
At the same time, we begin observe in the archeological record the first substantial evidence of 
symbolic art and spiritual / religious practices. 
2. Language, Mind, and the Cultural Explosion 
 
It seems, then, that most of the creatures profiled in The Last Human, for the vast majority of the 
millions of years over which those different species lived and died out, were capable, at best, of 
little more technology than modern chimpanzees, and were incapable of creating symbolic art or 
spiritual / religious artifacts.  In evolutionary time, aside from some simple tools, what we call 
“human culture” appears suddenly and with little warning. 
Indeed, most paleoanthropologists broadly agree that a “cultural explosion,” a “big bang of 
human culture,” occurred around 60,000 to 30,000 years ago.446  As archeologist Steven Mithen 
notes, “with no apparent change in brain size, shape or anatomy in general – the cultural 
explosion occurred.”447  Similarly, paleoanthropologist Ian Tattersall, who curated the American 
Museum of History’s Hall of Human Origins, argues that modern humans “are an altogether 
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unprecedented presence on our planet.”448  Further, Tattersall says, the notion that “the long 
human story” represents “an extended and gradual struggle from primitiveness toward 
perfection” is simply false.449  “The acquisition of the uniquely modern sensibility” reflected in 
the cultural explosion, Tattersall says, “was instead an abrupt and recent event.”450   
Tattersall believes that our hominid predecessors generally did not possess the capacity for 
symbolic thought and had no robust sense of “self.”  For example, Tattersall describes Homo 
heidelbergensis, which lived between 600 and 200 thousand years ago, as follows: 
These were hardy, resourceful folk, who occupied and exploited a 
huge range of habitats throughout the Old World through the 
deployment of an amazing technological and cultural ingenuity.  
They were adroit hunters who pursued large game using 
sophisticated techniques, built shelters, controlled fire, understood 
the environments they inhabited with unprecedented subtlety, 
and produced admirable stone tools that at least occasionally they 
mounted into composite implements.  Altogether, they lived more 
complex lives than any hominids had ever done before them.451 
And yet, Tattersall observes, “throughout the period of Homo heidelbergensis’s tenure no 
hominid produced anything, anywhere, that we can be sure was a symbolic object.”452  He 
therefore concludes that,  
[i]f I had to wager a guess, it would be that the intelligence of these 
hominids, formidable as it may have been, was purely intuitive and 
non-declarative.  They neither thought symbolically as we do, nor 
did they have language.  As a result, we can’t usefully think of them 
as a version of ourselves, certainly cognitively speaking.453 
Although most paleoanthropologists agree that the fact of a “cultural explosion” is well 
documented, they disagree on what caused it.  Tattersall suggests there are two leading theories:  
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the theory of “mind” and the theory of “language.”  Tattersall himself falls into the “language” 
camp. 
Tattersall acknowledges that “[t]he changeover of Homo sapiens form a nonsymbolic, 
nonlinguistic species to a symbolic, linguistic one is the most mind-boggling cognitive 
transformation that has ever happened to any organism.”454  He finds the theory of language 
compelling because language seems to bridge the “symbolic” and “intuitive” aspects of observed 
human nature and because language is a “communal possession.”455  He takes these two aspects 
of human nature – symbolic and intuitive – to correspond to reason and emotion.456   
Tattersall suggests that language first developed “in a small community of biologically prepared 
early Homo sapiens somewhere in Africa,” perhaps first among children stretching their minds 
through play, though he acknowledges that “[t]he details of this transition will probably forever 
evade us….”457  Part of this “biological preparation,” according to Tattersall, might have involved 
the brain’s ability to make connections between higher areas – the cortex – “without passing 
through the older emotional centers below.”458  One of the first linguistic functions this might 
have facilitated, he suggests, was the ability to name objects.  Another possibility he finds 
plausible is a significant increase in the brain’s capacity for working memory, which facilitates 
executive functions such as “decision-making, goal forming, planning, and so-on.”459  In any 
event, he concludes, “it seems likely that a random modification of the already exapted brain, 
plus some children at play, led to the literal emergence of a phenomenon that changed the 
world.”460 
Steven Mithen, in contrast, is a prominent proponent of the “mind” school.  Mithen argues that 
the cultural explosion “resulted in such a fundamental change in lifestyles that there can be little 
doubt that it derived from a major change in the nature of the mind.”461  Mithen draws on 
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evolutionary psychologists who think of the “mind” not as a unified command center, but rather 
as a set of specialized modules that gradually developed in response to different environmental 
pressures.  Instead of the common metaphor of a “computer” for the mind, Mithen employs the 
metaphor of a “Swiss army knife.”462  The key breakthrough for the cultural explosion, Mithen 
argues, must have been a new way of connecting the diverse modules of the early human mind 
so that they could communicate and coordinate with each other in new ways.  Here he employs 
a different metaphor:  the human mind became a “cathedral,” with different “rooms” that can 
function seamlessly together.  Like a visitor to a cathedral who might walk from the nave to the 
chapel to the altar, cognition could then flow across domains and make unified connections.   
An early paleolithic person might have known “rock” in one domain that included making flake 
tools, “animal” in another domain that included scavenging carcasses for food, and “female” in 
yet another domain that included sex and reproduction – but these different cognitive modules 
might not have communicated with each other.  An upper paleolithic person, in contrast, might 
have been able to make connections between “rock,” “animal,” and “female” in ways that gave 
rise to the symbolic “Venus” figurines found in the archeological record starting about 35,000 
years ago, or the exquisite lion/man from Hohlenstein Cave in Germany, dating to about 30,000 
years ago, both shown below. 
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35,000 year old Venus figurine 
Photo Source:  Wikimedia Commons 
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Both Mithen and Tattersall, however, seem to recoil from the implications of their observations 
for any concept of transcendence, even as they exult in the transcendent beauty of something 
like the Lion Man Statue.  At the conclusion of The Prehistory of the Mind, Mithen declares that 
“[t]he human mind is a product of human evolution, not supernatural creation.  I have laid bare 
the evidence.  I have specified the ‘whats,’ the ‘whens’ and the ‘whys’ for the evolution of the 
mind.”463  Mithen believes his explanations are complete and airtight.  He seems to have no room 
for a concept of “why” beyond the biological, never mind a concept of causation that could 
encompass “evolution” as part of an act of “creation.” 
Similarly, in a strange coda to his Masters of the Planet, Tattersall reflects on universals and the 
bell curve.464  He observes that, 
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Yes, you can indeed find regularities in human behaviors, every one 
of them doubtless limited by basic commonalities in the structure 
of our controlling organs.  But all such regularities are in reality 
statistical abstractions, and people are absolutely uniform in none 
of them.  As a result, if any statistical phenomenon could be said to 
govern the human condition, it would be the ‘normal distribution’ 
or the ‘bell curve’….  In any human characteristic you might care to 
specify, physical or behavioral, you will find a bell curve….  For 
every saint, there is a sinner; for every philanthropist, a thief; for 
every genius, an idiot.465 
These variations, he suggests mean there are no universals, but only variations along a curve.466  
Indeed, he claims, “apart from that basic ability we all share to re-create the world in the mind, 
perhaps the only other true ‘human universal’ we all show is cognitive dissonance.”467  This is 
quite a jarring “Coda” given Tattersall’s exuberant claim in the previous chapter that human 
language, born in the play of children, represents a “communal possession” of humanity. It seems 
that Tattersall must toss aside his prior 220 pages of argument and resign himself to the fact that 
human existence can have no common meaning or purpose.   
3. The Emergence and Reduction of Transcendence and “Law” 
 
If Mithen and Tattersall’s reservations about transcendence are correct, there can be no “law,” 
or at least no possibility of the “rule of law.”  There may be cognitive connections that facilitate 
language and the production of cultural artifacts, but such signs must signify nothing beyond 
themselves.  If there is nothing signified, there may be cultural and linguistic structures that 
encourage and enforce behaviors, but there cannot be “law.” 
Yet Tattersall strikes a hopeful note at the end of his Coda.  Although humans have polluted the 
planet – a fact about which Tattersall does not hesitate to offer a negative value judgment rather 
than a placid observation about the normal distribution – there is hope, because “our rational 
abilities and our extravagant neophilia nonetheless remain beyond remarkable.”468  “From the 
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very first stirrings of the human symbolic spirit,” Tattersall assures us, “the technological and 
creative histories of humankind have revolved around an energetic exploration of the innovative 
potential released by our new way of processing information about the world.”469  Thus, “while 
the auguries appear indeed to be for no significant biological change in our species, culturally, 
the future is infinite.”470 
How does Tattersall move from the confines of the normal distribution into an infinite future in 
the course of a few paragraphs?  How does he move from rejecting all universals to “our rational 
abilities,” “our extravagant neophilia,” “the human symbolic spirit,” the “technological and 
creative histories of humankind” and “our new way of processing information about the 
world?”471  He does not explain. 
It seems that Mithen and Tattersall as archeologists and anthropologists cannot accept the 
implications of their own evidence against reductive scientism.  Mithen and Tattersall agree that 
something extraordinary happened around the cultural explosion.  For all the language of 
intentionality, self-consciousness, symbolism and memory that a book like The Last Human 
ascribes to our hominid forebears, Mithen and Tattersall argue that there has never been 
anything like these capacities as they present themselves in modern humans among any other 
creature known to have inhabited the Earth.  Purpose, meaning, and even beauty, joy and hope 
keep bubbling up from the primordial ooze. 
4. Law and Writing 
 
The timeline for the species profiled in The Last Human concludes well before the cultural 
explosion.  Even the cultural explosion is pre-historical, in the sense that there were no elaborate 
systems of writing or written records developed immediately during that time.  The notion of 
                                                     
469 Ibid. 
470 Ibid. 
471 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
113 
 
positive law, however, by definition, entails a record.472  We must look substantially later in 
human history, to the time of the first cities, to find such records. 
The oldest law code discovered by archeologists is that of Ur-Nammu, ruler of the city of Ur 
during its third dynasty, which began in about 2050 B.C.473  The tablet containing Ur-Nammu’s 
laws dates to about three hundred years before Hammurabi created the code that was inscribed 
on a famous stele now on display in the Louvre.474   
One side of the tablet containing Ur-Nammu’s law code locates the origin of the laws in a creation 
myth. 475 The chief gods An and Enlil appointed the moon-god Nanna to rule over Ur, and Nanna 
in turn selected Ur-Nammu as their human representative.476  Ur-Nammu removed the “chislers” 
and “grabbers,” people who stole the citizen’s oxen, sheep and donkeys, from the city.477  He 
established a system of weights and measures and ensured equity for the poor and 
dispossessed.478  By his rule he ensured that “the orphan did not fall a prey to the wealthy,” “the 
widow did not fall a prey to the powerful,” and “the man of one shekel did not fall a prey to the 
man of one mina (sixty shekels).”479 
The other side of the tablet lists Ur-Nammu’s laws.  The tablet is badly damaged and only five of 
the laws are readily discernible.480  These show that the lex talonis already had been mitigated 
through a system of monetary payments.  Thus, if a man cut off another man’s foot with some 
sort of instrument (the text is unclear about what kind of instrument), he was liable for damages 
of 10 silver shekels; a severed nose required damages of 2/3 of a silver mina (40 silver shekels).481 
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Ur-Nammu certainly was not the first law-giver.  Indeed, there are references dating about three 
hundred years before the Ur-Nammu law tablet to the legal reforms of Urukagina, ruler of this 
city of Lagash.482   According to an inscription memorializing Urukagina, he “freed the inhabitants 
of Lagash from usury, burdensome controls, hunger, theft, murder, and seizure (of their property 
and persons). He established freedom (of a type).  The widow and orphan were no longer at the 
mercy of the powerful:  it was for them that Urukagina made his covenant with Ningirsu.”483  All 
of these references show that concepts of justice, the rule of law, and written law codes date at 
least to the foundations of the earliest Mesopotamian cities.  Perhaps the inscribing of positive 
law is as old as writing itself.484 
We know nothing of “law” prior to recorded history.  But if Stephen Mithen’s theory of mind is 
correct, the cognitive connections that facilitated art, science and religion also would have 
facilitated concepts of “law” -- and the lack of such connections would have meant that for early 
hominids / humans, there was no “law.”  And if Tattersall is correct, the acquisition of language 
would also have facilitated the concept of law, particularly positive law with its concrete 
expression in language. 
The earliest small bands of hunter-gatherer hominid / humans, of course, would have operated 
according to sets of social “rules.”485  Social rules are not a uniquely human trait.  Indeed, social 
ordering is a pervasive feature of the animal kingdom.  Even insects, such as honey bees, can 
show intricate social ordering.486  “Dumb” farm animals, such as the chickens I’ve begun raising 
in my backyard, are socially strict creatures – hence the term “pecking order.”487  Other higher 
mammals, such as whales, dolphins, and elephants, display detailed social ordering with local 
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cultural variations.488  Modern chimpanzee bands possess elaborate cultural norms that regulate 
access to food, access to sex, access to affection, and even what we might anthropomorphically 
call “war” with other tribes.489  Observations of chimpanzee and bonobo social ordering provide 
the raw material for many game-theoretic studies of human evolutionary psychology.490 
But it seems clear that even the most socially “advanced” of the higher mammals do not possess 
concepts of social order closely akin to what we call “law.”  A dominant animal in the pack might 
perform a sort of “judicial” function by forcibly ending disputes, but there is nothing like a well-
defined set of juridical procedures or principles.  Most significantly, even these highest of social 
mammals appear to have no concept of binding abstract principles that would support a “rule of 
law.”  The “law” for them finally is, literally, the “law of the jungle” – chemistry, instinct, material 
and reproductive advantage, and force. 
If we humans know a concept of “law” that refers the “legitimate” rule of law to abstract 
principles – indeed if we know even a concept of “legitimacy” – this requires a sort of cognitive 
capacity that only we humans, of all the creatures on Earth, seem to possess.  Could it be that 
the same cognitive breakthroughs that facilitated the creative explosion in language art, 
technology and religion also were necessary to the development of “law?”  Indeed, could it be 
that an essential part of what marks us out as “human” is just this sense of transcendent “law?” 
Such a notion resonates with the Bible’s second creation narrative in Genesis 2.  To be clear, we 
are not suggesting some kind of “concordist” reading in which Genesis 2 must in the literal sense 
conform to the upper paleolithic cultural explosion, much less to Mithen’s intriguing but 
debatable views about the prehistory of the mind.  The literal sense seems to be rooted in ancient 
near eastern mythological forms that cannot be correlated to any precise “historical” record.  Yet 
all the senses of this text together do convey that God’s institution of the “law of the Garden” – 
“do not eat of it” – represents something significant about the creation of the “human,” the 
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adam.  To the adam and not to Sahelanthropus tchadensis or any of the other extinct species 
detailed in The Last Human, so it seems, God said “do not eat of it.”  Perhaps only the adam was 
cognitively prepared to hear this command.  Indeed it seems that no species of hominid / human 
prior to the cultural explosion, at least, would have been prepared to hear 
5. Reductive Sociobiology 
Reductive sociobiological and neurobiological orthodoxy demurs even from the modest claims of 
paleoanthropologists such as Mithen and Tattersall.  David Sloan Wilson, Distinguished Professor 
of Biological Sciences and Anthropology at Binghamton University, argues that Darwinian 
evolution fully explains everything, including every aspect of human nature.491  Anyone who 
thinks otherwise, even an “intellectual” who is not religious, is a kind of fundamentalist, an 
“’academic creationist.’”492 
Sloan Wilson is clear in his evangelistic program for his version of evolutionism.  “First,” he says, 
“we must abandon the notion that some special quality was breathed into us by a higher 
power.”493  He claims that this does not demand an outright rejection of religious faith because, 
he says, – “many people manage to combine a vibrant religious faith with a fully naturalistic 
conception of the world.”494  But whatever he means here by “religious faith,” there is no room 
in that faith for anything but the physical world.  Sloan Wilson’s epistemology is uncompromising:  
“[w]hat goes for knowledge of the physical world also goes for knowledge about ourselves.  If 
something is wrong with your body, your mind, or society, it has a naturalistic explanation, just 
like [a] problem with your car.  Believing that we have special God-given abilities is like praying 
to your car on the side of the road.”495 
Sloan Wilson is not content merely to reduce “religious faith” to nature.  He must include 
“culture” as well.  “A common claim,” even among non-religious people, he notes, “is that 
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‘biology’ sets broad limits to our behavior, such as eating and procreation, but that ‘culture’ 
determines what we do within the broad limits, such as making art rather than babies.”496  This 
high concept of “culture,” he correctly observes, suggests that notwithstanding our evolutionary 
past we are free to choose our future destiny.  To this claim that “culture” exerts some kind of 
downward causality Sloan Wilson cries “Hubris, all hubris!”497  Since whatever attributes make 
humans unique are merely “like an addition on to a vast multiroom mansion” over deep 
evolutionary time, “[i]t is sheer hubris to think that we can ignore all but the newest room.”498  
Indeed, Sloan Wilson thinks claims that humans are “uniquely intelligent, moral, flexible, and 
capable of aesthetic appreciation” are mostly “self-congratulatory and suspect as factual 
claims.”499  He thinks it empirically established that “other species far surpass our intelligence for 
specific tasks and that traits associated with goodness can evolve in any species, given the right 
environmental conditions.”500   
Nevertheless, Sloan Wilson admits that humans possess a unique capacity to construct their own 
social environments, and indeed “evolutionary social constructivism” is the core of his moral and 
political philosophy.501  The essential problem for morality, religion, and politics, in Sloan Wilson’s 
scheme, is that “[s]ome individuals are driven to benefit themselves at the expense of others or 
their society as a whole.”502  To illustrate this problem, he surveys various game-theoretic models 
of altruism.   
In a chapter titled “Love Thy Neighbor Microbe,” for example, he describes a bacterial species, 
Pseudomonas flourescens, which creates a polymer mat that sticks the bacteria together in a 
colony.503  The mat is biologically expensive to create, and eventually some mutant bacteria 
instead devote energy to reproduction.  When the mutants begin to thrive, the mat collapses, 
and the colony disintegrates.  “Thus,” Sloan Wilson observes, “is the glue of civilization dissolved 
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by sloth!”  And such “examples of good and evil among microbes can be repeated without end 
because they are based on inescapable facts of social life.”504  All of this maps directly onto human 
behavior and human folk concepts of “good” and “evil.”  But, Sloan Wilson concludes, “[i]f the 
traits that we associate with goodness can evolve, then we can make them more common by 
providing the right environmental conditions.  Far from denying the potential for change, 
evolutionary theory can provide a detailed recipe for change.”505 
Of course, the behavior of these bacteria has nothing to do with what most Christian theologians 
and philosophers traditionally have called “good” and “evil” because those categories relate to 
intentional states and transcendentals.506  If the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy and the 
Christian, Islamic and Jewish traditions have anything to say about it, a microbe is neither “good” 
nor “evil” because microbes have no capacity for intentional participation in a “good” that is 
beyond themselves, nor can microbes intentionally deny “the good” and thereby abandon 
themselves to “evil.”  Microbes indeed do not have intentional “selves,” or in the grammar of 
Christian theology, “souls.”  Even the Eastern / Buddhist traditions to which Sloan Wilson seems 
drawn – he seems to think the Dali Lama would approve of his naturalist reductionism – locate 
“reality” in a transcendent realm, although finally in a very different way than in the West.  But 
Sloan Wilson has already made his a priori commitment to absolute naturalism, so he has 
dismissed several thousand years of historical reflection on “good” and “evil” tout court.  Here 
we must remark on Sloan-Wilson’s cry of “Hubris, all hubris!” (Yet what is “hubris” in a naturalistic 
game-theoretic world without transcendent virtues?) 
Similarly, Michael Graziano, Professor at Princeton University’s Neuroscience Institute, denies 
any sense of the transcendent:  
When we say we are conscious, aware, self-aware, in conscious 
control of our actions, have a stream-of-consciousness 
understanding of ourselves, what we really mean, apparently, is 
this:  there is a system in the brain whose job is to construct models 
of intentionality of other people or of ourselves; and right or 
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wrong, confabulated or not, the self-model, continuously updated, 
continuously refined, supplies the contents of our conscious 
mind.507 
Since the author of this phenomenon is merely a system in the brain, Graziano says, “this sense 
of consciousness – a soul on a trajectory through waking life – is a perceptual illusion.  It is a 
perceptual model that is at best a simplification and sometimes plain wrong.”508 All intentionality 
is reducible, for Graziano, to individual neurons.509  And what seems like the product of self-
reflexivity, awareness, and language – the sorts of cultural things Mithen and Tattersall argue 
radically distinguish modern humans from all other creatures – are merely “memes” that cause 
certain neurons to fire.510  Graziano is particularly keen to apply his notion of neurobiology and 
memeology to religion:  “[b]elief after belief,” he proclaims, “each component of a religion is 
ultimately present for one historical reason; the religion was better able to spread and survive 
because of it.  Darwinian evolution selected for those traits.”511 
Notwithstanding Graziano’s confidence in memeology, the concept is highly problematic.512 
Nevertheless, there is something insightful about memeology:  it at least recognizes the 
phenomenon of “culture” as something that exists and exerts causality.  The neurobiologist 
Graziano’s memeology does not mix well with the anthropologist Tattersall’s rejection of 
universals (half-hearted though it turns out to be), nor can it be squared with evolutionary 
biologist Sloan Wilson’s absolutist constructivism.  If cultural units replicate and spread akin to 
genes, then they have the capacity to become universals.  A common cultural substrate might 
become as universal as a common biological substrate, and just as some common biological 
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features demarcate a species, so might some common cultural features.  Indeed, memologists 
commonly point to religion, belief in the “self” and in other “selves,” and the “illusion” of free 
will as essentially universal units of human culture, notwithstanding their efforts to spread new 
and contrary memes to those notions.   
This reference to the “illusion” of free will, however, highlights another problem for memeology.  
If materialism is true, how can we speak of “culture,” the “will” or the “mind” at all?  There could 
not be any such entity as a cultural replicator, because “culture” must be more than the sum of 
the material that produces “culture.”  If Van Gough’s Starry Night is finally only described in terms 
of the matter that makes up the pigments and canvas arranged in patterns forced by the 
neurochemicals in Van Gough’s brain – neurochemicals that in their production, distribution, 
transmission, or reception apparently fell outside the normal distribution for homo sapiens 
sapiens, judging by Van Gouhg’s obvious mental illness – then there is nothing about Stary Night 
that could comprise “culture.”  “Culture,” “pigments,” “canvas,” “patterns,” “brain,” “Van 
Gough,” “Starry Night,” and so-on, would be signs without signifying anything real.  In 
metaphysical terms, if materialism is true, neither memeology nor any other theory of “culture” 
can be true.  And since “law” is a persistent feature of human culture, if materialism is true, then 
there can be no metaphysical realism in the concept of “law.”  The next Chapter describes how 
some scholars have used neuroscience to reach precisely that conclusion. 
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Chapter 4:  Neuro-Law and the End of Persons 
The previous chapter surveyed human evolution in relation to the development of human 
“culture” and law.  We have seen that paleoanthropologists speak of a “cultural explosion” that 
dramatically sets our species apart from anything that preceded it.  The capacities that facilitated 
this unprecedented shift may relate to language, brain structure, or some combination of such 
factors.  It is reasonable to include “law” as one of the fruits, if not one of the defining features, 
of this phase in which human beings dramatically became distinct from all other creatures on the 
Earth.   
But we have also seen that paleoanthropologists shrink from the conclusion that the “cultural 
explosion” reflects any sort of emergence or irruption of transcendence.  Even more so do 
neurobiologists and sociobiologists  reject any notion of transcendence.  For them, self-
awareness and transcendence must be illusions of the brain, and “culture” must, at most, reflect 
the spread of “memes.” 
Legal theorists have not missed the implications of the new reductive sociobiology and 
neuroscience for “folk” concepts of the rule of law.  Many legal scholars have become interested 
in the emerging field of “Law and Neuroscience,” or “Neurolaw.”513  This chapter reviews and 
critiques neurolaw discourse.  This discussion prepares the way for a positive theological account 
of “law” in Chapter 4. 
1. The Emergence of NeuroLaw 
Popular science writers and scholars alike often suggest that the “mind” is the last unopened 
black box in the universe.514  Modern neuroscience promises to crack open this box by unlocking 
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and demystifying human consciousness, conscience, and will.   It seems that each day reveals a 
new discovery, from the identification of brain regions associated with specific emotions, 
perceptions and memories to the translation of human visual impulses onto computer screens.515  
Such research offers the hope of new treatments for debilitating neurological diseases such as 
Epilepsy and Parkinson’s, better therapies for depression, anxiety, sleep disorders, and other 
maladies, more effective reconstructive techniques and prosthetic devices for disabilities caused 
by stroke, brain damage and other traumatic injuries, and deeper insights into cognition, mental 
performance, and learning, among other benefits.  The rapid progress of brain and 
neuroscientific research therefore is rightly cause for celebration. 
There are, however, dangers lurking within this framework of progress.  Modern neuroscience 
operates under a presumption of scientific naturalism.  In part, this reflects the methodological 
presupposition of all modern natural science:  a “scientific” explanation is one that makes 
reference only to “natural” phenomena.516   In significant part it is also a metaphysical 
assumption about what is real, or at least what is possible.  The “mind” or “will,” many 
neuroscientists argue, is simply an epiphenomenal product of lower level processes that are 
hidden from what we (mistakenly) call “consciousness.”  Human beings do not have any real 
“freedom.”  We are entirely creatures of “law” – the laws of nature.517 
This connection between neuroscience and the laws of nature has informed the emerging 
discourse in “neurolaw.”518  In the relevant literature, “neurolaw” encompasses as wide variety 
of research programs and perspectives.  Many neurolaw scholars are exploring how the new 
insights drawn from brain scans and other neuroscientific findings might be used as evidence in 
                                                     
515 See Nishimoto, Vu, Naselaris, Benjamini, Yu and Gallant, “Reconstructing Visual Experiences from Brain Activity 
Evoked by Natural Movies,” Current Biology 21:19, 1641-1646 (September 2011), available at 
http://www.cell.com/current-biology/abstract/S0960-9822%2811%2900937-7. 
516 See, e.g., Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Science” (defining “science” as “knowledge about or study of the 
natural world based on facts learned through experiments and observation”), available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/science. 
517 See Chapter 3.5. 
518 See Chapter 3. 
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a courtroom, for example, to establish diminished mental capacity to commit a crime.519  These 
generally are salutary efforts consistent with traditional scholarship and practice on the use of 
scientific evidence in the courtroom. Neurolaw scholars are seeking to better understand, for 
example, how diagnostic tools such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) might or 
might not be useful as evidence in the courtroom.520  Such evidence might help determine the 
presence of brain injury in a negligence case, assess mental capacity in a competency hearing, or 
define “brain death” for purposes of interpreting a medical advance directive.521  More 
controversially, fMRI evidence could bear on the mens rea requirement in criminal law when the 
defendant suffers from some mental defect, or on whether a witness is telling the truth.522  Such 
uses of the best available empirical science to help clarify the application of legal rules represents 
the way in which the law’s general principles become instantiated in particular situated contexts. 
But “neurolaw” also refers to efforts to explain and reform the legal system based on 
neuroscience.  If the human “mind” or “will” is reducible to the laws of nature, then the cultural 
artifacts of the human mind that that affect the will – in particular, positive law – likewise are 
reducible to the laws of nature.  If positive law is reducible to the laws of nature, then Ockham’s 
Razor suggests that the unnecessary term should be elided and we should acknowledge that 
jurisprudence is really only the study of human behavior from the bottom up.  That is, what we 
call “positive law” is in fact epiphenomenal, and what are “real”are only the brute facts of nature.  
“Jurisprudence” is actually just “sociology,” or more accurately, “jurisprudence” is actually just 
“sociobiology.” 
Some of the more candid neurolaw scholars acknowledge and celebrate this reductionistic 
program.  Neurolaw, for them, represents an opportunity to erase the final traces of 
jurisprudential moralism that seem irrepressible in common-sense “folk” conceptions of positive 
law.  Mainstream modern academic legal scholarship has long been suspicious of connections 
                                                     
519 See Owen D. Jones, Jeffrey D. Schall & Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience (Sandy:  Aspen 2014); The 
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience Website, available at 
http://www.lawneuro.org/. 
520 See, e.g., Neal Feigenson, “Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence:  On the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of 
fMRI,” in Michael Freeman and Oliver R. Goodenough, Law, Mind and Brain (Franham:  Ashgate 2009). 
521 Ibid. at 25. 
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between “law” and “morality.”  In particular, since the nineteenth century, American legal 
scholarship has been deeply influenced by “legal realism” (not to be confused with metaphysical 
realism), which holds that positive law is produced “from below,” in the concrete realms of 
sociology, economics, and evolutionary psychology, and not “from above,” in the ethereal realm 
of transcendent ethics.  The Kantian separation between facts and values has thoroughly invaded 
modern American jurisprudence.  Neurolaw presents an opportunity to cement this gap 
empirically with the hard data of brain scans. 
2. The Path of the Law:  Reductive NeuroLaw 
Reductive neurolaw scholars argue that neuroscience completely rewrites the concept of “law” 
because it destroys any meaningful concept of intentionality.  They want to replace any notion 
of autonomous general legal principles with neurobiology.  Law, like everything else, could be 
fully explained by science. 
For these reductive neurolaw scholars, neuroscience suggests that “the brain is a physical entity 
governed by the principles and rules of the physical world,”and that “brain determines mind.”523  
Contemporary neuroscience thereby claims to elide the soul and the mind – what many 
neuroscientists call “the ghost in the machine.”524  All of the faculties attributed in Medieval 
Christian theology to the "sensitive soul" ("locomotion, appetite, sensation, and emotion"), as 
well as the intellectual faculties attributed to the human "rational soul," these scientists suggest, 
can or will be accounted for by brain functions.525  As Martha Farah of the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Center for Neuroscience & Society puts it, “as neuroscience begins to reveal the 
mechanisms of personality, character, and even sense of spirituality dualism becomes strained. 
If these are all features of the machine, why have a ghost at all? By raising questions like this, it 
seems likely that neuroscience will pose a far more fundamental challenge to religion than 
                                                     
523 Brent Garland, ed., Neuroscience and the Law:  Brain, Mind and the Scales of Justice (New York:  Dana Press 
2004). 
524 See Ibid.  For the origin of the term “ghost in the machine,” see Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Chicago:  
Univ. of Chicago Press 1949). 
525 See Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies (Cambridge:  CUP 2006), 55-69. 
125 
 
evolutionary biology.”526  Not just religion, but law as well, can be reduced to neuroscience.  
Farah notes with some understatement that "[t]he idea that behaviour is determined by physical 
causes is hard to reconcile with the intuitive notions of free will and moral agency on which our 
legal systems are based.”527  
Indeed, “free will” is an illusion, many neurolaw scholars argue.  Among their most compelling 
bits of evidence for this claim are studies, based on the pioneering work of Benjamin Libet, 
suggesting that the brain signals the body to engage in actions before we become consciously 
aware of the action we will take.528  This “precognition” suggests that our actions are automatic 
responses to stimuli and that our conscious “decisions” are really merely ex post determinations 
not to “veto” what the brain has already signaled its readiness to do.  We have, at best, “free 
won’t” rather than “free will.”529  Therefore, “according to neuroscience, no one person is more 
or less responsible than any other for actions.  We are all part of a deterministic system that 
someday, in theory, we will completely understand.”530  The notion of “responsibility” is only a 
“social construct,” law is an instrumentalist tool useful for engineering of the society we are 
constructing, and the society we are constructing ultimately is reducible to the evolutionary 
history embedded in our brains.   
David Eagleman, Director of the Initiative for Neuroscience and the Law at the Baylor College of 
Medicine, is a leading proponent of this view.531  Eagleman states the issue for neurolaw as 
follows: "the crux of the question is whether all of your actions are fundamentally on autopilot 
or whether there is some little bit that is ‘free’ to choose, independent of the rules of biology."532   
                                                     
526 University of Pennsylvania Center for Neuroscience & Society website, available at 
http://neuroethics.upenn.edu/index.php/section-blog/28-articles/72-science-and-the-soul (last visited March 10, 
2010). 
527Martha Farah, "Responsibility and Brain Function," available at  http://neuroethics.upenn.edu/index.php/penn-
neuroethics-briefing/responsibility-a-brain-function 
528 Garland, Neuroscience and the Law, supra Note 48, 56. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Ibid. at 68. 
531 See http://www.nuelaw.org (last visited October 28, 2011). 
532 Daivd Eagleman, Incognito:  The Secret Life of the Brain (New York:  Pantheon 2011), 166. 
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Eagleman offers a seemingly mundane example: the every-day activity of driving home from 
work and opening the front door of one’s home.533  Most of us will realize, if we reflect on these 
actions once we are comfortably seated on the couch after a long day, that we drove home on 
mental auto-pilot and that we opened the door without thinking about the location of the 
doorknob.  If our route had been changed because of road construction, or if our significant other 
had installed a new door with a different type of opener, things would have been different:  these 
new facts would have required greater attentiveness.  For Eagleman, this means that the 
conscious aspect of returning home from work is only a “little bit” of the story.  Once we become 
habituated to the routine, it becomes automatic.534  The same is true, he argues, for all of our 
actions, including what we mistakenly attribute to intentionality.   
In a recent interview, Eagleman acknowledged that his view of neurobiology undermines 
libertarian notions of personal autonomy and free will.535  Asked, whether neuroscience 
completely erodes or at least challenges the notion of individual autonomy, he replied, “I’m 
afraid it does,” “you are your biology,” and “what I’m pretty certain about now is that to whatever 
extent we have free will it is only a bit player in what actually happens in people’s lives.”536   
Eagleman asserts that “[t]he unique patterns of neurobiology inside each of our heads cannot 
qualify as choices; these are the cards we’re dealt.”537  He suggests that “it is difficult to find the 
gap into which to slip free will – the uncaused causer – because there seems to be no part of the 
machinery that does not follow in a causal relationship from the other parts.”538  He argues that 
concepts of “blame” should be replaced with “science” and that “[b]lameworthiness should be 
removed from the legal argot.”539  Blameworthiness is merely a “backward-looking concept that 
                                                     
533 Ibid. 
534 Ibid. 
535 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wSQY7zHk5y8 (last visited October 28, 2011).   
536 Ibid.  Of course, he did not explain how his views about biological determinism are consistent with his 
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demands the impossible task of untangling the hopelessly complex web of genetics and 
environment that constructs the trajectory of a human life.”540 
Eagleman’s near-mechanistic view of human nature is reflected in his bold and ultimately 
frightening vision of the legal system.  Since people do not really possess moral agency, the 
question for the law is not whether the accused is to blame for his or her conduct, but rather 
whether there is something “different” about the person’s neurobiology that led the person to 
act in a certain way.541  We should think about criminal conduct “[i]n the same way we think 
about any other physical process, such as diabetes or lung disease.”542   
Eagleman admits that, at present, only in relatively rare cases can we assert with confidence that 
a person’s anti-social conduct was caused by an identifiable brain condition, such as a tumor, but 
this, he claims, is merely a problem of technology.543  In principle, he suggests, science will one 
day be able to measure biological states with a degree of comprehensiveness and granularity 
that will permit a full diagnosis of criminal conduct.  Culpability, he argues, should not “be 
determined by the limits of current technology.”544 In place of traditional legal concepts of fault 
and blame, Eagleman proposes a “forward-looking” system in which criminals would receive bio-
feedback treatments designed to retrain their brains towards “pro-social behavior.”545   
How does Eagleman define what “pro-social” should mean in a world of neurobiological 
determinism?  He speaks of “social contracts,” “society’s needs,” and what we can “hope for” as 
“a society that respects individual rights and freedom of thought.”546  All of these concepts, of 
course, presuppose the very “folk” concepts of freedom, autonomy, and intentionality that 
Eagleman’s neuroscience supposedly deconstructs. Yet for Eagleman, these concepts are merely 
artifacts of evolution.  “A meaningful theory of human biology,” he argues 
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Cannot be reduced to chemistry and physics, but instead must be 
understood in its own vocabulary of evolution, competition, 
reward, desire, reputation, avarice, friendship, trust, hunger, and 
so on – in the same way that traffic flow will be understood not in 
the vocabulary of screws and spark plugs, but instead in terms of 
speed limits, rush hours, road rage, and people wanting to get 
home to their families as soon as possible when their workday is 
over.547 
Instead of assuming people ordinarily possess a degree of agency that allows them to choose 
whether to abide by the law, Eagleman argues that “criminals should always be treated as 
incapable of having acted otherwise.”548   
 The role the legal system would then shift from assigning blame based on agency to changing 
the law-breaker’s brain state in order to produce more desirable behavior.  This would be 
accomplished by a “prefrontal workout,” consisting of cognitive biofeedback.549  A person’s 
sentence – their prescribed prefrontal workout regimen – would depend on the degree to which 
the person’s biology is “modifiable,” based on some as-yet-undiscovered measure of 
neuroplasticity.550 The concept of variable neuroplasticity is important, Eagleman observes, 
because contrary to the ideals of developed democracies, all people are not created equal:  
“[w]hile admirable, the notion [of human equality] is simply not true.”551 People vary widely both 
in nature and in nurture.552 With this truth in hand, we could “tailor sentencing and 
rehabilitation” to the individual’s specific neurobiological make-up.553 
If neurolaw is truly to fulfill its promise, why doesn’t an ardent believer such as David Eagleman 
go all-in for lobotomies, chemical castrations, and other more direct biological interventions?  
“The ethical problem,” Eagleman suggests, “pivots on how much a state should be able to change 
its citizens.”554  This is a “landmark problem” in neuroscience:  “as we come to understand the 
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brain, how can we keep governments from meddling with it?”555  One of Eagleman’s concerns is 
that legal advances of recent years, such as civil rights legislation, should not be compromised:  
“[o]ur social policies work to cement into place the most enlightened ideas of humanity and to 
surmount the basest facets of human nature.”556 
3. NeuroLaw and the Camp 
Reductive NeuroLaw advocates such as David Eagleman never explain what terms like “should” 
or “meddling” or “enlightened” or “surmount” or “basest facets” might mean in his neuro-world.  
Nor does he venture any suggestion about why some behaviors should qualify for a prefrontal 
workout while others ought to be left unchecked, or encouraged.  In a world without 
transcendence, why should one organism’s immanent frame be preferred over another’s?  
Eagleman recites notorious examples of pedophiles and mass murderers whose conduct clearly 
was influenced by significant brain traumas or invasive tumors.  What makes their brain states or 
their conduct abnormal and therefore subject to correction?  Why ought “governments” not 
possess the power to meddle with citizens’ brain states?  In an evolving sociobiological matrix, 
there are no “neuro-rights” (a term Eagleman inexplicably introduces and then drops); there are 
only game-theoretic solutions for passing along genes. 
To move from extreme examples such as pedophiles and mass murderers, consider a society in 
which people who hold undesirable ideas and engage in other anti-social practices – say, rallies 
and demonstrations for political or religious causes opposed by the majority of the populace – 
are sent to re-education camps for prefrontal workouts.  To refine the example, let us admit that 
people are not in fact created equal, and that the task of determining which rallies and 
demonstrations are anti-social is taken on by an elite class specially bred for this task.  To risk the 
reductio ad Hitlerum, Visions of Aryan supremacy, Communist China during the Cultural 
Revolution, contemporary North Korea, and Orwell’s “1984” are not far off.557  These are not new 
ideas, dressed up though they may be in the trendy lingo of neuroscience. 
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Eagleman, to be fair, is not advocating a neuroscientific totalitarian state, but there appears to 
be no reason why not.  There simply is no basis in neuroscience for his expressed preference of 
liberal democratic values or for any other notion of human dignity inscribed in the law.  Having 
given up on a meaningful notion of persons and agency, he destroys the basis for understanding 
“human equality” as something that transcends differences in mental capacity.558   
Indeed, Eagleman at times seems uncomfortable with his own logic.  In an effort to critique any 
concept of an immaterial soul – which he refers to as “the extrabiological soul” – he rehearses 
various examples of how brain states, chemical alterations (such as cocaine) and brain injuries 
can affect behavior, and concludes that “invisibly small molecules we call narcotics, 
neurotransmitters, hormones, viruses, and genes can place their little hands on the steering 
wheel of our behavior.”559  Quoting neuroethicist Martha Farah, he asks 
if an antidepressant pill can help us take everyday problems in 
stride, and if a stimulant can help us meet our deadlines and keep 
our commitments at work, then must not unflabbable [sic] 
temperaments and conscientious characters also be features of 
people’s bodies?  And if so, is there anything about people that is 
not a feature of their bodies?560 
“If there is something like a soul,” Eagleman says, “it is at minimum tangled irreversibly with the 
microscopic details.”561  “From this point of view,” he notes, “you can see why biological 
reductionism has a strong foothold in modern brain science.”562   
                                                     
558 Cf. Stephen R.L. Clark, Biology & Christian Ethics,,264 (noting that “[i]f our bodies and minds have been 
constructed from chance innovations by evolutionary selection, without any regard to Beauty or the Good, it may 
be true that most minor deviations will be less ‘fit’. . . .  But their fitness is of no serious concern to any 
disillusioned eye.  Why should we not rearrange things to secure whatever it is we still find we want? . . . . If we 
retain a residual, ‘superstitious’ belief that pain (not just my pain) is ‘bad’ we might even reckon it better to 
extinguish living creatures and their pain altogether.”).   
559 Ibid. at 209. 
560 Ibid. (quoting Farah, M.J., “Neuroethics:  The Practical and the Philosphical,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9: 34-
40 (2005)). 
561 Eagleman, 209. 
562 Ibid. 
131 
 
But then, remarkably, Eagleman undermines his entire thesis with a critique of reductionism 
based on emergence.563  Reductionism, he says, “isn’t the whole story.”564  He critiques the sort 
of genetic reductionism that drove the Human Genome Project and concludes that “successive 
levels of reduction are doomed to tell us very little about the questions important to humans.”565  
He nods towards systems biology by noting that “the contributions from the genome can really 
be understood only in the context of interaction with the environment” and argues that 
“knowledge of the genes alone is not sufficient to tell you much about behavior.”566  He offers 
the example of reducing an airplane to a hunk of metal, and concludes that “[t]he concept of 
emergent properties means that something new can be introduced that is not inherent in any of 
the parts.”567   
So much for the way Eagleman initially framed the “crux of the question” concerning law and 
responsibility:  he apparently agrees that there can be a meaningful concept of will and 
responsibility that need not propose a mind “independent of biology.”  Indeed, he agrees that 
will and responsibility need not even emerge from the brain alone:  “[w]ithout a doubt,” he says, 
“minds and biology are connected – but not in a manner that we’ll have any hope of 
understanding with a purely reductionist approach.”568  And later he concludes: 
When we talk about ‘the brain’ and behavior, this is a shorthand 
label for something that includes contributes from a much broader 
sociobiological system.  The brain is not so much the seat of the 
mind as the hub of the mind.569 
After this statement, it is hard to comprehend what all the fuss is about.  It seems, then, that 
Eagleman wants it both ways:  he wants neuroscience to replace notions of agency and 
culpability, but at the same time he wants to speak holistically of things like “desire,” 
“friendship,” “trust,” “people,” and “families.”   
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In fact, Eagleman’s approach is question-begging on multiple fronts.  First, Eagleman assumes 
that any part of the brain that is “free” to choose must comprise a “little bit.” But what is meant 
by “little?”  Throughout his book, Eagleman gives examples that suggest the brain is comprised 
of multiple independent control systems that operate below conscious awareness.  He argues 
that what we call “consciousness” is a sort of executive control module that becomes active when 
circumstances require mediation between the sub-conscious control systems – a situation that, 
in quantitative terms, represents a small portion of our overall brain function.  It appears, then, 
that Eagleman’s term “little bit” is quantitative:  only a small portion of our waking brain activity 
may be dedicated to conscious decision-making. This may be true, but Eagleman simply begs the 
question whether the qualitative aspects of the activity he assigns to conscious decision-making 
are a “big bit” of what we mean by “consciousness” and “responsibility.”570   
4. NeuroLaw and the Normal Distribution 
 
In an evolving universe, taken solely on its own terms, there is no normative force to the term 
“normal.”  There are populations, which always exhibit some degree of genetic diversity, and 
there is change over time.  There is no sense in which organisms should conform to any “norm” 
external to survival in the context of the selective pressures on the organism.  Perhaps a rough 
analogy to a “norm” would be a species’ fitness landscape – that is, the parameters of the 
environment the species inhabits.571  The notion is that natural selection will direct a population 
toward the mean fitness level as determined by the organisms’ environment.572   
Let us return to Ian Tattersall’s reference to the normal distribution.  We could imagine a 
statistical normal distribution in which the mean fitness level represents what Eagleman means 
by “normal” behavior.  This is a great leap of imagination given the complexity of human 
behavioral interactions (can “a behavior” even be isolated from other behaviors?), but 
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nevertheless we shall simplify for the sake of discussion.  In a normal distribution, more than 25% 
of the set falls between one and two standard deviations from the mean, as illustrated below:573 
 
Would Eagleman propose that 25% of the population be assigned to reeducation camps for 
prefrontal workouts?  In the United States, this would encompass about 780 million people.  
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, over 1.6 million people were incarcerated in State and 
Federal prisons in the U.S. as of 2009.574  Extending Eagleman’s cognitive workout program to 
people beyond one standard deviation of the mean therefore would represent a massive 
expansion of the criminal justice system, without precedent in world history.  Or, perhaps, 
Eagleman would require cognitive workouts for only the roughly 2% who fall on the tails outside 
two standard deviations of the mean?  This would cover about 6.8 million people in the U.S. – 
about six times the number now incarcerated.  Who would decide where to draw this line?  Do 
the 68% within one standard deviation of the mean get to decide, or the 95% within two standard 
deviations? 
A significant problem here – which is also a problem with Tattersall’s reference to the normal 
distribution – is that, in strictly evolutionary terms, particularly in terms of the concept of fitness 
landscapes, it is doubtful whether there is any such thing as a homogenous normal 
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distribution.575  Biologists who favor the idea of fitness landscapes distinguish between “global” 
and “local” landscapes, and argue that segments of a broader population can move toward a 
fitness mean dictated by local niche conditions, which might represent a different mean that that 
of the aggregate population.  The resulting picture is more like a set of hills and valleys rather 
than a single normal distribution:576 
 
So what might the fitness landscape look like for human social behaviors?  Would there be local 
populations in which optimal behaviors include things like forced marriage of young girls, slavery 
and spousal abuse?  It seems there would be, or else such behaviors would not recur so often 
throughout human history.  Within such populations, presumably there would be no need for 
cognitive workouts to correct such behavior.  If anything, people who fall a standard deviation or 
two outside this local mean (such as, perhaps, some brave young woman who desired 
independence and an education) would be candidates for reeducation.  Curiously, this might 
indeed describe the socialization process for young girls in some contemporary societies that 
blend tribalism with radical Islamism (the Taliban). 577 
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Biologist and new atheist popularizer Sam Harris tackled precisely the problem of the treatment 
of women in radical Islamist societies in an audacious TED talk, entitled “Science Can Answer 
Moral Questions.”578  Early in his talk, consistent with Eagleman, Harris claims that “a suicide 
bomber’s personality … is a product of his brain.”579  Yet, later, he flashes a picture of a woman 
wearing a Burqa, and claims that everyone in his audience knows it is unhealthy and bad for this 
woman to be forced to wear a Burqa “involuntarily.”580  But isn’t the woman’s choice to wear the 
Burqa, or her compliance with the social norm that impels her to wear the Burqa, a product of 
her brain?  And doesn’t the tradition of Burqa-wearing reflect something about social strategies 
in the fitness landscape of Islamic societies, with deep historical roots in the cultural dress 
practices of the ancient near east?  Why should Harris’ historically recent Western liberal 
democratic values trump the survival strategies of the near eastern societies in which the Burqa 
is valued?  
5. Law and Science 
The drive to make the law “scientific” is not in the first instance the result of any empirical 
observations of evolutionary biology or neuroscience.  Rather, it is rooted in the broader 
intellectual movement towards legal positivism and instrumentalism.   In his insightful book Law 
as a Means to an End, Brian Tamanaha describes the shift in Anglo-American law towards legal 
instrumentalism starting in the nineteenth century.581  Tamanaha traces how “law” in the West 
became unmoored from any transcendent source and began to occupy the place of a “science.”  
He explains that  
Science is oriented toward uncovering causal relations, effects and 
functions, formulated in terms of principles or laws.  Non-
instrumental views portrayed law as an immanent ordering (of the 
universe or of the community).  Under a scientific view, law would 
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come instead to be seen as the source of social order -- to produce 
social order is the function or purpose or end of law.  In turn, this 
new perspective, over time, would open up questions about the 
efficiency and utility of law in carrying out its functions.  The subtle 
but fundamental difference can be put thus:  law is order, versus 
law maintains order."582 
Tamanaha notes that in the Anglo-American legal tradition, historically, “law was not seen as an 
empty vessel that could be filled in with whatever content might be desired by law makers to 
serve whatever end was desired.”583  There were various theories of legal legitimacy, including 
“natural law, principle and reason, or customs from time immemorial,” all of which finally located 
law in some transcendent source.584  But, according to Tamanaha, a variety of intellectual 
currents, including Spenserian social Darwinism, laisez faire economics, and Benthamite 
utilitarianism, contributed to the rise of “legal positivism” throughout the nineteenth century.585  
Legal positivism is a form of “command” theory of law, in which the law is simply whatever the 
authority with the power to enforce it says it is.586  Legal positivism is readily twinned with legal 
instrumentalism, which understands the law as a tool for achieving ends that are essentially 
infinitely malleable.587  Thus the law becomes severed from any transcendent source beyond the 
chosen instrumental ends instantiated in the will of whoever has the power to enforce the law. 
This notion that law is reducible to power and will is reflected in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr.’s influential essay The Path of the Law, delivered at the opening of Boston University Law 
School and published in the Harvard Law Review in 1897.588  Holmes’ essay is so important that 
it occupies the opening slot in David Kennedy and William Fishers’ compilation of The Canon of 
American Legal Thought.589   
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Holmes opens his essay with the claim that “[w]hen we study law we are not studying a mystery 
but a well-known profession.”590  From the study of precedent – the “oracles of the law” – Holmes 
argued, the law student can discern the nature of legal duties.591  A legal duty is not a moral idea, 
but rather “is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made 
to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court.”592  The law exists to deter the “bad man,” 
for “[a] man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practiced by his neighbor 
is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to 
keep out of jail if he can.”593  Therefore, Holmes told the newly matriculated Boston University 
law students, “[i]f you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, 
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not 
as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the 
vaguer sanctions of conscience.”594 
The law in esse, for Holmes, had nothing to do with morality.  Indeed, only “confusion of thought” 
could result from any equation of law and morality.595  Instead, Holmes wondered aloud 
“whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the 
law altogether, and other words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything 
outside the law.”596  If this were possible, Holmes mused, judges might better understand their 
role as social engineers.597  Indeed, Holmes looked “forward to a time when the part played by 
history in the explanation of [legal] dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research 
we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for 
desiring them.”598   
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A key “step towards that ideal” for Holmes was “that every lawyer ought to seek an 
understanding of economics.”599  Holmes concluded his germinal essay with a nod to the form of 
practical reason that underwrote his philosophy:   “Read the works of the great German jurists,” 
Holmes advised, “and see how much more the world is governed to-day by Kant than by 
Bonaparte.”600  There were no choices for Holmes other than the seemingly opposite poles of 
rational freedom and dictatorial tyranny. 
There is a profound irony here that seems to escape neurolaw scholars such as David Eagleman:  
Justice Holmes wrote the infamous U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Buck v. Bell, a 1927 case that 
upheld the forced sterilization of mentally retarded persons.601  In that case, Holmes wrote that 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call 
upon the best citizens for their lives.  It would be strange if it could 
not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for 
these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, 
to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.  It is better for 
all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring 
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can 
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.  
The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough 
to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.602 
The climactic line of Holmes’ opinion in Buck v. Bell is widely regarded as one of the most 
embarrassing in the history of U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence:  “Three generations of 
imbeciles are enough.”603 
6. From the Bad Man to Homo Economicus to Homo Irrationaliblis 
 
In the contemporary history of American legal thought, this conjoining of legal positivism and 
legal instrumentalism has tended to break into two sometimes contradictory streams:  the law 
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and economics movement, and critical legal studies (“CLS”).604  Law and economics seeks to 
explain legal rules in terms of microeconomic principles.  CLS seeks to explain legal rules by 
deconstructing the power relations behind the rules.  CLS can be critical, indeed hostile, to law 
and economics, but in some ways they are natural bedfellows.  It is law and economics, after all, 
that supplies the notion of “capture,” which shows how most regulatory requirements result 
from the influence of power industries that influence (“capture”) the regulators.   
But law and economics, following Holme’s Kantian bent, purports to offer a “scientific” analysis 
of legal rules that can supply an objective basis for policymaking.605  Perhaps for this reason, over 
the past twenty five years or so, law and economics has been a reigning paradigm for legal 
scholarship, while CLS has declined except among pockets of diehard adherents (often among 
dispossessed groups such as racial minorities, women, and the LGBT community).  To be sure, 
there are other very important paradigms in the legal academy that eschew the positivism behind 
both law and economics and CLS, notably deontological approaches informed in one way or 
another by John Rawls.606  Nevertheless, law and economics continues to represent a default 
“scientific” posture for many legal scholars.607 
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In recent years, however, the law and economics movement has witnessed a significant shift 
occasioned by the rise of behavioral economics.608  Classical microeconomics assumes rational 
utility-maximizing actors who act on perfect information, a model which even neoclassical 
economists admit almost never obtains in the real world.609  Behavioral economics, in contrast, 
assumes that people do things for reasons that are often irrational or sub-rational.610  This 
assumption is informed by empirical behavioral psychology studies.611  And behavioral economics 
has spawned a robust new sub-discipline of behavioral law and economics.612   
Behavioral law and economics scholarship can offer useful and interesting insights concerning 
the limitations of rational choice theory for legal analysis.613 Critics have argued, however, that 
the experiments upon which behavioral economics is based are not transposable to real-world 
market situations.614  Here reductive neurolaw enters the stage.  The supposedly harder science 
of neurobiology – “harder” precisely because it is a natural science rather than a social science – 
might confirm the behavioral economists’ insight that human beings are finally not rational 
beings.  NeuroLaw thereby promises the fulfillment of Holmes’ Kantian dream. 
7. Cautionary Tales 
Contrary to Eagleman and Harris, some neurolaw scholars recognize the need for caution when 
reframing concepts of positive law, particularly in light of the expansive possibilities seemingly 
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opened up by neuroscience.  Stephen J. Morse, a law professor and Associate Director of the 
Center of Neuroscience & Society at the University of Pennsylvania, asks “why so many 
enthusiasts seem to have extravagant expectations about the contributions of neuroscience to 
law, especially criminal law.”615  Morse suggests that  
Many people intensely dislike the concept and practice of 
retributive justice, thinking that they are prescientific and harsh.  
Their hope is that the new neuroscience will convince the law at 
last that determinism is true, no offender is genuinely responsible, 
and the only logical conclusion is that the law should adopt a 
consequentially based prediction / prevention system of social 
control guided by the knowledge of the neuroscientist-kings who 
will finally have supplanted the platonic philosopher-kings.616 
Careful neurolaw scholars recognize some of the problems with reductionism.  As Morse notes, 
“the arguments and evidence that [reductive neurolaw scholars] use to convince others 
presuppose the folk-psychological view of the person.  Brains do not convince each other, people 
do.  Folk psychology presupposes only that human action will at least be rationalizable by mental 
state explanations or will be response to reasons – including incentives – under the right 
conditions.”617   
Morse notes that “the legal view of the person does not hold that people must always reason or 
consistently behave rationally according to some preordained, normative notion of 
rationality.”618  Instead, he argues, the law requires only that people be capable of “minimal 
rationality according to predominantly conventional, socially constructed standards.”619  Such a 
notion of minimal rationality is important because law governs people, not machines: 
Machines may cause harm, but they cannot do wrong, and they 
cannot violate expectations about how people ought to live 
together.  Machines do not deserve praise, blame, reward, 
punishment, concern, or respect because they exist or because of 
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the results they may cause.  Only people, intentional agents with 
the potential to act, can do wrong and violate expectations of what 
they owe each other.620 
“If human beings were not rational creatures who could understand the good reasons for action 
and were not capable of conforming to legal requirements through intentional action or 
forbearance,” Morse reminds us, “the law could not adequately guide action and would not be 
just.”621 
Nevertheless, Morse argues that, even if neuroscience destroys any concept of human free will, 
this would not matter one bit for legal doctrine.622  Morse argues that “[c]riminal law doctrines 
are fully consistent with the truth of determinism or universal causation that allegedly 
undermines the foundations of responsibility.  Even if determinism is true, some people act and 
some do not.”623   
In one sense, Morse is correct.  A society could continue to employ legal doctrines that govern 
behaviors even if those behaviors are unfree.  And even where legal doctrines govern mental 
states – such as the mens rea requirement in criminal law – the law could define those states 
with reference to the absence of certain kinds of constraints on action, such as unusual 
behavioral states defined as “insanity.”  But what Morse does not admit is that this would 
represent a radically different concept of “law” than what has historically obtained in Western 
culture.  In particular, this conception would sever the notion of “law” from the notion of 
“justice.”  Why ought a society to enact laws that discourage some behaviors and encourage 
others? That is a question of justice.  Without some concept of human freedom, there is no 
concept of justice, at least not in any sense familiar to our sense of “law.” 
Later in the same article, Morse seems to recognize this conundrum.  He notes that “[d]espite 
our lack of understanding of the mind-brain-action relation, some scientists and philosophers 
question whether mental states have any causal effect, thus treating mental states as psychic 
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appendixes that evolution has created but that have no genuine function.”624  This claim, he 
admits, is made by “serious, thoughtful people,” and, if true, “would create a complete and 
revolutionary paradigm shift in the law of criminal responsibility and competence (and more 
widely).”625  Nevertheless, Morse suggests, “given our current state of knowledge, there is little 
scientific or conceptual reason to accept” this broader critique.626  It seems that Morse thinks 
some concept of supervenience might preserve a notion of intentionality that would underwrite 
some idea of rationality and justice in the law.  And yet, Morse suggests that “[m]ost informed 
people are not dualists concerning the relation between the mind and the brain.  That is, they no 
longer think our minds—or souls—are independent of our brains and bodies more generally and 
can somehow exert a causal influence over our bodies.”627    
8. NeuroLaw and neo-Aristotelianism 
A few bold philosophers and legal scholars have gone further than Morse and have more directly 
taken neurolaw to task for its reductionism of “mind” to “brain.”628  Michal Pardo and Dennis 
Patterson, in their article Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, observe that “[i]f 
anything unites the various problems and projects of neurolegalists, it is the belief that the mind 
and the brain are one. This belief has spread far beyond neurolegalists, for it is a pervasive feature 
of much of the current literature and research in neuroscience as well as more popular 
writings.”629  Yet, Pardo and Patterson ask, “does it make sense to attribute to the brain 
psychological attributes normally attributed to persons? Can we intelligibly say that the brain 
thinks, perceives, feels pain, and decides? If we cannot, what are the implications for 
neuroscience and law?”630 
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Pardo and Patterson believe that the reduction of “mind” to “brain” is a category mistake.  
Nevertheless, they reject what they describe as the “Cartesian dualism” that posits the “mind” 
as a separate “substance” or “entity.”631  Instead, they opt for a phenomenological distinction 
between “behavior, reactions and responses of the living human being in the stream of life” and 
the “brain functions and activities” that relate to these behaviors, reactions and responses.  “This 
is the key,” they claim, “to the mereological fallacy and the undoing of the reductive impulses of 
neurolegalists”: 
Behavior is something only a human being (or other animal) can 
engage in. Brain functions and activities are not behaviors (and 
persons are not their brains). Yes, it is necessary that one have a 
brain in order to engage in behavior.  But the reduction of a 
psychological attribute to a cortical attribute is a fallacious move 
from whole to part.632 
A key aspect of Pardo and Patterson’s critique is the interpretation of the relation between 
empirical observations of brain states and specific behaviors.   For example, Pardo and Patterson 
criticize a “neuroeconomics” study of activity in different brain regions triggered by monetary 
offers in a ultimatum game.633  The authors of the study concluded that different brain regions 
fire when the offer is perceived to be “unfair,” and suggested that legal rules (presumably 
regarding information disclosures) could be tweaked to mitigate bad economic choices.  Pardo 
and Patterson conclude that  
The evidence does not support their interpretations. First, it makes 
no sense to say that the brain “decides,” “reasons,” or 
“adjudicates” anything.  Second, all that the neuroscientific 
evidence shows with regard to the ultimatum game is what 
subjects' brains were doing while they (the subjects) were deciding 
whether to accept or reject the offer. Consider the following 
analogy. Suppose one's face turned red whenever he was angry. 
Now, suppose when faced with an unfair offer in the ultimatum 
game, his face turned red right before he rejected the offer. Surely 
we would not say that the person's face rejected the offer--why, 
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then, conclude that his insula cortex did so because it too turned 
colors on an fMRI machine?634  
But if Pardo and Patterson reject what they consider the Cartesian-dualist and reductionist 
accounts of the mind-brain relation, what do they offer instead?  They propose that “[t]he mind 
is not an entity or substance at all (whether non-physical or physical). To have a mind is to possess 
a certain array of rational powers exhibited in thought, feeling, and action.”635  This concept, they 
suggest, is rooted in Aristotle.  As they interpret Aristotle,  
the mind is not a part of the person that causally interacts with the 
person's body. It is just the mental powers, abilities, and capacities 
possessed by humans. Likewise, the ability to see is not a part of 
the eye that interacts with other parts of the physical eye. Under 
this conception, the question of the mind's location in the body 
makes no sense just as the location of eyesight within the eye 
makes no sense.636  
They argue that this Aristotelian concept is “materialist/physicalist” in the sense that to lose the 
brain is also to lose the mind, but that it is nonreductive because “the mind is not identical with 
the brain.”637  And this means that, although neuroscience can contribute to law, it cannot 
overtake law.638 
Pardo and Patterson have done a great service in debunking some of the grander claims of 
neurolaw and in introducing Aristotle back into the mix.  But Pardo and Patterson are careful to 
steer away from Aristotelian notions of causation.  They invoke Aristotle as a sort of paradigmatic 
example of holism in the mind-body relation, but without offering the context for Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism, which finally only makes sense within a thicker metaphysical matrix than that to 
which Pardo and Patterson are prepared to commit.  The next Chapter explores such a thicker 
matrix. 
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Chapter 5:  Mind, Law, Soul 
Our discussion of method in theology and science in Chapter 1 raised basic questions about the 
relationship between “faith” and “reason,” particularly in connection with Christian theology’s 
claims about God, creation, and the human person.  In Chapter 2, we began to relate these 
concerns to discourse in paleoanthropology and evolutionary neurobiology concerning human 
uniqueness, agency, and the human mind.  In Chapters 3 and 4, we saw how the 
paleoanthropological and neurobiological discourse has been extended into the “science” of 
jurisprudence, we began to critique some reductive concepts of neurolaw, and we suggested that 
at least some contemporary analytic philosophers are looking towards a new Aristotelianism in 
order to preserve some meaningful concept of “law.”  In this Chapter, we will examine other 
contemporary philosophical and theological responses to neuroscientific reductionism, both in 
the general philosophy of mind and in ethics, and we will begin to build a case for the continued 
importance and rationality of “orthodoxy” – that is, of an essentially Nicene Trinitarian faith and 
an essentially Chalcedonian Christology – in response to reductive neurolaw.  In the process of 
this argument, we will return to one of our basic motivating questions:  who was, and who is, 
“Adam?” 
1. The Cartesian Mind and Mental Causation 
Neurobiological and sociobiological reductionists often speak as though there is no reasonable 
debate among serious thinkers about the elision of “mind” or “soul” in contemporary accounts 
of the person.  The common foil here is the sort of dualism attributed to René Descartes.639  In 
this account, Descartes proposed that “a person is a wholly immaterial substance possessing 
mental but no physical characteristics,” and that this inner “person” somehow causes events in 
the physical body (for Descartes, famously, through the pineal gland).640  Descartes was 
motivated towards such an extreme form of dualism because he accepted the prevailing 
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Newtonian view of physical determinism and did not think it possible for mechanistic processes 
to produce intelligent or apparently intelligent activities such as thought and speech.641   
Descartes’ effort to explain the mind developed in the disenchanted cosmos of early 
modernity.642  The cosmic order of Ideas, in which “reason” involved a teleological participation 
in the good that draws the soul towards being and gives the universe intelligibility, was replaced 
by a cosmic order of mechanism, in which reason or rationality was located entirely in the internal 
representation of an external world of physical causes.643  Contemporary physicalists understand 
the ways in which quantum mechanics changed Newtonian mechanism, but they agree with 
Descartes’ most basic metaphysical assumption:  that the participatory ontology of the Platonic 
/ Aristotelian / Scholastic world has no purchase on reality.  The Cartesian notion of mind, for 
them, is a sort of vestigial appendage that does no real work. 
If that were the sum of the equation, the physicalists surely would be right.  The various 
arguments Descartes mounted in support of the disembodied mind or soul lack traction.  His 
“conceivability” argument – that if it is possible to conceive of one’s self as existing apart from a 
body, then this is in fact so – fails because it is possible to imagine all sorts of things that are not 
real states of affairs.644   Descartes’ “divisibility” argument – that the self is a simple and whole 
substance while the physical body is composed of parts and divisible – is question begging.645  
Perhaps, as today’s physicalists argue, the self is neither simple nor a substance, and there really 
is no such thing as a unified, persistent “self.”646  Further, Descartes’ interactionist account of 
mental causation upon the physical violates empirical conservation laws.647  The non-physical 
force of the Cartesian mind cannot alter the momentum of the physical vital spirits Descartes 
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imagined were connected with bodily motion because to alter momentum requires the addition 
of physical energy.648  Nonreductive physicalists argue that their approach does not involve any 
of these problems because downward mental causation emerges from lower physical levels; 
there is no need to invoke new infusions of energy that would violate conservation laws.649 
It is certainly not the case, however, that a very narrow form of Cartesian interactionist dualism 
is the only sort of dualism on offer in the current philosophical debate over the “mind-body” 
problem.650  As E.J Lowe notes in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, “most of the current 
‘isms’ in the philosophy of mind are generated by the need felt by their advocates to propound 
and justify a broadly physicalist account of the mind and its capacities.”651  Nevertheless, other 
philosophers, including Lowe, opt for non-Cartesian dualist or idealist approaches to the mind-
body problem.652   
Lowe notes that good philosophers must “inform themselves as well as they can about a domain 
of empirical scientific inquiry before presuming to offer philosophical reflections about it.”653  But 
as science (by which Lowe means natural and physical science) “only aims to establish what does 
in fact exist, given the empirical evidence available to us,” these sciences cannot in themselves 
“tell us what could or could not exist, much less what must exist, for these are matters which go 
beyond the scope of any empirical evidence.”654  Physicalism may or may not be true, but science 
alone cannot reach this determination.  There is no a priori reason, then, to restrict the 
philosophical investigation of the mind-body problem to physicalist alternatives.655 
For Lowe, the issue turns on whether we are realists about mental states – that is, whether one 
“considers that states of thinking and feeling really do exist.”656  The reality of mental states, for 
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Lowe as well as for other dualists and even non-reductive physicalists, seems to be the principal 
driver of all contemporary non-reductive accounts of the mind.  If mental states are not real, then 
there seems to be no possibility of reflecting on propositions such as the reality of mental 
states.657   
Even reductive physicalists, Lowe notes, retain some notion of the reality of mental states.  Lowe 
distinguishes reductive physicalists from eliminative materialists in that “[r]eductive physicalists 
do not, in general, want to deny the very existence of many of the types of mental state talked 
about by functionalists, such as beliefs, desires and intentions.”658  Instead, reductive physicalists 
simply believe that “mental states of these types just are – that is, are identical with – certain 
types of brain states:  just as science has revealed, say, that the temperature of a heated body of 
gas is in fact identical with the mean kinetic energy of its constituent molecules. . . .”659  But this, 
as Lowe noted previously, is a fundamentally metaphysical claim that cannot be resolved by 
empirical science alone. 
In the extreme anti-realist view of eliminative materialism, in contrast, “states of belief, desire 
and intention simply do not exist, and hence a fortiori . . . such states are not identical with 
physical sates of any sort.”660  But this would mean, as Lowe argues, “to abandon also the very 
notions of truth and falsehood and therewith, it seems, the very notion of rational argument 
which lies at the heart of the scientific understanding of the world.”661  “It would be ironic 
indeed,” Lowe notes, “if the eliminative materialist, in his pursuit of a scientific theory of human 
behavior, could be convicted of undermining the very enterprise of science itself.”662   
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The fact that even the practice of meaningful empirical science seems to require some sort of 
realist account of mental states, Lowe concludes, provides a powerful argument for the reality of 
mental states.  The concepts of belief, desire and intention that eliminative materialists dismiss 
as “folk psychology,” Lowe concludes, should not “be viewed as a proto-scientific theory of 
human behavior but, rather, as part of what it is to be a human being capable of engaging 
meaningfully with other human beings.  They are not dispensable intellectual artifacts, but 
partially constitutive of our very humanity.”663 
Lowe argues that the problems with strong forms of Cartesian dualism can potentially be 
overcome by other ways of conceiving the causal interaction between mental and physical 
states.664  Lowe states the common causal closure argument in favor of reductive physicalism as 
follows: 
(1)  At every time at which a physical state has a cause, it has a fully 
sufficient physical cause.  (Call this the principle of the causal 
closure of the physical.) 
(2) Some physical states have mental states amongst their causes.  
(Call this premise the principle of psychophysical causation.) 
(3) When a physical state has a mental state amongst its causes, it 
is rarely if ever causally overdetermined by that mental state 
and some other physical state.  (Call this premise the principle 
of causal non-overdetermination.)665 
The principle of causal non-overdetermination “rules out the possibility that, whenever a mental 
state M is a cause of a physical state P, there is another physical state Q such that (a) Q is a cause 
of P and yet (b) even if one of the two states M and Q had not existed, the other would still have 
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sufficed, in the circumstances, to cause P to exist.”666  The example Lowe refers to here is a 
common one in the law of Torts and in criminal law:  a victim is shot simultaneously by two 
assailants, and the bullet from either gun would have been sufficient to cause death.667  In such 
a case, there are independently sufficient causes for the victim’s death, and both shooters are 
legally culpable.  Premise (3) in the argument above, however, rules out the possibility of such 
independently sufficient causes with respect to mental states that are causes of physical 
states.668  A mental state, according this argument, cannot comprise an independently sufficient 
cause of any physical state. 
From these premises, physicalists reach the following conclusion: 
(4) At least some mental states are identical with certain physical states.669 
 
In effect, with respect to causation of physical states, there is really only one shooter pulling the 
trigger. 
Although this argument seems logically sound, as Lowe notes, some of its premises may be stated 
too broadly.670  Most significantly, premise (1) can be stated in a weaker form: 
  (1*) Every physical state has a fully sufficient physical cause.671 
Since causation is a transitive relation, the replacement of (1) by (1*) can support a theory of 
mind that avoids the physicalist conclusion (4).672  If S1  is a fully sufficient cause of S2, and if S2 is 
a fully sufficient cause of S3, then S1 is also a fully sufficient cause of S3.673  But this does not imply 
that S3 is causally overdetermined by S1 and S2.  Lowe does not offer a specific example here, but 
we could return to the example of an accidental shooting that might be employed in Tort law.  
                                                     
666 Ibid. 
667 Ibid.,, 28. 
668 Ibid. 
669 Ibid. 
670 Ibid.,, 29. 
671 Ibid.,, 30. 
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Assume A deceptively advises B that a weapon B is holding is a relatively harmless paintball gun, 
when the gun is in fact a high powered rifle; and assume B shoots C with the gun in a paintball 
match and kills C.  To use the terminology of Tort law, both A’s deception and B’s action in pulling 
the trigger are “actual causes” of C’s death.  C’s death is not causally overdetermined by A and 
B’s actions together; indeed, the “chain of causation” requires that both A and B’s actions 
comprise actual causes of C’s death.  Questions of legal liability, of course, would remain.  It might 
be that B did not breach any duty of care and thus was not “negligent” in relying on A’s deceptive 
advice; or, it might be that B’s reliance on A’s advice was negligent, under the circumstances.  But 
both A and B’s conduct were in any event “actual causes” of C’s death.  But-for B’s pulling of the 
trigger, C would still be alive.674 
Consider then that mental state M is not identical with a physical state but is a cause of physical 
state P; and that physical cause Q is a fully sufficient cause of M.675  This would mean that both 
Q and M are causes of P.  P is not in this case causally overdetermined by Q and M, and premise 
(3) is satisfied without implying premise (4).676  But-for M, P would not have obtained; if not M, 
not P.  This is true even though Q also was a but-for cause of P. 
Lowe employs this version of (1*) to support an emergentist view of dualist interactionism.677  In 
taking that approach, Lowe commits himself to the plausibility of the assumptions that otherwise 
underlie the argument:  notably that every state has a “fully sufficient” physical cause, which 
obtains in both (1) and (1*).  According to Lowe, emergentist views, including his own, “hold that 
mental states have come into existence as a result of the natural evolution of highly complex 
biological entities, rather than through any kind of divine intervention by a being who exists 
‘outside’ the spacetime universe, such as God.”678  His concern is not to defend any sort of 
creationist account of the mind or soul, but simply to show that the causal closure of the physical 
does not rule out mental causation as a real cause of physical states.   
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But Lowe explicitly sets aside, for the purpose of evaluating this argument, the “not altogether 
uncontroversial” assumption in both (1) and (1*) “that there are no uncaused physical states.”679  
This assumption, Lowe notes, raises the issue of “free will and determinism,” as well as 
“cosmological and theological questions of whether there was a ‘first’ cause.”680  Lowe also 
brushes aside the argument that quantum indeterminacy undermines (1) and (1*) because, he 
argues, quantum indeterminacy obtains “on the atomic scale, rather than at the level of neural 
structure and function in the brain.”681 
2. Theology, Emergence, and the Soul 
Many theologians – probably the mainstream of the faith and science scholarship – like Lowe, 
accept the causal closure of the physical.  Instead of the soul, these contemporary theologians 
attempt to locate human will, intentionality and moral responsibility in emergent properties of 
physical systems.  The “soul” or “mind,” in this sort of system, is the capacity for downward 
causality made possible by emergent properties of the brain, body, and environment.682  Some 
contemporary theologians extend this concept of emergence to God Himself, either in a 
thorough-going way through process theology, or as a partial explanation for God’s interaction 
with the physical world.683 
Some aspects of emergentism are helpful for explaining the problem of the mind-body relation, 
as discussed in more detail below.  At the outset, however, it is important to note the 
metaphysical commitments emergentist theologians and philosophers make before embarking 
on their projects.   
Nancey Murphy, for example, is one of the leading Christian theologians working from an 
emergentist / non-reductive physicalist paradigm.  Murphy describes a variety of forms of 
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physicalist reductionism against which she contrasts her nonreductive physicalism.684  Notably, 
Murphy does not object to what she calls “ontological reductionism,” which she defines as “the 
thesis that higher-level entities are nothing but the sum of their parts.”685  One aspect of this 
ontological reductionism is  
the view that as one goes up the hierarchy of levels, no new kinds 
of metaphysical ‘ingredients’ need to be added to produce higher-
level entities from lower.  No ‘vital force’ or ‘entelechy’ must be 
added to get living beings from non-living materials; no immaterial 
mind or soul needed to get consciousness; no Zeitgeist to form 
individuals into a society.686 
Murphy states that she “take[s] ontological reductionism to be entirely unobjectionable, so long 
as it is applied to the cosmos itself and no illegitimate inferences are drawn from it regarding the 
source of the cosmos.”687  Her objection is only to “causal” reductionism, which she defines as 
the view that “the behavior of the parts of a system (ultimately, the parts studied by subatomic 
physics) is determinative of the behavior of all higher-level entities; all causation is ‘bottom-up’” 
– or, more prosaically, the view that “physics is doing all the work.”688  Murphy argues that 
physics cannot do “all the work” because lower-level causes are always embedded in higher-level 
systems generated by unique sets of relations among higher-level elements of the systems.689 
The systems level of relationships influences outcomes, and in fact influences the re-arrangement 
of elements at lower levels of causality.  Therefore, Murphy argues, causation cannot be reduced 
all the way down to the deterministic level of physics. 
Robert Van Gulick follows a similar systems-oriented model in his essay on the mind/body 
problem in Murphy’s edited volume on Evolution and Emergence.690  Van Gulick also 
acknowledges the a priori metaphysical commitment of emergentist models.  Nonreductive 
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physicalism, he says, “has emerged as more or less the majority view among current philosophers 
of mind.”691  This view “combines a pluralist view about the diversity of what needs to be 
explained by science with an underlying metaphysical commitment to the physical as the 
ultimate basis of all that is real.”692   
Similar to Murphy, Van Gulick argues that outcomes are not determined only by the “laws of 
physics,” but rather “by the laws of physics together with initial boundary conditions.”693  Natural 
systems supply higher-order “patterns of organization” that are irreducible to their physical 
constituents.694  Van Gulick argues that these higher-order patterns of organization are real 
entities, no less than their physical constituents.695  Indeed, Van Gulick argues for hypothetical 
worlds “that are like our world in having some lawful or causal order but which do not contain 
any physical matter.”696  In such worlds, “patterns exist that are very much like the patterns 
associated in our world with acquiring, possessing, and exploiting information.”697  This suggests 
that the “order of higher-level patterns” in our world reflects “a much more pervasive order that 
simply manifests itself in our world in physical realizations.”698  There is a very subtle move behind 
this claim:  Van Gulick takes a non-realist stance concerning physical “laws.”699  He asserts that 
“laws are statements or sentences in our theories of the world, not independent items among 
the furniture of the world itself.”700  The most basic reality, for Van Gulick, are systems of “stable 
self-sustaining recurrent states of the quantum flux of an irreducibly probabilistic and statistical 
reality.”701 
Both Murphy and Van Gulick, as leading representatives of non-reductive physicalism, pledge 
their bona fides to a non-dualistic metaphysic.  But both end up substituting “systems,” or, in Van 
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Gulick’s case, “information systems,” for the “spiritual” or “non-physical” components of the 
“Cartesian” and “Aristotelian” metaphysics they eschew.  Why this effort to render in physicalist 
terms realities that in Christian theology traditionally have been thought of as belonging to a non-
physical aspect of creation? 
Murphy cites the triumph of atomism over the Aristotelian ontology of matter and form.702  
Murphy credits this shift to Galileo and then to Lavoisier and Dalton.703  From atomism in biology 
to reductionism in chemistry, Murphy suggests, the atomist / reductionist program continued 
down to the level of physics.704  Thus, Murphy argues, “much of modern science can be 
understood as the development of a variety of research programs that in one way or another 
embody and spell out the consequences of what was originally a metaphysical theory.  It has 
been the era in which Democritus has triumphed over Aristotle.”705   
But if Murphy wants to argue that atomistic reductionism is wrong, why not look again at 
Aristotle?  The problem seems to relate to Divine action.  In a lawful or law-like universe, what 
“place” is there for Divine action?706  And in a lawful or law-like universe in which creatures, 
including humans, exercise some degree of agency, what explanatory power lies in the concept 
of “Divine” agency?707  Finally, if God acts in the universe, why does the universe exhibit so much 
pain and suffering (the “theodicy” problem)?708 
As Robert John Russell notes, the question of Divine action became particularly acute because of 
many of the key intellectual developments of the Enlightenment: 
Newtonian mechanics seemed to depict a causally closed universe 
with little, if any, room for God’s special action in specific events.  
With the ascendancy of deism in the eighteenth century, the scope 
of divine agency was limited to an initial act of creation.  Moreover, 
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David Hume and Immanuel Kant raised fundamental questions 
concerning the project of natural theology, challenged belief in 
miracles, undercut metaphysical speculation about causality and 
design, and restricted religion to the sphere of morality.709 
These crises led to the split between liberal Schleiermachian Protestantism and Fundamentalism, 
as well as to the Barthian neo-orthodox project, none of which, Russell notes, provided adequate 
responses to the problem of Divine action.710   
Russell provides a helpful topology of contemporary approaches to Divine action in light of this 
historical background.711  These include neo-Thomism (distinguishing primary and secondary 
causation – the “Aristotelian” approach); process theology (God acts “persuasively” but not 
“exclusively” in all events); uniform action (God acts uniformly in all events and the meaning and 
significance of those events are subjects of human interpretation); and four “personal agent” 
models, in which God either acts literally and directly in the world; God is immanent in and 
perhaps “embodied” by an organistic world; God is a non-embodied agent in the world; or God 
interacts with the world in the interstices of quantum probabilities and chaos theory.712  These 
different views map onto perspectives on the possibility of Divine “intervention” in the universe, 
including through miracles, and on the nature of such “miracles” -- for example, as suspensions 
of the laws of nature, or instead as acts within the laws of nature arranged in highly unusual 
ways.713 
Most of the contemporary theology and science literature on Divine action, Russell notes, 
explores “whether there are objectively special divine acts that are neither interventions nor 
suspensions of the laws of nature.”714  These include “top-down” or “whole-part” causality, in 
which God acts either in a higher level in nature or at the level of a physical boundary or system, 
and “bottom-up” approaches in which God acts directly at the quantum level in ways that 
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indirectly affect the macroscopic world.715  In the small sample of non-reductive physicalist 
accounts of “mind” above, Van Gulick’s view reflects a whole-part systems view of Divine action, 
and Murphy’s reflects a “bottom-up” approach that relies on God’s action in quantum 
improbabilities.716 
Murphy knows that the problem of divine action “is, at base, a metaphysical problem – one that 
cannot be solved by anything less radical than a revision of our understanding of natural 
causation.”717  Since she accepts the narrative that modern science’s reliance on the “laws of 
nature” has elided the higher levels of the Medieval hierarchy of being, she must attempt to 
create a new metaphysic of causation.718  According to Murphy, 
In the Medieval period, especially after the integration of the lost 
works of Aristotle into Western thought, God’s action in the world 
could be explained in a way perfectly consistent with the scientific 
knowledge of the time. Heaven was a part of the ‘physical’ cosmos.  
God’s agents, the angels, controlled the movements of the ‘seven 
planets,’ which, in turn, gave nature its rhythms.  But modern 
science changed all that, primarily by its dependence on the notion 
of laws of nature.719 
And so, Murphy substitutes God’s influence over quantum probabilities at the bottom of the 
causal layers of matter for any relation between matter and non-material transcendentals at 
higher orders of creation.720  Murphy also allows that God acts on the conscious actions of human 
agents, through varieties of religious experiences, consistent with her emergentist theory of 
mind.721  Even here, however, God influences human consciousness “by stimulation of neurons” 
through bottom-up causation beginning at the quantum level.722 
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Murphy is particularly keen to avoid accounts of divine action that interfere with the law-like 
behavior of the universe.  Since “[s]cience both presupposes for its very existence the strictly law-
like behavior of all entities and processes, and constantly progresses in its quest to account for 
observable phenomena in terms of elegant sets of interrelated laws,” an account of divine action 
that undermines the law-like behavior of the universe would unacceptably undermine the 
practice of science and destroy the program of interdisciplinarity between faith and science.723  
Murphy argues that, since the quantum level is probabilistic rather than law-like, making space 
for divine action at the quantum level does not interfere with the ordinary work of the 
sciences.724 
The strength of Murphy’s approach and others like it is that it takes seriously how the 
contemporary natural and physical sciences understand physical causation.  We are not exactly 
in Newton’s universe anymore, but it is not that classical physics have been elided.  Classical 
mechanics still accurately describe the motions of particles at the macro level and at sub-
relativistic speeds – the motions of things we interact with at a phenomenological level, such as 
navigating a car through traffic.  But classical mechanics no longer serve as the final level of 
explanation for such phenomena, because we are able to describe the probabilistic functions of 
quantum mechanics at a more basic level, including in the electrons and sub-atomic particles that 
make up the matter configured into a “car.”  And this means that the universe is no longer 
accurately describable as a rigid, deterministic system, but instead takes on the characteristics of 
a stochastic field of probabilities.725 
The problems with Murphy’s approach as it stands, however, are manifold, both scientifically and 
theologically.  The first essential problem is that Murphy’s approach, and others like it (such as 
John Polkinghorne’s), depends on a causal gap.  It is the old “god of the gaps” problem writ small 
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(small as in sub-atomic).  Scientifically, it is not at all clear that it will remain forever impossible 
to describe quantum realities in ways that close this apparent gap.  Indeed, the Holy Grail of 
theoretical physics remains the search for a “unified theory” that would unite general relativity 
and quantum mechanics – a “theory of everything” (“TOE”).726  A successful TOE might or might 
not result in a deterministic set of unifying physical laws, but even a TOE that left quantum realm 
as a stochastic space likely would elide the space for bottom-up Divine intervention that Murphy 
hopes to preserve.   
The leading candidate for producing a TOE, for example, is string theory.727  Many versions of 
string theory are tied to multiverse theories, and some multiverse theories posit an infinite set 
of multiverses in which there is at least one universe in which every quantum possibility is 
realized.  In such a scenario, Murphy’s quantum God would vanish.  There would be no need for 
the hypothesis that God moves our minds subatomically.  Our choices in this universe would 
simply reflect the realization in this one universe of one set within the probability bounds 
determined by unifying laws, and “we” will have made different choices in other universes.  All 
the probabilities will inevitably have been realized in all possible universes.  If all possible choices 
are always realized, there is no room for God, or even for “choice.”  On the scale of the multiverse, 
everything simply is.   
Of course, string theory and multiverses may not provide a true description of physical reality, so 
perhaps there is a genuine singularity, an undefinable and truly stochastic realm, at the quantum 
level.  But banking on such gaps does not usually prove a satisfactory strategy over the long run.  
Moreover, contrary to Murphy’s desire to develop a theory that will not impinge in any way on 
the practice of science, any gap theory of Divine action finally depends on the failure of the 
modern scientific method.  The modern scientific method depends precisely on the assumption 
that human beings are capable of closing every gap and of obtaining a TOE.  To claim that this is 
epistemically impossible is to speak a word against some of the presumptions of the modern 
scientific method. 
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Theologically, Murphy’s approach is deeply problematic for at least two reasons, one relating to 
human freedom, and the second relating to Christology and soteriology.  First, although it 
attempts to preserve human freedom, Murphy’s approach ends up sounding much like the 
Baroque Scholastic idea of Divine “premotion” of the human will.  This idea, attributed to 
Dominican theologian Domingo Bañez, involves God’s providential first motion in the human will 
to move the subject towards his or her choices for or against God.728  Bañez , of course, was the 
foil of the Jesuit Louis de Molina in the sixteenth century debates over providence, predestination 
and free will.729   
As David Bentley Hart has argued, the Bañezian idea of premotion not only destroys human free 
will, but threatens to destroy creation itself.  “It can plausibly be argued,” Hart says, “that, in a 
very real sense, the Bañezian God does not create a world at all, and that his species of ‘classical’ 
Thomism amounts only to what the greatest Catholic philosopher of the twentieth century, Erich 
Przywara, called ‘theophanism.’”730  If there is “physical premotion,” Hart argues persuasively, 
“all created actions would be merely diverse modalities of God’s will.”731  And if this is so, then 
God is not really distinct from the created world:  if God is merely “the supereminent source of 
all being, then – apart from some kind of effective divine indetermination of the creature’s 
freedom in regard to specific goods – there is no ontological distinction between God and the 
world worth noting.”732  Indeed, the erasure of the ontological distinction between God and 
creation is precisely the move taken by emergentists who are radical panentheists or process 
theologians and who go a step further than Murphy and locate God (or “God-consciousness”) as 
a product of or as embodied within or by the evolving universe.733  In contrast to Murphy’s 
implied Bañezian bent, combined with string theory and multiverses, such process theologians 
and radical panentheists can become the ultimate Molinists:  every possible universe known to 
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“Godself” is indeed not only known but realized, including a universe with a purpose that is 
located in God.734  Either way, little room for authentic human freedom remains. 
A second problem with Murphy’s approach is that its metaphysical commitments undermine 
orthodox Christology and thereby compromise theological anthropology and soteriology.735  A 
physicalist emergentism cannot adequately account for the dual nature of Christ.  The language 
of Chalcedon depends on a metaphysics of transcendentals and substances.  This is evident, first, 
in the attribute to Christ of a “reasonable soul” (ψυχῆς λογικῆς): 
he is perfect in Godhead and perfect in manhood, very God and 
very man, of a reasonable soul (ψυχῆς λογικῆς) and [human] body 
consisting, consubstantial with the Father as touching his Godhead, 
and consubstantial with us as touching his manhood….736 
…. 
In two natures, unconfusedly, immutably, indivisibly, inseparably 
[united], and that without the distinction of natures being taken 
away by such union, but rather the peculiar property of each nature 
being preserved and being united in one Person and subsistence, 
not separated or divided into two persons, but one and the same 
Son and only-begotten, God the Word, our Lord Jesus Christ….737 
The term ψυχῆς λογικῆς was adopted in opposition to the views of Appolinaris, who held that 
the Incarnation involved the inhabiting or possession of a human body containing an animal soul 
with the Divine Logos – that in Christ, the Divine Word took the place of the human soul.738  As 
                                                     
734 Such a move seems to inform, for example, Ted Peters, Anticipating Omega:  Science, Faith and Our Ultimate 
Future (Göttingen:  Vanderhoek & Ruprecht 2006).  For a discussion of this notion from a panentheist perspective, 
see Paul Davies, “How Many Universes?,” in Robert J. Russell, Ted Peters, and Nathan Illanger, God’s Action in 
Nature’s World:  Essays in Honor of Robert John Russell (Farnham:  Ashgate 2006). 
735 Cf. Stephen R.L. Clark, Biology & Christian Ethics (Cambridge:  CUP 2000),, 92 (noting that “[t]he deconstruction 
of a uniquely human nature needs further commentary from Christian thinkers:  after all, it is our nature that the 
Word took up, and that has been assumed to be a human one.  If it was not our nature that he assumed, since – 
qua human beings – we have no nature, what happened in the Incarnation that we need to recall and ponder?”). 
736 The Chalcedonian Definition, translated at Early Church Texts, available at 
http://www.earlychurchtexts.com/public/chalcedonian_definition.htm. 
737 The Chalcedonian Definition, translated at Early Church Texts, available at 
http://www.earlychurchtexts.com/public/chalcedonian_definition.htm. 
738 See Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, With a History and Critical Notes, comment on The Chalcedonian 
Definition, available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/creeds2.iv.i.iii.html; John Behr, The Nicene Faith:  
Formation of Christian Theology, Vol. 2 (Yonkers:  St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press 2004),, 392-401. 
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John Behr notes, “[t]he most serious problem concerning Apollinarius’ account of Christ is not 
simply his claim that Christ did not assume a human soul or mind, but whether there remains any 
point of contact between Christ and us:  ‘He is not a man, but like a man, for he is not 
consubstantial with man in the highest dimension.’”739  This leads to a “’failure to see in Christ 
the source and type of God’s project of reshaping all of humanity together, and every person 
individually, in God’s image, through the inner communication of divine life to a complete and 
normal human being.’”740 
It is difficult to see how a physicalist emergentist anthropology such as Murphy’s would avoid the 
same fate as applied to Christology.  If there is no “soul,” and the “mind” is merely the result of 
lower level physical processes, in what sense could Christ have had a nature “consubstantial 
(ὁμοούσιον) with us as touching his manhood?”  It is important to note that the sense in which 
Christ is “consubstantial (ὁμοούσιον) with us” differs from the sense in which Christ is 
“consubstantial (ὁμοούσιον) with the Father as touching his Godhead” in that his 
consubstantiality with the Father implies a unity of essence, whereas his consubstantiality with 
humanity implies a unity of nature and not essence.741  The Nicene Creed made plain that the 
Father, Son and Spirit are three persons in one essence, and preserved the Biblical witness to the 
fact that God is one.742  But human beings are not God, so the way in which Christ is ὁμοούσιον 
                                                     
739 Behr, The Nicene Faith,, 399 (quoting Apollonarius, Frag. 45 (from the Apodeixis, GNO 3.1, p. 165.7-9)). 
740 Ibid., Note 160 (quoting B.E. Daley, “‘Heavenly Man’ and ‘Eternal Christ’:  Apollinarius and Gregory of Nyssa on 
the Personal Identity of the Savior,” JECS 10.4 (2002),, 478). 
741 See Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, The Chalcedonian Definition, Note 66, 67. 
742 As John Behr notes, the Trinitarian theology of the Nicene Creed was not a new invention over 
against the Biblical witness.  See Behr, The Nicene Faith, Part 1, Introduction,, 7.  As Behr argues, 
it is not enough simply to assert the identity of the ‘economic’ Trinity and the 
‘immanent’ Trinity, or to emphasis that the ‘economic’ basis of our knowledge of the 
Trinity – that it is only the revelation of the Son in and through the Spirit that we can 
speak of God as Father – must correspond to how the Trinity actually is in ‘immanent’ 
terms.  These two dimensions of Trinitarian theology, economic and immanent, should 
never have been separated, even if they are subsequently reunited.  That Trinitarian 
theology results from reflecting on how the crucified and exalted Lord Jesus Christ 
reveals the one and only God as Father, in and through the Holy Spirit, who also enables 
adopted sons crucified with Christ to call upon the same God as Father, means that 
Trinitarian theology has less to do with the heavenly existence of the three divine 
persons than with this new manner of confessing the one God – as Father, in the Son, by 
the Holy Spirit. 
Ibid.,, 8. 
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with us differs and relates to the transcendentals of human nature.  If there are no 
transcendentals of human nature – if each person just is, as a particular person – then there does 
not seem to be any way in which Christ can be savingly related to humanity.  The term ψυχῆς 
λογικῆς therefore continues to do crucial work in the Chalcedonian definition.  It is by taking on 
the transcendental property of human nature shared by all persons – the ψυχῆς λογικῆς – that 
Christ shares in the common humanity of us all. 
A response may be that the emergent mind, capable of exercising downward causality and 
therefore capable of moral agency, is shared by Christ with all humanity.  There is simply an 
updating here of the Greek notion of ψυχῆς with a more scientifically accurate conception of an 
emergent capacity.  But once this emergent capacity is conceived in this fashion, it has been 
remade as a transcendental, and it ceases to represent a “physicalist” account of the person.743  
In an authentically physicalist account, the fact that particular individual homo sapiens sapiens 
each possess an emergent capacity for agency is nothing but a historical accident.  Within the 
possibilities of evolution, it may arise that some group of biologically homo sapiens sapiens 
develop a different sort of emergent capacity, or lose the existing emergent capacity.  In fact, the 
logic of evolution says that such flux is inevitable – flux is simply how evolution works.  There is 
no physicalist reason to identify the emergent capacity nonreductive physicalists such as Murphy 
equate with “mind” as a common and stable feature of human nature in which Christ could share 
and act savingly towards us.  To make that identification is to posit a transcendental and thereby 
to leave the world of mere physicalism behind. 
Perhaps some nonreductive physicalists would partially grant this argument with a back-handed 
nominalist move:  go head and call it a “transcendental” if you like, but realize that this is merely 
a convenient term for something that in the long evolutionary scheme of things is really in 
evolutionary flux.  This is a dubious move on its own merits because it cannot avoid words like 
“something” when referring to this property or capacity we are trying to define.  But it also 
                                                     
743 Cf. Neo-Aristotelian approaches to “substance” in Joshua Hoffman, “Neo-Aristotelianism and Substance,” in Dr. 
Tuomas E. Tahko, ed., Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (Cambridge:  CUP 2011).  As will be discussed 
further below, I believe theological approaches like Murphy’s suffer from a lack of engagement with the 
resurgence of Aristotelian thinking in metaphysics and the philosophy of science.  See generally, Tuomas E. Tahko, 
“In Defence of Aristotelian Metaphysics,” in Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics. 
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interferes with the concept of “freedom,” in which the transcendental of ψυχῆς must play a 
prominent role. 
Like Murphy, E.J. Lowe demonstrates that reductive physicalism need not obtain even in a purely 
naturalistic universe.  Unfortunately, however, like Murphy, Lowe seems to refer to theistic 
arguments for a universe that is not merely naturalistic only in terms of arguments from a “’first’ 
cause.”  Most modern theistic “first cause” arguments are of the sort that equate the Deity or 
“Intelligent Designer” with other causes in the universe.  Lowe, Murphy, and other nonreductive 
physicalists, does not seem prepared to consider “causation” other than in terms of diachronic 
cause and effect. This is a curious posture in light of the current state of philosophical discussion 
about the “laws of nature.” 
3. The Laws of Nature 
In Jewish and Christian theology, the Divine Command inheres not only in the Torah given to 
humans but also in God’s commands that establish and govern all of creation.  The creation poem 
of Genesis 1 is a series of spoken commands through which God brings order to primordial chaos:  
“Let there be Light,” “Let there be a vault between the waters to separate water from water,” 
and so-on.  There is no question about whether the chaos will or will not obey.  God speaks, and 
what He speaks is.  The midrash on Genesis 1 in the Gospel of John identifies this Divine command 
with God’s Wisdom, identifies God’s Wisdom with Christ, distinguishes the persons of Christ and 
“God,” and yet identifies Christ with God:  “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was 
with God, and the Word was God” ( Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος, καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, καὶ Θεός 
ἦν ὁ Λόγος) (John 1:1).  In Paul’s epistles the Divine command and Wisdom are personified in 
Christ such that the being of the universe inheres in the being of Christ:  “The Son is the image of 
the invisible God, the firstborn over all creation. For in him (ἐν αὐτῷ) all things were created: 
things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or 
authorities; all things have been created through him (δι' αὐτοῦ) and for him (εἰς αὐτὸν). He is 
before all things (αὐτὸς  ἔστινπρὸ  πάντων), and in him all things hold together (πάντα ἐν  αὐτῷ 
συνέστηκεν).”  (Colossians 1:15-17).  Creation is in him, through him, for him, and before him, - 
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ἐν αὐτῷ, δι' αὐτοῦ, εἰς αὐτὸν, αὐτὸς  ἔστινπρὸ -- and in him (ἐν  αὐτῷ) everything is synestēken 
– put together, synthesized, put together into an inter-locking whole, “understood.”744 
Modern scientific accounts of causality drew on a deracinated version of Divine command theory 
in that, after Newton, the natural “laws” were divorced from being:  this action produces that 
reaction, in causal chains that can, in theory, be described with mathematical precision through 
equations that do not in themselves require any person to operate.  To account for the entire 
causal chain would be to demonstrate that each action along the chain is determined by its 
antecedents. 
In terms of the analytic philosophy of science, this sort of flat Newtonian notion of causality has 
been out of favor since at least David Hume’s treatment of the subject.  Hume, in fact denied that 
we can know causality at all, because of the problem of instance confirmability.  The observation 
that B follows A in an observed instance does not guarantee that B will always follow A.  We can 
only claim that B has always followed A in the past, and that B will always follow A in the future, 
if we assume that whatever properties affect the relations between B and A are stable, uniform 
and unchanging.  But since we cannot observe every instance of the relation between A and B in 
the past, and since we cannot presently observe the future of relations between A and B, there 
is no way empirically to know that A “causes” B.  Hume therefore concluded that the idea of 
natural “laws” is semantic or a matter of custom and not necessarily real.745 
                                                     
744 See Strong’s Greek Concordance, 4919, available at http://biblesuite.com/greek/4920.htm. 
745 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Part II.   Hume states that “[a]ll events seem 
entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They 
seem conjoined but never connected. And as we can have no idea of anything, which never appears to our 
outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be, that we have no idea of connexion or 
power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical 
reasoning, or in private life.”  Hume did not want to deny the explanatory power of causation, so he located the 
sense of causation in experience rather than in logical induction:  “In all single instances of the operation of bodies 
or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or 
necessary connexion. But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the 
same event; we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion. We then feel a new sentiment or 
impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual 
attendant; and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for.”  Ibid. 
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Within the philosophy of science today, Humean approaches to natural “laws” remain 
important.746  Neo-Humeans focus on instance confirmability and counterfactual support as 
markers of things that could be called natural “laws.”  The greater number of instances that can 
be observed of B following A, the stronger the inference that A causes B; and the greater ability 
of the relation between A and B to obtain across other possible worlds, the stronger the modal 
force of the relation between A and B.  But this approach assumes that natural “laws” are entirely 
contingent.  In other possible worlds, the “laws” could be different.  Natural laws therefore are 
not embedded in a realist metaphysic, but are accidental features of the universe we happen to 
inhabit. 
The neo-Humean approach to natural laws does not in itself avoid determinism in a weak sense.  
We can still speak of laws, and of causal relations, and the systems of our universe are all that 
obtain for us – there is no transcendence.  In principle, a present observation that B followed A 
could be described in terms of all the relations that ever obtained in the history of the universe 
and that led to A and then to B given the things we would call “laws” in this universe.  But this 
non-realist approach to natural laws does avoid determinism in a hard sense – the universe could 
have been different, and nothing outside the universe determines the fate of the universe or of 
the things (including homo sapiens) within it. 
This sort of metaphysic underpins the contemporary debate in analytic philosophy over the 
problem of human free will.  Camps divide over whether the concept of “freedom” requires 
“libertarian” or “compatibilist” free will.747  Libertarians argue that “freedom” means, in any 
given situation, the ability to choose otherwise.  Compatibilists argue that “freedom” does not 
necessarily imply a counterfactual choice, but rather implies only that an agent’s capacities are 
functioning properly when a choice is made.   
                                                     
746 See, e.g., E. Zilsel, “The Genesis of the Concept of Physical Law,” 51 Phil. Rev. 245 (1942); A.J. Ayer, “What is a 
Law of Nature,” 36 Rev. Int. Phil. 144 (1956). 
747 See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Compatibilism,” available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#1. 
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Modern philosophical theologians in the analytic mode have largely accepted these categories.748  
One attempt at a theological response to the Humean notion of natural law and causality (which 
also was a response to Newtonian determinism) is to invoke the need for a first cause.  Unless 
the universe is eternal, something must have set the chain of causation going, and that something 
must itself be eternal – i.e., God.  To this sort of argument, critics such as Richard Dawkins rightly 
ask “but what caused God?”  Philosophically, this sort of argument reflects an incapacity to move 
beyond Humean accounts of freedom and causality.  Such accounts are being located once again 
in Aristotle. 
In his treatise “On the Soul,” Aristotle stated that the “soul” and the “body” are inseparable.  For 
example, comparing the soul to the potential power of a cutting tool and relating it to the power 
of sight, Aristotle said: 
the soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to the power of 
sight and the power in the tool; the body corresponds to what 
exists in potentiality; as the pupil plus the power of sight 
constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body constitutes the 
animal.749 
Yet Aristotle never simply equated the soul with bodily functions.   For example, he noted that 
“all those who define the soul by its power of knowing make it either an element or constructed 
out of the elements,” and he is keen to refute this sort of reductionism.750  Instead, for Aristotle, 
the soul is the form or source of the body: 
The soul is the cause or source of the living body. The terms cause 
and source have many senses. But the soul is the cause of its body 
alike in all three senses which we explicitly recognize.  It is (a) the 
source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end, it is (c) the essence 
of the whole living body.751 
                                                     
748 See, e.g., David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls , Good God:  The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford:  OUP 
2011). 
749 Aristotle, De Anima, II.1. 
750 Ibid., II.2. 
751 Id, II.4.  (emphasis added). 
169 
 
This reference to origin, source, and movement invokes Aristotle’s concept of causation.  
Aristotle recognized four kinds or aspects of causation:  material, formal, efficient and final.752  
The material cause is that out of which something comes, such as the bronze of a statue.753  The 
formal cause is the form or account of what it is to be something, such as the shape of a statue.754  
The efficient cause is the primary source of change or rest, such as the sculptor who chips away 
at the marble.755  The final cause is the end for which something is done, such as the production 
of a sculpture.756 
 Modern science recognizes only efficient and material causes.757  While this may be an important 
methodological limitation, it is unwarranted, without further explanation, as an overarching 
metaphysic.  Moreover, an Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian notion of “mind” (or “soul”) requires 
all these various senses of causation, and in particular final causation.758  If some sort of 
Aristotelian anthropology is a response to reductive NeuroLaw, as Pardo and Patterson suggest, 
then we must speak of where “law” comes from, what it means for “law” to be “law,” and of the 
ends or purposes of “law.”  That is, we must speak of “law” as having some transcendent telos, 
some source that also implies its ends. 
In fact, even in the academic philosophy of science literature, there has been a resurgence in 
Aristotelian thinking about the powers and dispositions of things.759  This move has been spurred 
in large part by Roy Bhaskar and other philosophers of science who espouse an approach they 
call “critical realism.”760  As noted in Chapter 1 above, a related move is made by many “science 
                                                     
752 See, e.g., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Aristotle on Causality,” available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/ (last visited January 29, 2013). 
753 Ibid. 
754 Ibid. 
755 Ibid. 
756 Ibid. 
757 For a discussion of causation in modern science, see Nancey Murphy, “Divine Action, Emergence, and Scientific 
Explanation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Science & Religion (Cambridge U. Press 2010), 244-47. 
758 See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Aristotle’s Psychology,” available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-psychology/ (last visited February 9, 2013). 
759 See Ruth Groff and John Greco, eds, Powers and Capacities in Philosophy:  The New Aristotelianism (London:  
Routledge 2013). 
760 For a definition of critical realism, see Mervyn Hartwig, Dictionary of Critical Realism (Routledge 2007), 96:  “A 
movement in philosophy, social theory and cognate practices that seeks to under labour for science and other 
ways of knowing in order to promote the cause of TRUTH and FREEDOM, hence the transformation of social 
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and religion” scholars, although their version of “critical realism” differs in some important 
respects from the Bhaskar school.761  Nevertheless, there are important areas of overlap, 
particularly in relation to anthropology and the problem of “mind.”762 
Bhaskar’s metaphysic is phenomenological, realist, and essentialist.763  Bhaskar argues that  
[t]he world consists of things, not events.  Most things are complex 
objects, in virtue of which they possess an ensemble of tendencies, 
liabilities, and powers.  It is by reference to the exercise of their 
tendencies, liabilities and powers that the phenomena of the world 
are explained.  Such continuing activity is in turn referred back for 
explanation to the essential nature of things.764 
Similarly, Nancy Cartwright and John Pemberton state that “Aristotelian powers . . . are part of 
the basic ontology of nature – at least as nature is pictured through the lens of modern 
science.”765  Cartwright and Pemberton argue that, although “[t]he scientific revolutionaries 
                                                     
structures and other constraints that impeded that cause and their replacement with wanted and needed ones, or 
emancipation.” 
761 See Ibid. at 98.  The Dictionary of Critical Realism suggests that  
In another neck of the realist philosophical woods, the ‘critical realism’ of the Canadian 
Jesuit philosopher-theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904-84) appears to commit the 
epistemic fallacy in viewing the real as that which is known … as does that of the French 
Thomist philosopher, Jacques Maritain….  The current movement in theology known as 
‘critical realism’ … was significantly influenced by the tradition of representative realism, 
but is currently being taken in a strongly Bhaskarian direction by Alister McGrath (2002).  
By and large, while there are obvious commonalities between all these various kinds of 
realisms, one can say that Bhaskarian CR is sharply distinguished from the others by its 
robustly transcendental and immanently critical method, its outright rejection of 
empiricism and positivism, its thoroughgoing emergentism, its understanding of social 
science as necessarily explanatory critical (entailing rejection of the fact-value and 
theory-practice dichotomies) and its explicitly emancipatory stance. 
Ibid. 
762 The Dictionary of Critical Realism states that “CR’s major contribution on this subject is synchronic emergent 
powers materialism … which shares with Searle’s biological naturalism … a refusal of the basic terms of debate set 
out by dualism and reductionism, on the basis that both are rooted in an ontological idealist-materialist 
dichotomy.  Dualism leaves consciousness as a mysterious non-corrigible intangible, whilst reductionism, in the 
name of materialism, puts aside the totality of a conscious being which is the very property that gives rise to 
questioning the nature of mind in the first place.  SEPM argues that consciousness is an emergent non-reducible 
property of the material brain.”  Ibid. at 314-15. 
763 See Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (New York:  Verso 1977). 
764 Ibid. at 51. 
765 Nancy Cartwright and John Pemberton, “Aristotelian Powers:  Without Them, What Would Modern Science 
Do,” in Powers and Capacities in Philosophy, supra Note 851, 93.  See also Ruth Groff, “Whose Powers?  Which 
Agency?,” in Powers and Capacities in Philosophy, supra Note 851, 209 (noting that “[i]t is fair to date to the mid-
1970s the contemporary retrieval of causal power for which Hume couldn’t locate an original impression.”).  See 
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made fun of this kind of Aristotelianism,” the notion that there are “powers” in nature that can 
combine to produce various sorts of “canonical effects” is essential to a non-reductive 
understanding of nature and to the practice of science itself.766  They wish to elide Hume’s 
skepticism about causation by showing how “nomological machines” produce predictable effects 
that support meaningful claims of causation.767  For Cartwright and Pemberton, such effects 
result from a nomological machine’s “emergent powers which are not to be found in its 
components.”768  Nomological machines, then, are not reducible to underlying “laws,” but rather 
employ powers that are the canonical effects they contribute to the machine.769  Moreover, 
powers are not arbitrary in relation to nomological machines.  For Cartwright and Pemberton, 
“arrangement matters.”770  This ontological move – rendering “powers” as emergent features of 
nature – thus eliminates the problems of reduction and instance confirmability that so troubled 
Hume.771  As Cartwright and Pemberton conclude, their account of powers “has major 
implications for debates about levels and about reduction.  The arrangement of parts is 
immanent in the whole but not in each of the parts.  Machine arrangements can have emergent 
powers not possessed by the parts.”772 
Further, as Ruth Groff observes, realism about powers as stable emergent properties of machine 
arrangements “carries with it implications for the theorizing of human agency. . . .”773  Groff 
argues that among the emergent powers of human beings is the power to act as genuine 
causative agents.774  In a chapter that explores the link between powers and agency, Groff 
invokes Brian Ellis’ canonical discussion of how realism about essential powers differs from 
Humeanism.775  Ellis identified his view with Leibniz:  “[l]ike Leibniz,” Ellis says, “I suppose that 
                                                     
also Louis M. Guenin, “Developmental Potential,” in Tuomas E. Tahko, ed., Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics 
(Cambridge:  CUP 2011). 
766 Ibid. at 93-94. 
767 Ibid. at 94. 
768 Ibid. 
769 Ibid. at 95. 
770 Ibid. at 109. 
771 Ibid. at 105 (noting that, in contrast to Hume, “[o]ur account is a powers account precisely because we take 
exercisings seriously as a central part of scientific ontology.”). 
772 Ibid. at 111. 
773 Ruth Groff, “Whose Powers?  Which Agency?,” in Powers and Capacities in Philosophy, supra Note 851, 207. 
774 Ibid. at 208. 
775 Ibid. at 211. 
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laws of nature are grounded in intrinsically powerful properties.”776  For Ellis, Groff, and other 
neo-Aristotelian philosophers of science, human beings possess dispositional properties relating 
to natural powers.  For example, a person who comes in from the cold and sits by a fire becomes 
warm due to the fire’s power to warm, and now that person also has the power “to warm some 
other thing, such as the body of anyone who wants to come and cuddle.”777  This implies a space 
for ethical action:  the person who obtains the fire’s power to warm may share or not share that 
power with others.778   
These neo-Aristotelian philosophers sound like they are connected to the participatory ontology 
of classical Christian theology and Greek thought.  But generally they are attempting to speak of 
powers as something emergent from lower orders of nature, without any prior referent or 
antecedent end.  As Charlotte Witt notes, Aristotle’s ontology of causal powers requires “the 
central presence of teleology.”779  Witt argues that “[w]ithout  the teleological thread it is unclear 
on what basis it makes sense to extend a realist theory of causal powers from natural causation 
to human activity.”780  But a notion of Aristotelian teleology, Witt suggests, is missing “from many 
contemporary versions of realist theories of causal powers.”781   
One reason for this lacuna might reflect a failure to understand the classical Christian doctrine of 
creation.  For example, Ellis argues that powers “are not imposed by God on things that are 
intrinsically powerless, nor are they just regular patterns of behavior that happen to be displayed 
by such things, just as if they were imposed by God.”782  Ellis’ conception of how natural powers 
might relate to Divine causation here betrays a failure to understand the traditional Christian 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo.  God neither stamps pre-existing matter with powers, nor randomly 
imbues things with powers by fiat.  In the traditional Christian conception, created things have 
dispositions, powers and capacities because they participate in the being of the living Triune God, 
                                                     
776 Ibid. 
777 Ibid. at 218 (quoting Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum, “Getting Causes from Powers,” at 6, in Ruth Groff, 
ed., Revitalizing Causality:  Realism About Causality in Philosophy and Social Science (London:  Routledge 2008)). 
778 See Ibid. 
779 Charlotte Witt, “Aristotelian Powers,” in Ruth Groff, ed., Revitalizing Causality. 
780 Ibid. at 137 
781 Ibid. at 130. 
782 Ibid. at 212 (quoting Brian Ellis, Scientific Essentialism (Cambridge:  CUP 2011), 265). 
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and moreover the dispositions, powers, and capacities of all things are finally oriented towards a 
telos in God.   
In fact, as Eleonore Stump has noted, “what is distinctive about this contemporary resurgence of 
Aristotelianism in metaphysics is its subtle difference from standard versions of Aristotelianism, 
such as that which can be found in the high Middle Ages, in the work of Aquinas, for example.”783  
Stump notes that contemporary neo-Aristotelianism meshes with Aquinas’ thought in that both 
understand a material thing to comprise a dynamically organized system that cannot be elided 
through reduction.784 For Aquinas, this system-level dynamic configuration was the “form” that 
gave the thing its “function.”785  But contemporary neo-Aristotelians are generally committed to 
the principle of the causal closure of the physical.786  Aquinas, Stump suggests, would agree with 
the causal closure of the physical with respect to the integrity of secondary causation.787  Using 
the paradigmatic example of water as a composition of matter with emergent properties, Stump 
notes that Aquinas would not posit any “mental stuff or panentheistic stuff or anything else non-
physical which is responsible for the causal power of a water molecule to form a hydrogen 
bond.”788  But Aquinas would not accept causal closure at the level of what Stump calls the 
“micro-physical,” because the fundamental particles that make up hydrogen and oxygen atoms 
taken in isolation do not each possess the powers of a water molecule.789  The “form” of the 
water molecule, for Aquinas, inheres only in its configuration as a system.  This is particularly 
important, Stump notes, for Aquinas’ treatment of the human person.  A neo-Aristotelian 
account of the human person may be “non-reductive” based on the emergent property of 
“mind,” but it remains “physicalist” in that it recognizes no source beyond the physical.790 The 
neo-Aristotelian person therefore remains subject to a dissolution into matter.  For Aquinas, in 
contrast, a human person is a whole system with an integral form that is not subject to dissolution 
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into matter – that survives death.791  And, although Stump does not explicitly make this 
connection in her discussion of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics, for Aquinas the human form – the 
soul – finds its true telos in the Resurrection, when united again with matter and participating 
fully in the beatific vision of God. 
4. Adam, Christ, and the Law 
This construal of “natural” law as the participation of the human creature in the free gift of God’s 
love returns us to one of the big questions in theology and science with which this dissertation 
opened:  who was “Adam?”  Even conservative Christians in contemporary theology and science 
discourse like to point out that, based on evidence from population genetics, there cannot have 
been a “literal” Adam and Eve from whom the entire human race has descended.792  Within the 
millions of years of “human” evolution, with all its “natural” struggle, violence, and death, how 
can we speak intelligibly about the creation of the first man and woman in paradise and of their 
“Fall?”  If so much about us is “hard wired” by evolutionary history, what sense can be made of 
the traditional doctrines of original righteousness and original sin? 
The temptation to reductionism here is strong.  But as Graham Ward has noted in his own study 
of “belief” and paleoanthropology, “we are not what we were.  We are not stardust blown around 
by solar winds following a Big Bang.  We are not single-cell organisms learning to swamp in a 
primordial soup.  We are not creatures who have crawled from the swamp, climbed trees and 
then begun to swing among the branches.”793  Rather, we are “the most intellectually advanced 
thinking and self-conscious beings,” capable of creating elaborate symbolic systems that can be 
passed along as culture.794  We homo sapiens alone among the creatures of the Earth possess the 
extensive capacity “to generate actualities from virtualities.”795  In a more theological key, we 
alone among the creatures of the Earth can see the gap between the first Adam and the last 
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Adam, can hear and respond to the Word of God, can receive the grace that enables us to 
participate as free agents in the transforming law of love. 
We can say almost nothing about a “person” merely by observing genes, because genes are not 
“persons.” Populations genetics studies can provide models of the dispersion of genes through 
groups of biological entities, but they can tell us nothing whatsoever about when the first “human 
person” emerged. Indeed, for population genetics qua population genetics, there simply are no 
“persons” – for this is a science of the movement of genes, not a philosophical, sociological, or 
theological description of “persons.” 
It is often suggested that in Romans 5:12 Adam is a type of Christ.  In fact, in Paul’s thought, as 
well as for the early Church Fathers, Christ is the type, the typos, a notion derived from the 
“stamp” or “seal” on an official document.  There is a hint in Romans 5 of a truth that would only 
become clarified later in Christian theology – that the pre-incarnate Christ, the second person of 
the Trinity, always was.  Whereas Arius declared that “there was a time when he [Christ] was 
not,” Nicea established the orthodox Christology of Christ’s eternal sonship. Thus Christ is and 
was the Redeemer, the one for whom creation was made and in whose death and resurrection 
creation always finds its fulfillment. Adam’s failure was that he went against type – he did not 
conform to Christ but rather tried to become something else, and thereby the true nature of 
humanity was broken. 
Is the typos of Christ reducible to a set of genes? Surely not.  It resides not in genes or in any 
other created thing but rather in the Triune life of God Himself.  We might speak, in a roughly 
analogical way, of ideas we hold in our minds – say, the idea of a perfect Bordeaux, ruby-red, 
silky, smoky, plummy, luxurious.  We could labor to instantiate that idea, combining genes and 
terroir and water and light and care, and perhaps we might achieve it, to the point where upon 
taking a sip we exclaim, “this – this – is Bordeaux.  Nothing else is worthy of that name.” 
This is what God said of Adam, when he gave him breath and a name.  It is not something that 
God said of any other creature, even apparently some creatures that a modern population 
geneticist or paleoanthropologist might designate as ancestrally human based on genes or bones.  
Yet that Adam, and each of us in that Adam, fail to participate fully and unreservedly in the true 
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nature of the true human, the nature of Christ.  And so Pontius Pilot, an unwitting prophet, said 
of Christ: “behold, the man” (John 19:5, KJV).  And so also Paul invites us to see: the sinful man, 
the broken seal, the first created Adam; and the true type, the seal of humanity’s future, the 
perfect Adam, the Christ.  None of this is about the definitions and categories of modern science, 
as helpful and important as they may be for the progress of scientific thought.  It is, rather, about 
the fullness of what it means to be human.  Reductive neurolaw by definition offers no such 
transcendent sources or ends.     
5. Law, the Origin of the Soul, and Original Sin 
Now we can move towards a conclusion:  in some sense “law” is a constituent element of the 
human soul, present in our created goodness, prevenient in our fallenness, perfected in our 
resurrection with Christ.  Law is part of the origin of each person’s soul.   
The pattern of Genesis 2 seems to reflect this order:  God creates the soul of Adam (“the breath 
of life”) and imprints on Adam’s soul the law of the Garden (“you shall not eat of it”).  This pattern 
is discussed in St. Athanasius’ On the Incarnation.796   Athanasius notes that all of creation is God’s 
good gift.   Human beings, however, we given additional gifts:  God made them in His image and 
“[gave] them a share of the power of his own Word, so that having as it were shadows of the 
Word and being made rational, they might be able to abide in blessedness, living the true life 
which is really that of the holy ones in paradise.”   But because of their rational nature, human 
beings were given a power to choose whether to live in accordance with this gift of life.   The 
Garden and the law were therefore given to provide the means for human beings to choose to 
live in accordance with the grace of reason: 
And knowing again that free choice of human beings could turn 
either way, he secured beforehand, by a law and a set place, the 
grace given.  For bringing them into his own paradise, he gave them 
a law, so that if the guarded the grace and remained good, they 
might have the life of paradise – without sorrow, pain or care – 
besides having the promise of their incorruptibility in heaven….797  
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But when human beings turned against God and transgressed the law, they lost the gift of 
incorruptibility and were returned to their “natural state,” which in fact dissolved them as 
“human”: 
For the transgression of the commandment returned them to the 
natural state, so that, just as they, not being, came to be, so also 
they might rightly endure in time the corruption unto non-being.  
For if, having a nature that did not once exist, they were called into 
existence by the Word’s advent [parousia] and love for human 
beings, it followed that when human beings were bereft of the 
knowledge of God and had turned to things which exist not – evil is 
non-being, the good is being, since it has come into being from the 
existing God – then they were bereft also of eternal being.798   
The Fall as a turn from the law, then, for Athanasius, produced an ontological change in the 
human person precisely in the loss of direct and full participation in God’s eternal being secured 
by the law in the Garden.  The loss of the law in the Garden reduces the human being towards 
non-being: 
But this, being decomposed, is to remain in death and corruption.  
For the human being is by nature mortal, having come into being 
from nothing.  But because of his likeness to the One who Is, which, 
if he had guarded through his comprehension of him, would have 
blunted his natural corruption, he would have remained 
incorruptible, just as Wisdom says:  “Attention to the laws is the 
confirmation of incorruptibility” (Wis 6:18).799  
This view of law might be particularly consonant with a Traducian or generative view of the soul 
in light of original sin.  As the pure law would be passed in the soul from person to person through 
generation, so would the broken law.  But it is also helpful in connection with a creationist view 
of the soul, particularly when combined with a Federal understanding of Adam’s headship over 
humanity.  Adam’s sin resulted in his expulsion from the Garden.  The Cherubim with flaming 
swords bar the way back.  Judicially, then, Adam has been placed outside the law.  This is his 
curse, his sentence for lawbreaking.   
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Outside the Garden, of course, Adam and his heirs remain accountable to the law and can still 
hear God’s commands.  This is evident in Cain’s murder of Abel.  Cain is banished in punishment 
for his crime, but God pronounces a law of protection over Cain:  “anyone who kills Cain will 
suffer vengeance seven times over.”800   Yet Cain was capable of murder because the law was no 
longer constitutive of his soul in the way possible only in the Garden.  The law had become 
something at least partially external, at least partially inaccessible.  His knowledge of the law 
remained – he knew murder was evil – but his power to keep the law failed. 
This separation is symbolized by the cherubim and flaming swords that bar access to the Tree of 
Life.  (Gen. 3:24.)  The Tree of Life is the pure law.  To eat from the Tree of Life is to take the pure 
law into the soul, to nourish the soul.  As the fruit of the Tree of Life metabolized into the body 
(we are speaking metaphorically here, of course), the law pervades a person’s being, body and 
soul.  Without the Tree of Life, a person may know the difference between good and evil, but 
doing the good is a struggle, and indeed the tendency is away from the good.  When eating of 
the Tree of Life, the soul is so joined to the pure law that the law is ecstatic delight.  The sweet 
juice of the pure law fills the mouth and runs down the beard, its fragrance occupies the nose, 
its taste explodes with indivisibly rich layers of flavor.  There is no thought, when eating of the 
Tree of Life, but of that which is good and right and beautiful and just and true.  There is love and 
no possibility of anything other. 
We, as Adam’s heirs, are born outside the law.  But as gift, law continually presents itself to us 
without coercion or violence.  The Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil was not locked behind 
a wall that had to be breached, nor was it surrounded by armed Cherubim.  It was, rather, at the 
center of the Garden, open and accessible.  The most severe penalty, of course, was attached to 
God’s command not to eat:  death.  Yet here God’s perlocutionary act of uttering the command 
and delineating its penalty – of establishing “law” – was inseparable from the gift of justice which 
flowed from God’s being.  There was no distinction between “justice” and “law,” for the gift of 
“life” is participation in the life of God, who is no being like us and who gives us being.  To refuse 
participation in God’s life by equating the self with God is to engage in the absurd performance 
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of death.   The act, therefore, is its own penalty, and not something externally imposed by force 
of will.  It is self-chosen, self-imposed, an exile of the self from the self as created from God’s 
ecstatic generosity, a loss of the self for which no one but the self is responsible. 
6. Law, Participation, and Grace 
If the Fall is a fall away from the Law, are we saved by returning to the Law and keeping it?  The 
answer in the Pauline theology of the New Testament, and in the Christian tradition as it 
developed in both the East and West, is no.  Because of the ontological effects of sin, we cannot 
keep the law.   
The East and West differ in various ways concerning the precise nature of the ontological effects 
of Adam’s sin.  In the East, following some of the Eastern Fathers such as Athanasius and Gregory 
of Nyssa, the ontological consequence of Adam’s fall is typically pictured as a kind of separation, 
misdirection, and interruption of growth.801   Separated from intimate fellowship with the source 
of life, we experience death, and in this experience of separation, finitude and death, we fail to 
grow into our proper end, despair and sin.   It is more of an existential condition than a direct 
inheritance.  In the West, following Augustine, the ontological consequence of the Fall is often 
pictured as more of an organic loss of an originally perfect physical capacity coupled with a quasi-
biological state mysteriously passed on through sexual generation.   
 It is sometimes suggested by Eastern Orthodox scholars that the East retained a higher view of 
post-lapsarian human capacities and individual human responsibility than the parts of the 
Western tradition that have been deeply influenced by Augustine.802   That may be true, but as 
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noted above, even for Athanasius the Fall produced an ontological change in that the human 
person is no longer constituted by the Garden and the law.  It is not the sort of change that 
appears in the paleontological or genetic record of human evolution, but it is rather a loss of 
direct participation in the life of God.  As Athanasisus stated:  “[b]ut human beings, turning away 
from things eternal and by the counsel of the devil turning towards things of corruption, were 
themselves the cause of corruption in death, being, as we already said, corruptible by nature but 
escaping their natural state by the grace of participation in the Word, had they remained 
good.”803   
This sense of ontological change in Athanasisus’ account of the Fall is richly teleological.  Humans 
were made to grow in participation in the life of God, but by sin they have moved in the direction 
of dissolution.  In fact, he says, “the race of human beings would have been utterly dissolved had 
not the Master and Savior of all, the Son of God, come for the completion of death.”804   
Moreover, although human beings were expelled from the Garden, God did not leave sinful 
humanity entirely bereft of law:  “since the negligence of humans descended gradually to lower 
things, God again anticipated such weakness of theirs, sending the law and the prophets, known 
to them, so that if they shrank from looking up to the heavens and knowing the Creator, they 
might have instruction from those close by.”805     The law and prophets were sent not only for 
the Jews, but for all of humanity:  “they were for the whole inhabited world a sacred school of 
the knowledge of God and the soul.”806   Nevertheless, humans remained “irrational” and “did 
not raise their gaze to the truth” of the law807.    
Thus God sent Christ:  “what should be done, except to renew again the ‘in the image,’ so that 
through it human beings would be able once again to know him?  But how could this have 
occurred except by the coming of the very image of God, our Savior Jesus Christ?”   But to state 
this in such a diachronic fashion is not entirely true to Athanasisus’ sense God’s continual 
presence in creation through Christ:  “For the Word unfolded himself everywhere, above and 
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below and in the depths and in the breadth:  above, in creation; below, in the incarnation; in the 
depths, in hell; in breadth, in the world.  Everything is filled with the knowledge of God.”808   The 
presence of the Word in all of creation and all of history is an aspect of providence:   
And, as being in all creation, he is in essence outside everything but 
inside everything by his own power, arranging everything, and 
unfolding his own providence in everything to all things, and giving 
life to each thing and to all things together, containing the universe 
and not being contained, but being wholly, in every respect, in his 
own Father alone.  So also, being in the human body, and himself 
giving it life, he properly gives life to the universe also, and was 
both in everything and outside all.  And being made known from 
the body through the works, he was not unseen even from the 
working of the universe.809  
Taking up this theme from Athanasius, we can say that the Word, the Tree of Life, and the Law 
are Christ, and the Garden is the presence of God.  This solves the problem of originary violence 
concerning the law:  the origin of the law is gift, not violence.  Law is not violently opposed to 
nature or to grace.  True law is the bridge between nature and grace.  The restoration of true law 
is the means by which nature is completed by grace and the soul is united again to God.  Christ 
present in the Eucharist is the Tree of Life made available to us again, which allows us to 
participate again in the true law. 
This theology of law as gift bears profound implications for the problem of Christian ethics and 
nonviolence.  To “resist an evildoer by violent means” – the best interpretation of Mathew 5:39 
-- is fundamentally to act apart from the law.810  But an evildoer’s dereliction of true law is a form 
of self-exclusion from the peaceable city, not an unlawful from of violent resistance imposed by 
the faithful community.   
Indeed, all this reflection on the Biblical texts reminds us that we cannot even begin to 
understand Adam without first confronting the Christ.  The original authors and redactors of the 
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Genesis creation accounts probably had no intention at all of portraying the idea of the Fall and 
original sin as it subsequently developed in Christian thought.   The connection comes to light 
most plainly in the Apostle Paul's use of Adam as a type of Christ.  Paul, of course, did not write 
in a vacuum, and scholars wonder about possible connections between Paul's understanding of 
Adam and some of the Second Temple Jewish texts that portray Adam as a sort of superman.  Yet 
even in these Second Temple texts, Adam is primarily a figure of Israel.  This is consistent with 
the likely original purposes of the texts in their canonical form, as a reminder of Israel's identity 
for the returnees from the Babylonian captivity.  And for Paul, Christ is the fulfillment of Israel's 
hope -- indeed, Christ is the true Israel. 
Now we see the pattern emerge:  to outsiders, Israel was a historical footnote, at best:  a minor, 
fractured and defeated power, now but a cultural annoyance to the pax Romana, an annoyance 
the Empire would not tolerate and that the Emperor Titus would crush under his heels.  In Christ, 
Israel is revealed to all the world to be what Israel has always knew itself to be:  the elect people 
of God called as a light to all the nations.   
To outsiders, the adam is ephemeral, a ghost in the machine of chance and fate, an 
epiphenomenon of folk psychology that always collapses under its own weight and that science 
will soon fully explain.  In Christ, the adam is revealed to all the world what it always knew itself 
to be:  the very good of creation, the gift of divine love, the rebellious sinner that chose death 
rather than life, the redeemed person empowered to live as the resurrected new creation and 
become united with God. 
This suggests that Adam's prelapsarian capacities were not things we can empirically measure.  
Both prior to and after the Fall, the narratives present Adam as a creature in continuity with the 
created order, including with all his descendants.  Whether Adam was already perfect and fell 
away from perfection, or whether Adam's perfection consisted in his participatory movement 
towards theosis -- or both -- in either event his created capacity for divinization, a capacity 
inherent in his soul, was broken. 
The fall is thus historical and trans-historical, much like the Resurrection of Christ.  Christ is risen 
indeed, and the tomb is empty.  Yet even as the event of the Resurrection breaks into history it 
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transcends history, because it is the breaking-in of the consummation of history into time.  In the 
Resurrection, eternity touches time in a manner that both can be observed -- "see his head, his 
hands, his feet" -- and surpasses the finite capacity of observation:  he is "seated at the right hand 
of God," who "cannot be seen."  
Adam is indeed fallen, and the way back to the Garden is barred by the Cherubim.  We have no 
empirical access to the Garden.  The event of the Fall broke into history and indeed broke history, 
the history of the human soul's unhindered participation in God's life.  It was the anti-
resurrection.  The study of history, in genetics and bones and anthropological comparisons, 
cannot reveal Adam in the Garden, any more than Christ as seated at God's right hand could be 
observed through a telescope.  We can observe now, in history, the open graves of our mouths 
and the empty tombs of our souls.   But we can only know of how humanity transcends the grave 
through the life, death and resurrection of Christ.  Only in Christ can we really get to know Adam. 
This does not mean that the scientific study of human evolution and neurobiology fail to reveal 
truth about human nature.  Our bodies and minds are no less the result of evolutionary change 
over deep time than any other aspect of the universe.  We are made from the "dust of the earth."  
Yet that is not all we are.  We have the "breath of life" and we are "living souls."  A Christian 
theology of the person surely conflicts with a reductionistic materialist's theology of the person.  
But this does not imply that Christian theology conflicts with "science," if science is understood 
as the empirical study of natural history.  The human person is more than its "natural history" 
and reflection on humanity's true nature requires more than empiricism alone offers.  A full 
account offers a multitude of finally complementary narratives. 
So the fact that our evolutionary "hard wiring" predisposes us to act in various ways, sometimes 
violent and sometimes altruistic, does not in itself preclude the Garden, in which we could have 
always acted in accordance with the divine law of love -- unless we choose to limit our account 
of the human person to what can be empirically observed about the interaction of biochemicals 
in time.  It is indeed merely the problem of agency taken from the specific to the general.  Am I 
choosing to write this book, or are the meanings latent in these words illusory, a signifier only of 
deterministic brain activity?  Do human beings ever choose?  Did human beings ever choose?  If 
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human being did and do choose, it is not difficult to imagine a threshold of accountability, a 
possibility of a "first choice."  If we do not choose, then there is no first or last choice, but only 
change. 
Indeed, the realization that human beings conduct many of their daily activities in an automatic 
or sub-conscious mode is not a new insight of neuroscience.  David Eagleman refers to this when 
he acknowledges that “[t]he existence of free will in human behavior is the subject of an ancient 
and heated debate.”811  Indeed!  Yet he never even attempts to explore the contours of that 
debate.  A key problem in that debate is the phenomenological observation, known from ancient 
times, that human beings often act automatically, under apparent mental compulsion, or 
otherwise outside the zone of conscious control.  What contemporary neuroscience brings to the 
table is a deeper understanding of the physical element of at least some of these phenomena. 
In fact, such a focus on habits and practices is precisely what virtue theory, which informs many 
kinds of moral theology, is all about.812  Moral theologians and philosophers, however, will want 
to inquire about the development of the habit itself.813   Isn’t the “largest bit” of the story, from 
a qualitative perspective, the initial development of habits and practices, through some exercise 
of the conscious will, that lead to habituated action?  As Peter Hampson suggests, ”[f]or Aquinas, 
habitus refers to the ways in which repeated acts become perfected dispositions to act for good 
or ill; that is how, if repeated, they can become part of our second nature.”814  Hampson notes 
that, “[i]n psychological terms, the deployment of a well-developed habitus is more like a 
demonstration of flexible expertise, sensitive to different situational demands, routinized but not 
robotic. . . .”815  Far from undermining traditional accounts of moral action, then, neuroscience 
simply fleshes out the physical picture of what theology and philosophy already knew:  behaviors 
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become ingrained in the “soul” and changing them requires prolonged and sometimes difficult 
habituation into new behaviors. 
Christos Yannaras is one contemporary theologian who has fruitfully explored these themes.   
Yannaras is a Greek Orthodox theologian who has written extensively on theological 
anthropology and ethics.816  In The Freedom of Morality, Yannaras addresses the seeming aporia 
between “freedom” and the strictures of “morality.”  Yannaras grounds his account in the 
personal and relational being of the Triune God.  God’s personal existence as Trinity constitutes 
His being, and therefore God’s being is free, not contingent on some prior essence.817  “When 
the Christian revelation declares that ‘God is love, (1 Jn 4:16)’” Yannaras argues, “it is not 
referring to one among many properties of God’s ‘behavior,’ but to what God is as the fullness of 
trinitarian and personal communion.”  Human existence “derives its ontological significance from 
the fact of divine love, the only love which gives substance to being.”818  Human persons, who 
are created to partake in the divine love, therefore must be “free” creatures.819 
Human freedom does not imply a capacity for absolutely libertarian choice.  It is, rather, “the 
freedom of love and of personal communion,” a capacity to relate existentially to God.820  As 
such, human beings are not subject to any kind of “natural predetermination.”821  A human being 
can reject this relationship, but to do so is to reject “the ontological precondition for his 
existence. . . .”822   
The ostensibly libertarian choice to pursue one’s own purposes apart from God is in fact a 
rejection of the self and the foreclosure of the freedom of love.  The Fall occurs when the human 
person “freely renounces his possibility of participating in true life, in personal relationship and 
loving communion – the only possibility for man to be as a hypostasis of personal 
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distinctiveness.”823  The Fall fragments the communality of human beings with God, each other 
and the rest of creation.  The Fall “has irrevocably split nature, and condemned the will of all 
other human persons to be merely an individual will expressing and enforcing the necessities of 
the fragmented nature.”824  This is a kind of non-being or non-existence, not a juridical 
category.825  For Yannaras, “[t]he God of the Church as known and proclaimed by Orthodox 
experience and tradition has never had anything to do with the God of the Roman juridical 
tradition, the God of Anselm and Abelard. . . .”826  Judgment and Hell are states of self-imposed 
exclusion from communion with God and therefore from genuine human existence.827 
Yannaras’ relational ontology leads him to view the Biblical Law not as a deontological code of 
obligation imposed from above, but rather as a gracious description of the principles of 
communion already present, as it were, from below.  For Yannaras, “Torah” is analogous to 
principles of aesthetics in art and music.828  The Law was given to Israel to identify and demarcate 
what it meant to participate in the life of the covenant community.  Christ’s “fulfillment” of the 
Law is the full realization of love, through which the Law is disclosed as thoroughly personal, 
indeed as a person, “the very person of Christ, the perfect image of God.”829  The telos of the Law 
therefore is love.830  This telos of the Law means that Christian faith and practice are not matters 
of positivistic legal observance. Instead, Christian faith and practice center on the communal life 
of the Church and in particular on the Eucharistic meal, by which we participate in Christ’s 
fulfillment of the Law through self-giving love.831  This embodied practice demonstrates that 
Christian anthropology is non-dualistic.  “The distinction between soul and body,” Yannaras 
notes, “is not an ontological distinction, like that between nature and person or between nature 
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and energies; it does not relate to man’s being, to his mode of existence.”832  The soul and the 
body are “distinct natural energies” of “the one human nature.”833 
Yannaras does not apply these observations to secular positive law, but he does address the role 
and nature of the Church Canons.  He interprets St. Paul’s treatment of the Law in terms of 
transcendence.  He argues that, for Paul, the Law is a form of separation leading to death, but 
that “[t]he cross of Christ, that ultimate consequence of the Law, the fulfillment of the curse and 
of death, is the end of the Law and transcendence of the Law.”834  The Church Canons, then, 
cannot be understood legalistically, in ways that suggest separation and death.  Instead, the 
Canons are ascetical principles that reflect “the ontology of the Church, the mode of existence 
within the church body.”835  They demonstrate, within the context of their times and places, the 
corporate ascetical disciplines required to transcend the passions that separate us from full 
participation in God’s life.  It is finally not through deontological rules but through “physical acts 
of asceticism, practical rejection of individuality, fasting, continence, freedom from the cares of 
the consumer, participation of the body in prayer and the labor of serving others” – the practices 
of the life of faith – that human persons become free from “subservience to natural necessity” 
and “confinement in existential individuality.”836  
Robert Spaemann is another philosophical theologian who has addressed freedom, virtue and 
causality in a richly theological key.  In his book “Persons,” Spaemann seeks to integrate a 
teleological and relational account of theological anthropology.837  Like Yannaras, Spaemann ties 
the nature of human “persons” to God’s personal nature as Trinity.  But while Yannaras, in the 
vein of the Cappadocian Fathers, focuses on relationality, Spaemann, in the vein of Augustine 
and the Western Doctors, focuses on knowledge, and particularly on self-knowledge.   
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“Persons,” Spaemann notes, “are not something else the world contains, over and above 
inanimate objects, plants, animals, and human beings. But human beings are connected to 
everything else the world contains at a deeper level than other things to each other. That is what 
it means to say that they are persons.”838  Where Yannaras tends to see individuation as a product 
of the Fall, however, Spaemann argues that individuation is part of any living organism’s, and any 
person’s, ontology:   “Coming to be of a new something, individuation, cannot be described as 
an emergent property. If drive, or pursuit, individuates experience, life cannot be comprehended 
as the property of an existent but only as its being.  ‘Life is the being of living things.’  Persons are 
living things, and their being is life, there individuation that of a living organism.”839  Indeed, for 
Spaemann, individual self-reflexivity demonstrates that materialist reductionism fails: 
Only of my hunger, mine from the outset, can I become aware. But 
what does my hunger mean? That we cannot say precisely. We can 
only say that there is a hunger which, when it surfaces in 
consciousness, surfaces in my consciousness as my hunger. 
Awareness of life is the irreducible paradigm for life and experience 
of every kind....  This casts new light back on the ontological status 
of psychological states. The reductionist attempt to treat them as 
ontological phantoms, seen without being believed, comes to grief 
if there is actually no clear dividing line between states of mind and 
awareness of states of mind. We have no idea what states of mind 
of which no one was aware could be like.840   
Nevertheless, for Spaemann, the ability to transcend individuality is a uniquely human quality 
among the creatures of the Earth.  “No beast reflects upon the fact that the world surrounding it 
is no more than its world, relative to it specific organization,” he notes, and “[n]o beast thinks 
beyond the scope of its own surrounding world to conceive itself as simply a feature of some 
other animal’s world. . . .”841  Like Yannaras, Spaemann wishes to preserve God’s freedom 
concerning creation, and to connect human persons to God’s creative freedom.  But Spaemann 
follows Aquinas in recognizing each individual human person as a “divine idea.”  The divine idea 
of a person is not in itself a person – “a human being is not called a person unless he or she exists 
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outside God's mind, extra causum.”  This means, for Spaemann, that “[e]xistence carries with it 
the moment of sheer facticity, which cannot be got round, and which implies God’s sheer creative 
freedom.842  Yet this sheer facticity, this contingency of personal existence on God’s creative gift, 
shows that self-knowledge requires a personal encounter with transcendence:  “The reality of a 
human person and all its depth and complexity is accessible only to someone who invests 
something of himself or herself in the encounter. It is not the most impersonal, but the most 
personal observation that reveals most of what reality is in itself. It is one of those persistent 
prejudices of modern thought to think that the less subjective something is, the more 
objective.”843 
For both Yannaras and Spaemann, then, as for Tertullian, Lactantius, Augustine and Aquinas, the 
notion of “libertarian” freedom is not the heart of what it means to be “human.”  To be human 
is to be able to know the source and end of the self, and thereby to know that one is known by 
God.  To be “free” is to be “human,” to “know fully as I am known” (1 Cor. 13:12), to find life, 
fellowship, and love in God.  The truly “natural” law – the law of love, the law of the Garden – if 
the receipt of the gift of life from God who creates, redeems, and fulfills human “being” in Christ. 
Both Yannaras and Spaemann show that, for Christian theology, the concept of human “freedom” 
must focus not so much on modern liberal ideas such as “agency,” and more on classical concepts 
of being and the good.844  Freedom, in Christian theology and Biblical thought, is not so much 
“freedom to” as “freedom from” and “freedom for.”845  This is illustrated by the “tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil” in the Bible’s Second Creation narrative.846  God’s command not to 
eat from this tree carried with it the consequence of death:  “but from the tree of the knowledge 
of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat from it you will surely die.”847   
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A participatory concept of "law," together with a consideration of both universal and particular 
human nature, thus may help us move towards a more cohesive account of the relation between 
“pre-“ and “post-“lapsarian humanity.  If there is a universal human nature, and each individual 
person is a particular instantiation of that universal, then any particular person's inhuman act 
affects our common humanity.  Something about universal human nature itself becomes altered.  
Potentialities, teleologies, and tendencies are introduced that previously were not present.  In 
the next, concluding chapter, we examine what these ideas might mean for natural law theory 
and political theology. 
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Chapter 6:  Revitalizing the Soul of the Law 
The discussion of law, neurolaw, and the philosophy of mind in the previous Chapters highlights 
a potential conflict.  A traditional Christian theological account of law requires a participatory 
ontology through which the created order reflects God’s own orderliness, a sense of human 
freedom through which human beings can choose to live in harmony with or in opposition to 
God’s law as instantiated in creation and encoded by His command, and a kind of human intellect 
through which human beings can craft social structures, including positive law, which reflect our 
created end, which is the Resurrection, theosis, the beatific vision, life fully with God.  But modern 
“natural” science elides the transcendence required for this kind of thick ontology.  Nevertheless, 
we identified one important stream within the contemporary philosophy of science literature 
concerning the “laws of nature” that advocates for a “new Aristotelianism” that focuses on the 
“powers” of entities rather than on “laws.”  In many ways, this new Aristotelianism echoes pre-
modern philosophical and theological arguments about essence and existence.   
This Chapter moves the discussion into how a coherent theory of natural law could be articulated 
and defended, consistent with the methodological perspective articulated in Chapter 1, and in 
light of the sources and arguments considered in Chapters 2-5.  In particular, this Chapter argues 
from a phenomenological perspective that a meaningful concept of “law” requires a thick 
metaphysical account of “essence” – ultimately an account rooted in the being of God.  Such a 
perspective on natural law differs significantly from the “new natural law” arguments that have 
come to represent the “conservative” perspective in the Western culture wars.  In fact, the 
supposed conservatism of the new natural lawyers is radically modern and heterodox, while 
natural law theory that unashamedly entails particular theological claims is truly “conservative” 
of orthodoxy. 
1. The New Natural Law 
In recent decades, there has been a resurgence in “natural law” theory among some analytic 
philosophers.   Philosophers such as Germain Grisez, John Finnis, and Robert George have 
spearheaded a movement in “new” natural law theory that is designed to appeal, at least in its 
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first principles, to all rational persons regardless of religious or theological commitments.848  The 
“new” natural law theory, however, turns out to represent another effort to define “law” without 
theological context.849 
Finnis identifies seven goods that he claims are self-evident to all rational persons:   (1) life; (2) 
knowledge; (3) play; (4) aesthetic experience; (5) sociability or friendship; (6) practical 
reasonableness; and (7) religion.850  These goods are not ordered hierarchically, but Finnis 
explains that the principles of practical reason enable human beings to make rational decisions 
about how all these goods could be instantiated in an ordered society.  The first principle of 
practical reason, for Finnis, is the Thomistic aphorism that “good is to be pursued and done and 
evil is to be avoided.”851   
The new natural law theory is controversial and problematic.  Indeed, the subtle critique implied 
by the adjective “new” demonstrates that many ethicists attracted to theories of inherent moral 
goods find the Grisez-Finnis approach troubling.852  In his critique of the Grisez-Finnis approach, 
for example, Russell Hittinger argues that the fundamental problem with that approach “lies in a 
failure to interrelate systematically practical reason with a philosophy of nature.”853  Hittinger 
notes that Grisez believes “speculative reason, including its metaphysical mode, is able to affirm 
little, if anything, concerning God as an end of human striving.”854  This leads Grisez and Finnis 
away from associating their method too closely with Augustine, Aquinas, or other pre-modern 
Christian natural law theorists.  Indeed, notwithstanding their reference to Aquinas’ first principle 
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concerning pursuing good and avoiding evil, Grisez and Finnis eschew the label of “Thomist,” in 
part to avoid interpretive disputes surrounding Aquinas’ own work.855   
The new natural law theorists are keen to distinguish themselves from both materialistic monism 
and Caretesian dualism.856  Patrick Lee and Robert George, for example, argue that human beings 
are animals with a capacity for agency.857  The capacity for intentional agency, they suggest, is 
the principle of action that defines human beings as body-soul composites.858  Without the sense 
organs and the brain, the human person cannot understand or will, yet understanding and willing 
cannot merely be identified with sense organs or the brain.859   
Although other animals can also perform acts of understanding and willing, Lee and George 
argue, “human beings fundamentally differ from other animals because they [human beings] 
perform actions which manifest a transcendence of matter not possessed by other animals.”860  
Human beings are capable of conceptual thought, which “radically distinguishes them from other 
animals.”861  For Lee and George, conceptual thought differs from sense perception in that 
“[w]hat one senses, perceives, or imagines – what one grasps in bodily cognitive acts – is always 
a this, with a particular, albeit sometimes vague, contour,” whereas conceptual thought is 
capable of obtaining insight about “a nature, property or form that can be (and usually is) 
instantiated in many, innumerable cases and which grounds explanations for why things (or 
                                                     
855 Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (South Bend:  Univ. Notre Dame Press 1987), 8-9.  
Grisez responded to Hittinger in “A Critique of Russell Hittinger’s Book, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory,” 
New Scholasticism 62 (1988), 62-74.  Hittinger responded with a terse paragraph in which Hittinger said “[a]t least 
in this piece, he [Grisez] reduces the philosophical issues to an argument from authority, which in this case is his 
own.”  Russell Hittinger, “Response to Professor Grisez’s Critique,” New Scholasticism 62 (1988), 466.  My purpose 
here is not to enter into the specifically internecine Roman Catholic debates about the new natural law theory 
which seem to this non-Roman catholic Christian perhaps to be more related to questions about Papal infallibility 
and the encyclical Humanae Vitae’s teaching on contraception than to broader questions of philosophy and 
theology.  I do agree with Hittinger, Jean Porter, and others, however, that the new natural law theory finally 
reflects a distorted theology that tends toward the separation of being and reason, in contrast to the historic 
Christian “natural law” tradition, and I further argue in this section that this causes significant problems in 
response to neurolaw. 
856 Patrick Lee and Robert George, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (Cambridge:  CUP 2008). 
857 Ibid. 
858 Ibid. at 17. 
859 Ibid. 
860 Ibid. at 52. 
861 Ibid. at 56. 
194 
 
relations, as in logic) are as they are.”862  Moreover, the human capacity for conceptual thought 
allows humans to “reflect back upon themselves and their place in reality.”863  Animals other than 
humans, Lee and George claim, “give no evidence at all” of being capable of conceptual thought 
or self-reflection.864 It is therefore the capacity for rationality that defines what human beings 
are and that render humans capable, in ways animals are not, of free choice and moral agency.865   
For Lee and George, the kind of freedom humans possess is libertarian freedom:  “that is, … not 
determined by the events that preceded it, but … determined by the person making the choice 
in the very act of choosing.”866  In at least some choices, Lee and George insist, “the events and 
realities” antecedent to the choice, including the person’s “character,” are not sufficient to bring 
about the choice, such that the person “could have chosen the other option, or not chosen at all, 
under the very same conditions.”867  The “principal objection” to this libertarian position, Lee and 
George assert, is the “principle of rational explanation” – the notion that a rational choice is 
determined by rationality or else the “choice” is irrational and random and not a “choice.”868  
They rebut this argument by distinguishing a “rational” choice from a “moral” or “best” choice.869  
A “rational” choice, they assert, is simply one in which “one sees a distinctive benefit” in the 
choice.870 
Lee and George argue that their anthropology is “not incompatible with theologically based key 
propositions” concerning the imago Dei, the immortality of the soul, and the resurrection of the 
body.871  The same sort of argument is common to all new natural law theorists:  rational 
arguments, understood on their own terms, establish a foundation for further theological 
reflection.  The project thus represents a “natural theology” of law. 
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This brief discussion of Lee and George’s notion of “rationality,” agency, embodiment and the 
soul, however, demonstrate precisely why their project ultimately fails.  A very particular 
metaphysic of “nature” is already smuggled into Lee and George’s presumptively neutral 
discussion of agency.  They betray their presumptions when they argue that the deterministic 
assumptions of the scientific method do not define the limits of “every entity which exists.”872    
“In fact,” they note, “renowned scientists such as Werner Heisenberg held this very position.”873  
“Free choices and thoughts,” they suggest, “are entities of this sort” (the sort that are not 
explicable by the scientific method).  This passing reference to the Heisenberg Uncertainty 
Principle and to “free choices and thoughts” as “entities” obviously encodes a metaphysic of 
“nature,” being reason and causality – and one derived straight from Kant and Paley.   
In this sense, the new natural law theorists engage in the same sort of “natural theology” as 
proponents of “intelligent design” (“ID”) theory.874  These kinds of natural theologies represent 
an apologetic program dictated by modernity.  They accept the premise that human rationality 
is a neutral arbiter among competing truth claims and argue that facts “consistent with” 
Christianity can be ascertained by all rational persons from self-evident first principles.  ID 
theorists do not claim their proofs establish there is a God, nor do new natural law theorists claim 
their principles require a Divine source.  Both, however, claim that their efforts clear a common 
ground on which theists and non-theists can parlay.   
There are many empirical, philosophical, and theological problems with these claims.  Empirically, 
neither ID theory nor the new natural lawyers take evolutionary biology seriously on its own 
terms.  ID theorists consistently misunderstand or misrepresent what evolutionary biology means 
by “randomness” in natural selection.  ID theorists claim that against the random background 
noise of natural history there are discernible patterns of “design” from which it can be inferred 
that a “Designer” exists.  Such patterns may take the form of specified informational content in 
DNA or of “irreducibly complex” biomechanical systems such as the bacterial flagellum.875  The 
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empirical problem is that “randomness” in evolutionary theory, properly understood, is a 
statement about ex ante predictability and not about ex post observations.  No evolutionary 
biologist would deny that there is “order” evident in the observable universe – that DNA 
molecules provide “instructions” for the expression of particular proteins and that  that there are 
complex biological structures with specific functions in particular organisms.  The evolutionary 
biologist’s claim, however, is that the higher level order inherent in something like a particular 
complex biological structure is not  predictable from a priori observations of the genetic material 
and biosphere existing at any earlier time.876  The order that presently exists is a contingent order, 
and that contingency is bound up in billions of years of evolutionary history that could have 
unfolded in paths too vast to quantify.877  Life as we know it is orderly, but not necessary.   
In a similar fashion, the new natural lawyers suggest that some moral principles are the necessary 
result of basic principles of rationality, such as the law against non-contradiction.  This inherently 
is a claim that these principles of rationality are a fundamental and necessary property of the 
universe and that the moral principles derived from them are likewise necessary.878  Such a claim, 
however, fails to comprehend the contingency of biological evolution.  The moral principles the 
new natural lawyers are concerned with purport to govern human activity.  Human beings are a 
product of biological evolution, like all other life on Earth.  Our beliefs about rationality may be 
no more than epiphenomena of contingent processes.  The principles of logic and reason may 
appear to us inviolable, but this appearance may simply reflect our rather puny status as large-
brained primates adapted to one of the billions upon billions of planets orbiting one of the billions 
upon billions of stars in one of the billions upon billions of galaxies in what we perceive to be the 
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universe – which may only be one of billions upon billions of universes in the multiverse, or one 
of infinite universes or multiverses.   
Philosophically, then, both ID theorists and the new natural lawyers adopt a naïve form of 
foundationalism.  They assume that a scientific, ethical, and/or legal system can be established 
from the bottom up based on rational foundations that cannot be challenged and that are 
sufficient to support the resulting edifice.  This sort of naïve foundationalism, however, 
consistently fails, because the supposed foundations turn out to require more basic unverifiable 
assumptions for their own support. 
Theologically, both ID theorists and the new natural lawyers claim they are not making 
theological claims.  Instead, they suggest that their arguments are neutrally accessible to religious 
and non-religious people and stand on their own, even though they are consistent with various 
theological and religious claims.  The unintended result of this position is a further separation of 
“faith” and “reason.”  It looks like a Kantian move because it is a response to the modern Kantian 
turn that is resigned, at least for the sake of argument, to separation of reason and sentiment.  
The “God” resulting from this modern form of apologetic ends up looking flatly immanent, 
defined, constrained, and revealed entirely by human reason.  Indeed, the “God” of this apologia 
seems to be human reason.  In this way, the theological problems with ID theory and the new 
natural law are related to the philosophical problems, which in turn are related to fundamental 
failures to take evolutionary biology seriously.  The lonely primate mind stretching out from 
within the incomprehensibly vast sea of the multiverse (whether “real” or only imaginatively 
counterfactual) remains incapable of establishing its own existence, much less the existence of 
universal “laws” or of its God. 
Hittinger is therefore correct when he argues that “[w]e should admit the truth:  it is not advisable 
to suppress the issues in a philosophy of nature and then, as it were, to take the ethics and 
run.”879  As Christian theology has always recognized, if “nature” is in fact “creation,” a gift of the 
transcendent and yet personal creator-God, then what it means to “reason”, to “be,” and to “act” 
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– what it means to be free – differs radically from any concepts in which such a God is absent.  
The very intelligibility of the universe depends on the first fact of that the universe is “creation.”  
In “creation” there are no “acts” apart from “being”; causes are not univocal; and there is neither 
determinism nor “libertarian” freedom.  In “creation,” what is “good” and “true” is not 
designated as such in virtue of its correspondence with a neutral rationality, but rather what is 
“rational” is designated as such in virtue of its participation in and orientation towards its final 
cause in God.  As Hittinger notes, “[a]ny effort to extract a part of the ethic [of common morality 
based in a shared notion of creation] in the absence of its proper foundations, or to assign that 
part to some other foundation, is tantamount to constructing a materially different ethic.”880   
2. Jean Porter, Stanley Hauerwas, and “Nature as Reason” 
 
In this respect Jean Porter’s philosophy of natural law is superior to the “new” natural law.  Porter 
notes that the Scholastic concept of natural law, like Grisez and Finnis’ approach, understood 
natural law as a “product of reason.”881  But, Porter argues, the Scholastics “interpreted reason 
itself in theological terms.”882 Like Hittinger, Porter argues that modern attempts to articulate a 
universally compelling and rationally defensible natural law ethic have failed because there 
simply is no possibility of rational inquiry outside culturally specific traditions.883 
Porter’s line of argument at this point seems to run in the direction of some Protestant critiques 
of natural law, as she acknowledges.884  She notes that “[r]ecently, Protestant reappraisals [of 
natural law theory] have retrieved aspects of the earlier tradition that many Catholic theologians 
have rejected, particularly its emphasis on prerational nature as a source for moral 
discernment.”885  One of these Protestant thinkers is Stanley Hauerwas.886 
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Hauerwas has been critical of natural law because, he argues, “the power of natural law as a 
systematic idea was developed in and for the Roman imperium and then for ‘Christendom.’  Thus, 
ironically, ‘natural law’ became the means of codifying a particular moral tradition.”887 Hauerwas 
is particularly concerned about what he understands as a conflation of “nature” and “grace” in 
Catholic natural law ethics.888  This approach, Hauerwas suggests, “is bound to use Christ to 
underwrite the integrity of the ‘natural,’ since he [Christ] is seen as epitomizing the fulfillment of 
the human vocation.”889  But for Hauerwas these categories of the “natural” and the “graced,” 
as well as the categories ordinarily emphasized in Protestant ethics – “covenant” and 
“redemption” – are abstractions that should not take priority over the narrative of the 
community shaped by God’s love for the world in Christ.890  Otherwise, the rightness or 
wrongness of particular actions is derived from “nature” and specifically Christian convictions 
only offer, at best, some supplemental motivation for an abstract “morality.”891  This means that 
learning how to be “moral” becomes an exercise in the analysis of logical propositions rather 
than a specific sort of communal formation in particular virtues, habits and practices.892  The 
Church then loses its ability to function as a counter-cultural community, particularly in Western 
democracies with historic links to modern natural law theories.893 
One of the most disturbing results of the tendency to identify what is “natural” with the prevailing 
culture, Hauerwas suggests, is that “violence and coercion become conceptually intelligible from 
a natural law standpoint.”894  The language of natural “rights,” he says, “in spite of its potential 
for good, contains within its logic a powerful justification for violence.”895  This is in part a result 
of grounding ethical reflection in anthropology, even an anthropology connected to Christology: 
“[i]t is certainly right that life in Christ makes us more nearly what we should be, but that is not 
                                                     
887 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom:  A Primer in Christian Ethics (Univ. Notre Dame Press 1983),, 51.  
Hauerwas bemoans the fact that “[m]oral theologians came to look more like lawyers than theologians.  They were 
people skilled in adjudication of cases for the troubled conscience (no mean or small skill).”  Ibid. 
888 Ibid. at 56. 
889 Ibid. 
890 Ibid. at 57. 
891 Ibid. 
892 Ibid. at 58. 
893 Ibid. at 59. 
894 Ibid. at 61. 
895 Ibid. 
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to say we must start with the human to determine what it means to be a disciple of Christ.  While 
the way of life taught by Christ is meant to be an ethic for all people, it does not follow that we 
can know what such an ethic involves ‘objectively’ by looking at the human.”896  Instead, also 
echoing Alasdaire MacIntyre, Hauerwas notes that all action is historically situated.897  The 
emphasis on narrative reminds us “that we do not know what it means to call God creator or 
redeemer apart from the story of his activity with Israel and Jesus.  The language of creation and 
redemption, nature and grace, is a secondary theological language, that is sometimes mistaken 
for the story itself.”898 
Given this emphasis on the particularity of the Christian narrative, how does Hauerwas avoid the 
spectre of voluntarism?  Would Hauerwas agree with other Protestant versions of divine 
command ethics that God could counterfactually have issued any command at all – say, a 
command to torture babies – and thereby established that command as “moral?”899  In response 
to these concerns, Hauerwas refers to God’s inherent character, which we learn “most clearly … 
in the life and death of Jesus Christ.”900  The “foundation” of Christian ethics is not in any form of 
rational foundationalism, but rather “[i]f we have a ‘foundation’ it is the story of Christ.”901  This 
foundation is not given in excess of reason, but is itself a claim about reality – a metaphysical 
claim, although Hauerwas does not use the term “metaphysics” in this text.902  God’s commands 
“make sense within his purpose of creating a people capable of witnessing in the world to the 
kingdom.”903 
Hauerwas’ narratival approach as articulated in The Peaceable Kingdom might help us navigate 
some of the tensions occasioned by modern evolutionary biology and paleoanthropology.  The 
human creature is manifestly selfish and violent as well as social and altruistic.  Prior to modern 
                                                     
896 Ibid. at 58. 
897 Ibid. at 61. 
898 Ibid. at 62-63. 
899 See Ibid. at 65-66. 
900 Ibid. at 67.  Hauerwas does not reference the Euthyphro Dilemma here, but he is responding in classical fashion 
to the concerns raised by the Dilemma.  Cf. David Baggett and Jerry Walls, Good God:  The Theistic Foundations of 
Morality (discussing the Euthyphro Dilemma and potential responses). 
901 Porter, Nature as Reason,, 65-66. 
902 Ibid., 67-68. 
903 Ibid., 69. 
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evolutionary science, Christian theology referred to the doctrine of the Fall to account for the 
selfishness and violence.  But it is now clear – unless we wish to adopt the epistemology of the 
young earth creationists – that selfishness, death and violence characterized “nature” for many 
billions of years prior to the emergence of “humans” and for the four million years or so of 
“human” evolutionary history prior to the emergence of homo sapiens sapiens.  Indeed, a leading 
introduction to the modern philosophy of biology bears the title “Sex and Death,” an apt 
summary of the brute facts of evolution.904   
In a northern Spanish cave called El Sidrón lie thousands of bone fragments once thought to be 
the remains of Republican soldiers.905  They are, in fact, the remains of twelve Neanderthals who 
died about 50,000 years ago:  an infant, two children, three adolescents, three adult males and 
three adult females.906  mtDNA analysis of the remains suggests that this was a social / family 
group in which the males were biologically closely related – they were perhaps brothers – with 
adult females from different lineages and multiple children related to one of the females.907  The 
site also contains hundreds of Mousterian stone tools made in situ.908  Here was a Neanderthal 
family group that lived, ate, raised children, and died together. 
Their deaths probably were violent.  Their bones show telltale signs of butchering.  It seems that 
the flesh and meat was removed from their carcasses with stone tools.  The evidence suggests 
cannibalism.909  Perhaps this group sat around the fire inside El Sidrón one quiet evening 
knapping hand axes and flints, when a rival group attacked, killed them, and ate their flesh, simply 
because the rival group was hungry.910   
                                                     
904 Kim Sterelny and Paul E. Griffiths, Sex and Death:  An Introduction to Philosophy of Biology (Chicago:  Univ. 
Chicago Press 1999). 
905 See Steven S. Hall, “Last of the Neanderthals,” National Geographic, October 2008, available at 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2008/10/neanderthals/hall-text/1. 
906 Ian Tattersall, Masters of the Planet (Macmillan 2012), 172; Carlos Lalueze-Fox, et al., “Genetic Evidence for 
Patrilocal Mating Behavior Among Neanderthal Groups,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences  of the 
United States of America, November 12, 2010, available at http://www.pnas.org/content/108/1/250.full. 
907 Tattersall, supra Note 52, 173-74; Lalueze-Fox, supra Note 52. 
908 Lalueze-Fox, supra Note 52. 
909 Tattersall, supra Note 52, 172. 
910 Ibid. at 172-73. 
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This story, like most recreations of Neanderthal and other paleo-human life, is contestable and 
has been contested in the scientific literature.911  Nevertheless, it raises it raises a fascinating 
question:  was there “law” for Neanderthals or other early human / hominid species?912  Was this 
an act of “murder?” 
As the Neanderthal remains at El Sidrón remind us, there was something like “murder” prior to 
what theology has traditionally thought of as the time of Adam and Cain.913  Yet Hauerwas might 
say – with Conor Cunningham in DPI – that we should not look to such abstractions of “nature” 
for the content of theology and ethics (and for Hauerwas, ethics is theology).  For “Adam” we 
should look to Christ, not to the Neanderthals at El Sidrón. 
There is a significant lacuna in such an approach, however, because – again, unless we want to 
adopt the epistemology of the young earth creationists – we cannot deny that our “human” 
proclivities, tendencies, unconscious reactions, raw emotional responses, epistemic limitations, 
and so-on – our human “nature” – is inseparable from our bodies, which are connected with our 
deep and dark evolutionary past.914  Moreover, it is unclear how billions of years of evolution, 
including millions of years of “human” evolution, fit into the narrative to which Hauerwas refers.  
The Biblical narrative and the narrative of the Christian Tradition know nothing of Darwinian 
                                                     
911 See Linda Vigilant and Kevin E. Langergraber, “Inconclusive Evidence for Patrilocality in Neanderthals,” PNAS 
May 3, 2011, available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/108/18/E87.full?ijkey=5e99dcbca8ece609d9c725468c9dbfbfcd026345&keytype2=tf
_ipsecsha; Caules Lalueza-Fox, et al., Reply to Vigilant and Langergraber:  Patrilocality in Neanderthals is Still the 
Best Explanation, PNAS May 3, 2011, available at http://www.pnas.org/content/108/18/E88.full. 
912 Scientific convention is to refer to as “human” all hominid species dating back to the split in evolutionary 
lineage from chimpanzees about four million years ago.  As will be explored further in this Chapter, this is a 
tendentious usage that simply begs the question what it means to be “human.”  Many hominid species referred to 
in the scientific literature as “human,” including Neanderthals, were not even direct evolutionary antecedents of 
contemporary humans (homo sapiens sapiens).  There was some genetic intermixing between early modern 
humans and Neanderthals and perhaps some other archaic humans.  Comparative DNA analysis suggest that the 
contemporary human genome includes only small traces of Neanderthal and Denisovan DNA, although the traces 
that have survived may be important for immune system function.  See, e.g., Benjamin Vernot and Joshua Akey, 
“Resurrecting Surviving Neandertal Lineages from Modern Human Genomes,” Science 28:1017-1021 (February 28, 
2014); Sriram Sankararamam, et al., “The Genomic Landscape of Neanderthal Ancestry in Present-Day Humans,” 
Nature 507:354-457 (January 29, 2014); Laurent Abi-Rached, et al., Science 7:89-94 (October 7, 2011). 
913 See Chapter 3.1. 
914 It should be noted here that the reference to Neanderthals in relation to the “human” evolutionary past is 
illustrative only.  We – homo sapiens sapiens – are not descendants of Neanderthals, although there was evidently 
some interbreeding between anatomically modern humans and Neanderthals at some point in the last tens of 
thousands of years. 
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evolution.  Those narratives suggest an unmarred original creation, stricken with the catastrophe 
of the Fall, restored in Christ finally at the eschaton.  The most significant “narrative” attempts 
by theology to incorporate evolutionary biology are those reflected in process theology – in other 
words, they are efforts that significantly alter the orthodox framework of the Trinity, Christology, 
creation, and eschatology.915 
Jean Porter also accepts the MacIntyreian / Hauerwasian critique of pure reason, but she returns 
to Aquinas in an effort to retain some notion of “nature” that is neither opposed to “grace” nor 
collapsed into “grace.”  For Porter, the necessary bridge is teleology.916  Aquinas’ account of 
natural law, Porter argues, “is essentially teleological – that is to say, it is developed and 
structured through reflection on the purpose, or end, of human life, and the way this end 
incorporates and brings order to the diverse inclinations of our complex specific nature.”917 
Porter also accepts the “critical realist” stance in theology and science, which commits her to 
“construing nature in a way that is responsive to our best speculative understanding of the world 
around us, which today comes to us largely, though not exclusively, through the natural 
sciences.”918  Indeed, Porter specifically relies on Alister McGrath’s approach to critical realism.919  
However, Porter criticizes what she perceives as naïve realism in McGrath’s understanding of 
“science” and the scientific portrait of “nature.”  Porter wishes to navigate between outright 
postmodern social constructivism and modern foundationalism.  She finds her way via a kind of 
“speculative realism” through which Macintyrean tradition-specific inquiry “can in some 
instances attain to a highly developed theoretical account of a given subject matter, of such a 
kind as to reveal proper divisions and causal connections within a field of inquiry.”920 
Porter’s approach to the nature-grace question reflects this critical realist orientation.  She 
suggests that Aquinas’ connection between the virtues and the natural law requires “a kind of 
                                                     
915 See the discussion of process theology in Chapter 1, supra. 
916 Ibid., 49-50.   
917 Porter, Nature as Reason,, 50. 
918 Ibid., 58. 
919 Ibid., 58-59. 
920 Ibid., 64. 
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happiness that is connatural to the human person.”921  Porter argues that Aquinas maintained a 
clear distinction between nature and grace that was central to his theology, but that Aquinas 
never assumed the existence of a state of “pure nature.”922  The first humans, for Porter’s 
Aquinas, were created in a state of grace.  Human nature has been distorted, but not entirely 
erased, by original and actual sin.  There are virtues and principles of action that are proper to 
human nature as it now is, yet there are also pervasive human tendencies (such as narrow self-
love) that are not proper to human nature as such.  Moreover, there are virtues and principles of 
action that are in excess of human nature as it now is – that are infused – but that move human 
persons back toward the state of grace (beatitude).923  For Porter, this distinction allows us to 
reflect on human nature as it now is and to develop principles of “natural law” that are 
appropriate to human nature but that do not imply the ad extra of grace.924  Nature, for Porter’s 
Aquinas, “broadly considered is intelligible on its own terms, and as such it has independent 
theological significance as a reflection of the wisdom of God.”925  Porter contrasts this with what 
she describes as the contemporary Catholic view, in which the nature-grace distinction is 
maintained only as a formal doctrinal principle, because “everything is permeated by grace, and 
at any rate all creation is a gratuitous gift of God.”926 
Porter argues that the nature-grace distinction is vital to the Thomistic dictum that grace does 
not pervert nature but perfects nature.  The infused virtues do not wash out or cancel the 
acquired virtues.  “’Nature as reason,’” Porter says, “informs the infused as well as the acquired 
virtues, even though the two kinds of virtues are specifically different, insofar as they are directed 
toward distinct ends.”927  In particular, for Porter, the acquired virtue of justice, which is reflected 
in ordinary relationships of obligation, is complemented and completed by the infused virtue of 
                                                     
921 Ibid., 379. 
922 Ibid., 384. 
923 Ibid., 384-85. 
924 Ibid., 385.  Porter states that “just as we can distinguish, albeit imperfectly, between what is natural to the 
human person as such and what reflects particular social/cultural expressions, so we can distinguish between what 
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925 Ibid., 386-87. 
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charity.928  Justice and love do not compete:  love fulfills justice.  This move allows Porter to offer 
a more positive concept of human “rights” than Hauerwas.  Reflection on human nature as such, 
on Porter’s reading of the Scholastics, “implies that all persons are naturally equal in some 
respects.”929  This notion of natural equality “leads to an expansive construal of the scope of 
justice, and it also implies limits on the scope of authority and obedience.”930 
Porter’s approach is attractive in that it seeks to avoid the positivism of the new natural law 
theory but still offers the prospect of some account of objective human goods that could inform 
systems of positive law.  But while Hauerwas’ narratival approach seems to require a particular 
story of grace that seems hard to square with the brute facts of natural history, Porter’s critically 
realist approach seems to require a particular concept of nature that does not realistically grapple 
with “nature red in tooth and claw.”  On Porter’s account of Aquinas, the virtue of justice is 
connatural with the human person because we naturally exist in certain kinds of reciprocal 
relationships, such as families.  But why is that so?  Why are there “families?  Does the “natural” 
history of “families” reveal anything about the essential nature of such arrangements?   
Philosophers of biology suggest that the answer is “no.”  “Natural” history is the history of 
change.  As the authors of Sex and Death note,  
Virtually all humans now live in environments that differ in 
important ways from the environments in which we evolved.  The 
foods most of us eat are unlike those yielded by hunter-gatherer 
lifestyles….  The wide availability of artificial light has changed our 
daily life rhythms.  The social groups in which we now live differ in 
size, and perhaps in composition, from those in which we evolved.  
Of course, there was no single ancestral human environment.  For 
much of human evolution we have lived in a wide variety of 
physical and social environments.  But the range of our ancestral 
environments probably overlapped very little with the current 
range.931 
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This means that “the link between selective history and current utility [is] fragile.”932  In other 
words, it is not so much the case that “family” arrangements are connatural to humans as that 
these are the sort of arrangements that we happen now to observe via the accidents of history.  
Moreover, “environmental change can change developmental outcomes.”933  Some set of 
environmental factors led to the predominance of “family” arrangements in the recent 
contingency of human evolution, but changing environmental factors may lead to different 
arrangements.  “Nature” is not anything essential within the domain of natural science; it is 
change. 
The observation that power structures within social groups – whether the “pecking order” in a 
flock of chickens, the grooming hierarchy in a troop of Chimpanzees, or the arrangement of labor 
in a human tribal or family group – can change over time under environmental pressures 
challenges the idea advanced by Hauerwas, Porter, and other theologians and philosophers that 
law is tied to reason and that reason is a gift that produces peace.  In “nature red in tooth and 
claw,” it seems that “law” is a function of power and violence.  An argument for any form of 
“natural law” therefore must grapple with the problem of originary violence.  Is the origin of law 
power and violence, or cooperation and peace?  This question is taken up in the following 
sections. 
3. The Violence of the Law 
In Hamilton, New Jersey, not far from the State capital, there is a government office building that 
houses the New Jersey State Police forensics laboratories.934  These include the sorts of labs made 
familiar by television series such as "CSI":  a room in which human remains are reconstructed to 
learn the identities of victims; a room in which DNA is sequenced to help identify a murderer or 
rapist; a room in which bullets recovered from dead bodies are compared under a microscope 
with test rounds to determine whether an accused's gun was used in the crime.  There is also a 
less well-known sort of lab:  cyber forensics. 
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933 Ibid., 315. 
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The cyber forensic technicians spend most of their time investigating online child pornography 
cases.  "Child pornography" is really a poor term for the sorts of materials these investigators 
confront.  A better term is "child rape."  These are horrifying videos and pictures of children as 
young as eighteen months old being subjected to anal, vaginal, and oral rape by adult men.  The 
children frequently cry and scream as they endure this abuse.  My friends in the local Prosecutor's 
Office tell me that the images being produced and traded are becoming more and more violent:  
children smeared in feces while they are being raped, children locked in dog crates, children 
forced to engage in sadomasochistic bondage acts. 
The law in New Jersey, and throughout the United States, prohibits even the possession of such 
images.  I have never met anyone, from the most leftist of ACLU members to the most rightist of 
off-the-grid Libertarians to the most calculating of utilitarians to the most steely-eyed of 
deterministic neuroscientists, who will say that the production and distribution of child 
pornography should be lawful.  I have also never met anyone who would argue that it is an 
inappropriately violent act to arrest and segregate child pornographers / rapists.  This is as clear 
an ethical universal as we are likely to find:  child rape is wrong and child rapists should be subject 
to legal sanctions; and the investigation and arrest of child pornographers / rapists in order to 
protect actual and potential child victims is a virtuous act.   But the protection of children against 
such acts – even within the bounds of the law, without vigilantism -- requires violence. 
In the earthly city, it seems, law always finally implies violence.  Chairman Mao once quipped 
that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”935  On the first day of law school, our 
Constitutional Law professor, distinguished federal appellate judge John J. Gibbons, introduced 
us to the study of law with this quote.  His purpose was to contrast the arbitrary rule of power 
from the rule of law.  It was a masterful lesson:  a polis grounded in commonly held constitutional 
legal principles functions by reason and not by power. 
                                                     
935 "Problems of War and Strategy" (November 6, 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 224, available at 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_12.htm.  In this text, Mao 
argued that a proletariat revolution could not occur in China without an armed struggle against Japanese 
imperialism.  He further noted that “[o]ur principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be 
allowed to command the party.”  Ibid.  Thus, even Mao recognized that violence cannot comprise the fundamental 
principle of society. 
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This is not only true of extreme cases involving child rapists.  One thing practicing lawyers learn 
quickly that is not taught in law school is that a victory in court in a civil case does not 
automatically translate into money in the bank.  The court issues a judgment, which in itself is 
just a piece of paper with some text requiring one party to pay the other the amount awarded.  
That paper in itself has no inherent value.  There is money in the bank only if the judgment is 
executed upon and the responsible party transfers funds or assets in full or partial satisfaction of 
the judgment.  The case is not really over when the final judgment is issued:  the money still must 
be paid or collected.936 
The reason why parties comply with judgments finally is coercive power.  Failure to comply with 
a court order can lead to sanctions for contempt of court, which may include fines, seizure of 
assets by armed U.S. Marshalls, or jail time.  As you enter a federal court building in the United 
States, just before passing through the metal detectors, you may notice a copy of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights etched into the marble wall.  It is an awesome and inspiring symbol.  
The quip that, in America, our Temple is the Courthouse and our Priestly and Acolyte classes are 
judges and lawyers seems tangible in that moment. 
Of course, many, perhaps most, civil litigants routinely comply with judgments without direct 
threat of contempt sanctions.  We might attribute this to the social contract through which 
parties bring their disputes before a constitutionally-appointed judge for a decision under the 
rule of law.  But a judgment’s final inherent value – and the reason why judgments can often be 
used as security for third-party transactions – lies in what stands behind the paper:  the power 
of the U.S. federal government.   
Sometimes judgments remain unsatisfied because the losing party lacks sufficient assets from 
which the judgment could be paIbid.  And, of course, some parties game the system by using 
corporate law and other means to render themselves judgment proof.  But even here, the 
coercive power of the law is evident:  the winning party cannot lawfully extract the judgment’s 
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finally will be collected. 
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value from an insolvent or defaulting party through revenge killings, beat-downs, cement loafers, 
or other forms of self-help commonly employed by organized crime gangs.  To do so is to risk 
arrest and incarceration by armed government police forces. Of course, the law’s coercive power 
is even more immediately evident in criminal cases.  No one does jail time only because of a social 
contract.937 
Experiences such as these make us wonder whether Judge Gibbons’ real purpose in offering the 
quote from Mao was more subtle than an easy contrast between totalitarianism and 
Constitutional democracy.  Even in a constitutional democracy, political authority is finally 
secured by the barrel of a gun.  The constitutional social contract in itself is a thin veil that is easily 
torn.  Many citizens refuse the terms of the social contract and live outside the bounds of the 
law.   
Some Christian theologians criticize the liberal notion of constitutional democracy and the social 
contract itself, on theological grounds, and argue for forms of Christian Socialism or other types 
of governmental structures.938  But even under such structures – indeed, perhaps even more so 
– the peace that is the goal of the governmental form must be secured by the force of law.  There 
is no form of earthly polis in which the law is entirely consensual.  Human experience tells us that 
some will not desire the peace of the city.  Scripture and Tradition tell us the same.  There is no 
earthly city without a police power. 
Jacques Derrida has noted that the language of the law is inherently violent.  In his essay Force 
of the Law:  The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority,’  Derrida notes that the phrase “to enforce 
the law” reminds us that “law is always an authorized force, a force that justifies itself or is 
                                                     
937 This is not to suggest that the prison system in the United States functions effectively.  Strict mandatory 
sentencing guidelines for non-violent offenses, the disproportionate number incarcerated of young African-
American men, and the perverse incentives of the prison-industrial complex raise numerous issues about the 
function of prisons in contemporary culture.  See, e.g., The Sentencing Project, “Facts About Prisons and People in 
Prison” (Jan. 2014), available athttp://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Facts%20About%20Prisons.pdf. 
Nevertheless, very few informed commentators argue that incarceration should be eliminated for every class of 
offender (say, violent sex offenders or mass murderers).  In any event, whatever sort of rehabilitative program 
might be suggested in place of prison, such programs must at some point be mandatory and thus backed by 
coercion and force. 
938 See, e.g., Milbank, Theology and Social Theory. 
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justified in applying itself, even if this justification may be judged from elsewhere to be unjust or 
unjustifiable.”939  Indeed, Derrida argues, “there is no such thing as law (droit) that doesn’t imply 
in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility of being ‘enforced,’ applied 
by force.”940  Derrida asks in this essay a perennial question for the rule of law:  how is the force 
or violence of the law distinguished from violence that is unjust? 
Derrida’s essay was written in French but delivered at an American law school in an English 
translation.941  He playfully notes the irony that his contractual agreement to deliver the essay as 
a keynote address in a symposium on law and deconstruction required – forced – him to use a 
language that was not his native tongue.  This very act of translation, with its inevitable changes 
in nuance and idiom, fails to do justice to the original text.  In the same way, legal concepts often 
lose the force of their meaning in translation.   
A basic example, for Derrida, is the German term Gewalt.942  In English and French, the term is 
often translated “violence,” but in the German idiom it also signifies “legitimate power, authority, 
public force,” including Gesetzegebende Gewalt (legislative power), geistliche Gewalt (the 
spiritual power of the church), and Staatsgewalt (the authority of the state).943  But what is the 
difference between bare Gewalt and legitimate Gewalt?  The modifiers “legislative,” “church,” 
and “state” represent institutions that at some time came into being and claimed legitimate 
power through some act of “originary violence.”944  What transmutes unjust originary violence 
into justified authority? 
Derrida refers here to one of Pascal’s Penseés:  “ Justice, force. – It is just that what is just should 
be obeyed; it is necessary that what is strongest should be followed.”945  There is no justice, 
Derrida concludes, without force; and the compulsion to follow arises from the strength of the 
                                                     
939 Jaques Derrida, “Force of the Law:  the “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 920, 925 (1989-
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940 Ibid. 
941 See Ibid. at 920. 
942 Ibid. at 927. 
943 Ibid. 
944 Ibid. at 927. 
945 Ibid. at 935 (quoting Pascal, Penseés, 298). 
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force applied rather than anything inherent in the law.946  “Justice,” then  is merely a word applied 
to the strong.  Derrida again quotes Pascal:  “And so, since it was not possible to make the just 
strong, the strong have been made just.” 947 
But if justice is only power, why do people ever obey the law, rather than living in perpetual 
revolt?  Derrida refers to another of Pascal’s Penseés, which refers in turn to Montaigne’s 
concepts of custom and equity.  Pascal seems at first to suggest that there is indeed a 
transcendent source of justice:  “Justice without might is helpless; might without justice is 
tyrannical. Justice without might is gainsaid, because there are always offenders; might without 
justice is condemned.”948  But Pascal immediately notes that “justice” seems impossible to define 
and quickly devolves to power:   
Justice is subject to dispute; might is easily recognised and is not 
disputed. So we cannot give might to justice, because might has 
gainsaid justice and has declared that it is she herself who is just. 
And thus, being unable to make what is just strong, we have made 
what is strong just.949 
For Pascal, the notion of “natural law” offers no succor: 
Men admit that justice does not consist in these customs, but that 
it resides in natural laws, common to every country. They would 
certainly maintain it obstinately, if reckless chance which has 
distributed human laws had encountered even one which was 
universal; but the farce is that the caprice of men has so many 
vagaries that there is no such law.  Theft, incest, infanticide, 
parricide, have all had a place among virtuous actions. Can anything 
be more ridiculous than that a man should have the right to kill me 
because he lives on the other side of the water, and because his 
ruler has a quarrel with mine, though I have none with him?950 
Finally, Pascal says, the foundation of authority is “mystical” and cannot be reduced to first 
principles: 
                                                     
946 Ibid. at 935, 937. 
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948 Pascal, Penseés 294. 
949 Ibid. 
950 Ibid. 
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The result of this confusion is that one affirms the essence of justice 
to be the authority of the legislator; another, the interest of the 
sovereign; another, present custom, and this is the most sure. 
Nothing, according to reason alone, is just itself; all changes with 
time. Custom creates the whole of equity, for the simple reason 
that it is accepted. It is the mystical foundation of its authority; 
whoever carries it back to first principles destroys it.951 
Derrida notes that in this paragraph on the mystical foundation of authority, Pascal is referencing 
Montaigne.952  Montaigne, Derrida points out, referred to the “legitimate fictions” of the law “on 
which it founds the truth of its justice.”953   Derrida finds a distinction between Pascal and 
Montaigne.  The heart of the problem, for Pascal, is sin:  “There are, no doubt, natural laws; but 
this fine thing called reason has corrupted everything,” Pascal says, and further “Our justice 
comes to nothing before divine justice.”954  But it is possible, says Derrida, to “set aside the 
functional mechanism of the Pascalian critique, if we dissociate it from Christian pessimism,” and 
to find in Montaigne “the basis for a modern critical philosophy” of law and justice.955  For 
Derrida, the mystical authority of justice derives from performativity.956  The discourse of “law” 
itself possesses a mystical performative power from which it derives its force. 
Because law is founded in a mystical performative power, for Derrida, law is always subject to 
deconstruction.957  This may be a “stroke of luck for politics, and for all historical progress,” 
Derrida suggests, for law then is infinitely malleable.958  But the paradox, he argues, is that justice 
in itself, “outside or beyond law,” is not deconstructible because justice is itself a performative 
act of deconstruction.959  That is, “Deconstruction is justice.”960  As a mystical event, justice simply 
presents itself to us as “an experience of the impossible.”  “It is just that there be law,” Derrida 
                                                     
951 Ibid. 
952 Derrida, “Force of Law,” at 939 (citing Pascal, Penseés 294 and Montaigne, Essais III, XIII, De l’expérience).   
953 Ibid. 
954 Ibid. (quoting Pascal, Penseés 294 and 233 (“The finite is annihilated in the presence of the infinite, and 
becomes a pure nothing. So our spirit before God, so our justice before divine justice.”). 
955 Ibid. at 941. 
956 Ibid. at 943. 
957 Ibid. at 943.  Derrida states that “[t]he structure I am describing here is a structure in which law (droit) is 
essentially deconstructible, whether because it is founded, constructed on interpretable  
958 Ibid. at 943, 945. 
959 Ibid. at 945. 
960 Ibid. 
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says, “but justice is incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the incalculable; and aporetic 
experiences are the experiences, as improbable as they are necessary, of justice; that is to say of 
moments in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule.”961 
Michel Foucault similarly develops the relation between law and the violence of punishment for 
violation of the law in Discipline & Punish:  the Birth of the Prison.962  Foucault describes in hoary 
detail the methods of public bodily punishment encoded in European legal systems prior to 
reforms in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.963  Such torturous public punishments, 
Foucault notes, were gradually replaced with the prison system, in which prisoners’ bodies are 
removed from public view.  This represented, for Foucault, a shift from the body to the soul:  
“[t]he expiation that once rained down upon the body,” he said, “must be replaced by a 
punishment that acts in depth on the heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations.”964  This was 
not a soul born into sin as in Christian doctrine, but rather a soul born “out of methods of 
punishment, supervision and constraint”965  Contrary to the Thomistic claim that the soul is the 
form of the body, Foucault stated that “the soul is the prison of the body,” because the “soul” is 
not a personal substance but rather a political economy of secrecy, fear, coercion and 
imprisonment.966 
4. Biopolitics in the State of Exception 
In the Auschwitz death camp there is a room in Cell Block 11 containing a long table and several 
chairs.   When the camp was in operation, a Gestapo judge sat at the table hearing cases against 
prisoners charged with “serious” crimes, such as attempted escape or political subversion.  At 
                                                     
961 Ibid.  at 947. 
962 Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish:  The Birth of the Prison (New York:  Pantheon 1975). 
963 In his first chapter, “The body of the condemned,” Foucault recounts the gruesome execution of Damiens 
Robert-François Damiens, who had attempted to kill King Louis XV.  Damiens was torn with hot pincers, burned 
with molten lead, oil, resin, wax and sulphur, and drawn and quartered.  The drawing-and-quartering was botched 
and could be completed only after Damiens’ arms and legs were hacked with blades.   
964 Ibid. at 16. 
965 Ibid. at 29 (emphasis added). 
966 Ibid. at 30. 
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one end of the courtyard outside Cell Block 11 stands a brick wall, still pockmarked with bullet 
holes, against which those condemned by the judge were executed.967    
None of those “tried” in the Auschwitz court had the benefit of representation by counsel.  There 
are no published law codes or judicial precedents specifying any rules of due process or 
substantive limitations on judicial power.  There is no record of any acquittals.    
Not all the inmates of Auschwitz-Birkenau, of course, appeared before the Getsapo court – 
indeed, the vast majority never received any judicial process.  Many, particularly the very young 
or old, the sick and infirm, were sorted for the gas chambers immediately upon debarking the 
train inside the gates of Birkenau.  Others were gassed after some time working in the camp 
factories.  Many died of exhaustion and disease, and still others were summarily executed by 
their guards.  At Auschwitz-Birkenau alone, about a million people died in this fashion, without 
even a false veneer of law.968 
So why is there a court room in Cell Block 11?  Why were some prisoners put through show trials 
before they were executed?   
Theologian Miroslav Volf tells the story of his involuntary service in the Yugoslavian military and 
his interrogation by his commander, “Captain G.”969   Volf was accused of serving as a CIA spy and 
of subverting the communist regime because he had married an American and studied theology.  
He was threatened with eight years in prison at the hands of a military tribunal.  As a soldier, he 
was not entitled to legal counsel.  “To be accused was to be condemned,” he recalls, “and to be 
condemned was to be ruined … unless I confessed.”970   After many weeks of this practice, Volf’s 
interrogations abruptly ended.  Why was Volf never tried? 
                                                     
967 A photograph of the execution wall is available at the U.S. Holocaust Museum, 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/media_ph.php?ModuleId=10005189&MediaId=752. 
968 See “Auschwitz:  Inside the Nazi State,” available at http://www.pbs.org/auschwitz/40-45/killing/; U.S. 
Holocaust Museum, Holocaust Encyclopedia, “Auschwitz,” available at 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005189. 
969 Miroslav Volf, The End of Memory:  Remembering Rightly in a Violent World (Grand Rapids:  Eerdmans 2006). 
970 Ibid. at 3. 
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History offers countless other examples of such summary justice, and untold multitudes have 
suffered similar abuse without any historical memory.  It seems that powerful human beings need 
to cloak their violence against the powerless with a simulacrum of judicial process.     
In his book Homo Sacer, Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben observes that in the state 
of exception the law is “suspended.”971  When faced with a perceived threat or emergency, the 
sovereign declares a “state of exception” under which the ordinary rules of procedure, evidence, 
and judgment no longer apply. In the state of exception there is no law but the will of the 
sovereign, and thus there is no “law” at all. 
Agamben highlights the problem of the relation between constituting and constituted power.  
Constituted power is that which is exercised with an existing state / juridical framework. 
Constituting power is that which legitimates the state / juridical framework in the first 
instance.972  Agamben suggests that the problem of constitutive power “is increasingly dismissed 
as a prejudice or a merely factual matter,” creating a circularity by which the problem of 
legitimate power simply is referred to a Constitutional document, which hangs in mid-air.973  The 
fundamental problem, he argues, is metaphysical:  what is the relation between potentiality (the 
possibility of constituting law) and actuality (law as constituted).   “Until a new and coherent 
ontology of potentiality . . . has replaced the ontology founded on the primacy of actuality and 
its relation to potentiality,” he argues, “a political theory freed form the aporias of sovereignty 
remains unthinkable.”974 
Agamben demonstrates that this problem of constituting and constituted power is a 
manifestation of the Aristotelian relationship between potentiality and act, dynamis and 
energia.975  How, if at all, is potentiality different from act?  Potentiality in the Aristotelian sense, 
                                                     
971 Giorgio Agamben,  Homo Sacer:  Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Palo Alto:  Stanford Univ. Press 1998). 
972 Id, 3.1,, 39-40. 
973 Ibid., 3.1,, 40. 
974 Ibid., 3.2,, 44. 
975 Ibid., 3.3,, 44-48.  For a critique of Agamben on this point, see Conor Cunningham, “Nihilism and Theology:  
Who Stands at the Door?” in The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought (Oxford:  OUP 
2013).  Cunningham argues that Agamben seeks to develop his constructive, demonic, nihilism (after all, the Devil 
wants a kingdom, so there is no point in going all napalm on us), by way of reinterpreting Aristotle’s division of 
actuality and potentiality. He does this in a bid to ‘decreate’ us.”  Ibid. at 326. 
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Agamben argues, is the ability not to do or be:  “’Every potentiality is impotentiality of the same 
and with respect to the same’” or “’What is potential can both be and not be.’”976  This means 
that when potentiality passes into act, that which is potential “sets aside its own potential not to 
be (its adynamia).”977  Therefore it is through potentiality that “Being founds itself sovereignly,” 
for the passage to actuality implies the sovereign freedom not to be or act.978  This means that 
constituting power is never exhausted by constituted power.  Sovereign power can remain in 
reserve, as un-given potentiality.979   As Conor Cunningham notes, Agamben plays on the 
voluntarist notion of potential dei absoluta.980 
Agamben then explores the figure of homo sacer, the person in Roman law placed under the 
sacred ban.  The homo sacer was not subject to execution by the State, but neither was it a crime 
of homicide for anyone to kill him.  This placed the homo sacer paradoxically both under and 
outside the law.  The same dynamic, Agamben notes, obtained in the Germanic wargus, the 
“werewolf” who is banned from the city and its law.981  Agamben defines this as the origin of 
politics:  “[n]ot simple natural life, but life exposed to death (bare life or sacred life) is the 
originary political element.”982   
Agamben thereby deconstructs the Hobbseian response to the state of nature:  the city and its 
laws do not limit the violence of the state of nature, but rather the state of nature exists within 
the city, in the human condition of bare life, through which the citizen may become homo sacer 
/ wolf-man in the state of exception.983  The potential of the state of exception, moreover, bears 
within in the potential for the dissolution of the city itself:  “[t]he transformation into a werewolf 
corresponds perfectly to the state of exception, during which (necessarily limited) time the city 
                                                     
976 Ibid. (quoting Aristotle, Metaphysics 1046a, 32; 1050b, 10). 
977 Ibid., 3.3,, 46.  This is how Agamben construes Aristotle’s statement that “[a] thing is said to be potential if, 
when the act of which it is said to be potential is realized, there will be nothing im-potential (that is, there will be 
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978 Ibid. 
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European Thought and Theology (Oxford:  OUP 2012).   
981 Homo Sacer, 6.1,, 104-105. 
982 Homo Sacer, 4.1, 88. 
983 Ibid. 
217 
 
is dissolved and men enter into a zone in which they are no longer distinct from beasts.”984  Thus, 
“[t]he state of nature is, in truth, a state of exception, in which the city appears for an instant 
(which is at the same time a chronological interval and a nontemporal moment) tanquam 
disoluta.”985   
The paradigm of this dynamic, Agamben argues, is the concentration camp.  In the camp, the 
governing “law” is pure biopolitics, the assertion of power over the body, as evidenced vividly in 
the gruesome Nazi medical experiments on inmates.986  “The camp,” Agamben says, “was also 
the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts 
nothing but pure life, without any mediation.”987  “Law” and “fact” become indistinguishable in 
the camp:  the fact of bare life is law.988  And as Western politics have come to define humanity 
in terms of bare life, to perpetuate the state of exception, and thereby to declare all persons not 
persons but rather homo sacer and wargus, the camp has superseded the city as our basic 
political paradigm.989 
Agamben does not resolve this aporia, but he concludes with an appeal to reconstitute Western 
metaphysics.990  As Graham Ward has noted, Agamben makes use of Pauline thinking about the 
person, about faith and love, “but there is no analysis of the third in the Pauline trilogue of virtues 
– hope.”991  Ward adopts Agamben’s critique of the state of exception but only as a starting point 
to illuminate the contemporary situation and to bring it into the light of Christian eschatological 
hope.992 
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Earlier in his essay on Homo Sacer, Agamben refers to an article by Emmanuel Levinas, Reflections 
on the Philosophy of Hitlerism.993  In that essay, Levinas locates the philosophy of National 
Socialism in “the essential possibility of elemental evil into which we can be led by logic and 
against which Western philosophy had not sufficiently insured itself.”994   
Within the Jewish and Christian traditions, Levinas argued, human beings are free to transcend 
the vicissitudes of history, including of their own personal histories.  “This freedom,” he said, 
“which is infinite with regard to any attachment and through which no attachment is ultimately 
definitive, lies at the base of the Christian notion of the soul.”995  Although the body remains 
stuck in the slipstream of history, through renewal of the soul a person “can regain the nudity he 
had during the first days of creation.”996   Because each soul always retains this potential to renew 
itself, there remains an “equal dignity of each and every soul, which is independent of the 
material or social conditions of people….”997  Indeed, freedom from history is the ultimate 
freedom:  “The salvation that Christianity wishes to bring us lies in the way it promises to reopen 
the finality brought about by the flow of moments of a past that is forever challenged, forever 
called into question, to go beyond the absolute contradiction of a past that is subordinate to the 
present.”998  The modern alternatives to this paradigm, for Levinas, were Liberalism, Marxism, 
and National Socialism. Each of these programs displaced this notion of the soul.   
For Levinas, liberalism retained the notion of choice but replaced the soul with a Kantian realm 
of pure, dispassionate reason. This produced dislocation and skepticism, which attempt to keep 
concrete human history at a distance.999  The seeds of National Socialism are present in this 
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paradigm, because “[t]hought becomes a game.”1000  People shy away from personal 
commitment to spiritual values.1001   
Materialist Marxism “confused the self [le moi] with the body … at the price of a pure and simple 
negation of the spirit.”1002  Thus, the Marxists “placed the body in nature, and accorded it no 
exceptional standing in the universe.”1003  For such materialists, “the whole of the spirit’s essence 
lies in the fact that it is chained to the body.”1004  Here again are seeds of National Socialism’s 
exercise of power over the body. 
National Socialism, in turn, replaced the soul with ideas. These were not ideas freely appropriated 
by reason, thereby creating a community of peers.1005  Rather, this was a framework of ideas – 
the Blut und Boden of the Aryan ideal of history – propagated by force. The violence attached to 
ideas propagated by force does not dissipate when the ideas find acquiescence in subjects.  
Instead, the force remains, universalizing one final ideal:  “war and conquest.”1006 
5. From the State of Exception to the State of Grace 
How did we move from the grand Christian theological connection between law and the order of 
creation to something as deracinated as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s “three generations of 
imbeciles is enough,” Agamben’s state of exception, or David Eagleman’s neurolaw?  Why do 
even non-reductive physicalists insist on the causal closure of the physical?  Most contemporary 
religion and science scholars, as we have noted, trace their views on neurobiology and the soul 
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The idea propagated detaches itself essentially from its point of departure.  In spite of the 
unique accent communicated to it by its creator, it becomes a common heritage.  It is 
fundamentally anonymous.  The person who accepts it becomes its master, as does the 
person who proposes it.  The propagation of an idea thus creates a community of 
‘masters’; it is a process of equalization.  To convert or persuade is to create peers. 
Ibid. at 70. 
1006 Ibid. at 71. 
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to Galileo’s scientific move back towards atomism.  The narrative is that science has finally show 
the top-down hierarchical Aristotelian cosmos to be false and that theology, like other disciplines, 
including law, must adjust accordingly.  But this empirical shift in perspective, which of course 
was warranted by Copernicus and Galileo’s observations and by the subsequent observations of 
the physical and biological sciences, is not the whole story.  
Some historians and theologians argue that modernity is a theological construction, rooted in 
late medieval nominalism and voluntarism.1007   The shift that gives energy to something like 
Eagleman’s fascist version of neurolaw then is not scientific; it is theological.   
For example, historian Brad Gregory notes, “the alleged incompatibility between science and 
religion derives not from science but in the first instance from a seemingly arcane metaphysical 
presupposition of some medieval scholastic thinkers.”1008  This metaphysical presupposition was 
that God shares being with creation (a “univocity of being” between God and creation); that 
God’s will is radically non-contingent, including on God’s essential nature or being; and that God’s 
providence, including his governance of creation, because of its radical non-contingency, was 
arbitrary.1009   
If God’s will was arbitrary, then it could be known only by revelation, and not by reason, and 
likewise nature could only be known by empirical investigation of natural phenomena and not by 
abstract reasoning about the relations between transcendent universals and immanent 
particulars.1010  Nominalist theologian William of Ockham (c. 1287-1347) is known today for 
“Ockham’s Razor,” which is interpreted in contemporary discourse as a general principle of 
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parsimony in theorizing about natural phenomena.1011  Ockham’s Razor, however, originally was 
directed at excessive speculation about transcendent universals.1012   
The nature of Scotus’ actual views and the extent of Scotus’ actual influence on the development 
of modern thought are hotly debated among contemporary historians, theologians and 
philosophers.1013  Unfortunately, even among accomplished thinkers such as Brad Gregory, the 
lines of debate sometimes become drawn according to highly polemical confessional lines.  I 
cannot pretend to offer a judgment about these larger issues, but it seems clear that it if God’s 
being was univocal with the being of creation, the “need” for God as a causal agent 
diminished.1014  It is at least in part because of the increasing loss of a sense of God’s absolute 
transcendence over creation prompted at least in part by Scholastic nominalism and voluntarism 
that the physicist Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827) could eventually (reportedly) exclaim that 
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only that this happened, but also that, in combination with Occam’s razor applied to an either/or 
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he had no need of God as a “hypothesis” in assessing natural causation.1015  Further, Laplace 
argued that nominalist scientific empiricism should be applied to law and politics:  “Let us apply 
to the political and moral sciences the method founded upon observation and calculation, which 
has served us so well in the natural sciences.”1016  
Political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain suggests that the rule of law was ultimately weakened 
by these trends.  In her Gifford lectures, Elshtain noted how the nominalistic sense of will, power, 
justice and law has informed Western concepts of political sovereignty since the late Middle 
Ages:  
If there is a vital move in theology, law and ethics with nominalism, 
it is this:  An emphasis on the primacy of will over intellect is lodged 
as the gravamen of understandings of power and authority – a 
seismic shift from realist emphases.  Within medieval realism, even 
as Jesus, the Mediator, help us to ‘rise to meet him,’ as Augustine 
puts it, so an enduring fabric and structure of unchanging law 
forges a connection between God and human beings.  Human 
reason has access to it and can come to know and embrace the law 
freely.  The grounding of ethics lies in law.  There is an element of 
predictability here:  You can ‘take it to the bank,’ as we nowadays 
say. 1017 
Elshtain connects this nominalist tendency with legal positivism: 
By contrast, the rise of a command-obedience account of law, what 
in modernity came to be called legal positivism, turned, at least in 
its early foundations, on the theory of a willful supreme being who 
might as well have created things differently than he did – and 
might yet do so by undoing what he has done. . . .   Remaining on 
the trail of the will in theology and politics – the voluntarist 
tendency – earthly sovereignty is to social, political, and religious 
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life as God’s sovereignty is to the emergence of law and dominion 
in the first instance. 1018  
Here is the trace of Derrida’s argument about the founding event of justice and law as always an 
act of violence.1019  If the founding event of God’s justice, the giving of the law in the Garden, is 
just an arbitrary act of will, a rule that God could change at any moment, then the same can be 
said of the human exercise of authority as derived from God.  Elshtain notes that 
In strong articulations of voluntarist theory, God holds the potential 
power in reserve – power as absoluta – and possesses the latent 
power to alter prior revelations of divine law and natural law as 
reason-based in favor of an alternative command structure. . . . 
The “sovereign” or ruler, whether pontiff, emperor, or king, might 
be understood to be above the law and not beholden to it lest he 
choose to be so. . . .1020 
Seen in this light, perhaps Jacques Derrida was not aware of how traditional and Augustinian his 
position turns out to be.  “Justice” indeed is finally ineffable because it is an aspect of the being 
of God, and thus is wholly other than creation.  And yet as creation participates in God it 
participates in justice, instantiating justice as a gift that flows from the life of God.  Justice, then, 
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whereas Biel is convinced that nothing can be called good unless it be accepted as such by the ‘uncreated 
principle,’ God.”  Ibid. at 96.  Moreover, for Biel, “God can do something which he himself has declared unjust; 
however, if he does it, it then becomes right; therefore the will of God is the first rule of all justice.”  Ibid.  
Nevertheless, Oberman notes that Biel did not radically separate God’s will from God’s being, but rather that Biel 
attempted to preserve divine simplicity by rejecting distinctions between God’s will and being.  Ibid. at 99.  In so 
doing, Oberman argues, Biel preserved a notion of natural law as a stable, universal principle, albeit in a form 
somewhat different from Thomas Aquinas, particularly in the possibility that God might temporarily suspend some 
of His commandments.  Ibid. at 110.  Nevertheless, for Biel “[i]nsofar as the wisdom of God which is involved in the 
establishment of the natural law is beyond human intellectual capacities, it would have been possible for god to 
have decided in favor of a natural law different from the present one.”  Ibid. at 100.  The present natural law exists 
“de facto” because God has in his inscrutable wisdom made it so.  Ibid.  This seems to introduce an uncomfortable 
possible division between God’s being and His will.  Brad Gregory suggests that Oberman’s assessment of 
nominalism is excessively sanguine because of Oberman’s personal disdain for Thomism.  Gregory, The Unintended 
Reformation, 401 n. 30. 
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is encountered and not constructed.  We cannot own or control justice, but we encounter it as it 
presents itself to us, and we can participate in it or not.1021 
But as God was elided from the equations of law and justice, first the absolute human sovereign, 
and then autonomous self, and then the irrational self, and finally the mercilessly deterministic 
brain, began to take His place.  As John Milbank observes,  
In the thought of the nominalists . . . the Trinity loses its significance 
as a prime location for discussing will and understanding in God and 
the relationship of God to the world.  No longer is the world 
participatorily enfolded within the divine expressive Logos, but 
instead a bare divine unity starkly confronts the other distinct 
unities which he has ordained. . . .  This dominance of logic and of 
the potential absoluta is finally brought to a peak by Hobbes:  ‘The 
right of Nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth 
those that break his Lawes, is to be derived, not from his creating 
them, as if he required obedience as of gratitude for his benefits; 
but from his Irresistible Power.’”1022 
Reductive neurobiology elides the concept of “law” and reduces any notions of self or social 
governance to chemistry, physics, and chance.  Law is therefore suspended by reductive 
                                                     
1021 Indeed, as Oliver O’Donovan has noted, the distinction between creator and creation requires us to maintain 
that in God’s divine freedom this creation is not necessary, but rather is contingent on God’s free decision.  Oliver 
O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order:  An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Eerdmans 2nd ed. 1994), 39.  As 
O’Donovan notes, “although we may perhaps dare to speak, by way of analogy and hesitantly, of a divine love that 
‘had’ to express itself in creation, as soon as we go beyond that to suggest that it had to create this world and not 
some other one, we say in effect that the ‘creation’ is not a creation at all, but an emanation, a reflection of the 
inner law of God’s being, sharing its necessity and thus, in some sense, sharing its divinity.”  Ibid.  But insofar as 
God has willed to create this world, O’Donovan further argues, “there is no reason why this proper theological 
concern should not be fully accommodated within a teleological and generic understanding of created order.”  
Ibid.  Therefore the source of “justice” is indeed ineffable, since it lies in the being and will of God.  But though it is 
ineffable, it is not bereft of human apprehension, if we, too, are God’s creatures. 
1022 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory,, 15-16 (quoting Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan.))  Hobbes’ nominalist 
and voluntarist views concerning law, power and sovereignty were, of course, hotly contested in their own time 
and formed the substrate of ideas that led to the English Civil War (1642-1651).  See Christopher Hill, The World 
Turned Upside Down:  Radical Ideas During the English Revolution (Penguin 1984).  A notable contrast to Hobbes 
was Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas in the early seventeenth century, who decided 
the famous Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 107 (1610), which suggested the practice of judicial review.  As Coke 
stated in his opinion, “it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul Acts of 
Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common 
right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such 
Act to be voIbid.”  For a comparison of Coke and Hobbes see James R. Stoner, Jr., Common Law and Liberal Theory:  
Coke, Hobbes, and the Origins of American Constitutionalism (University Press of Kansas 1992). 
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neurolaw.  The suspension of law, however, results in a state of exception, in which the sovereign 
acts arbitrarily in the absence of law.  The “sovereign,” for reductive neurolaw, is not a god or a 
person, but rather is pure nature.  Moreover, law always involves force or power.  Is law just the 
“force of nature?”  But perhaps Levinas hints at a direction for the inquiry Agamben opened 
concerning homo sacer / the wargus, metaphysics, and law, which is the connection we have 
argued for between “law” and the human “soul.” 
Here, Foucault’s study of the prison is penetrating and important, but he misses some important 
distinctions.  What he calls the “soul” is in fact what the Greeks, Romans and Christians called 
the polis.  In this respect, his analysis of the City as a “power” of fear and psychological coercion 
is nothing new.  The question is whether that power is always enslaving or can be redeemed and 
redemptive.  As Milbank and Ward suggest, Christian theology understood that the true City, the 
Heavenly City, is a place of peaceable, uncoerced participation and not violent imposition.  But 
Christian theology also recognized the conundrum of law, power and violence when the Heavenly 
City is not yet realized, and it understood positive law in relation to the preparation of the soul 
for that greater City. 
Reductive neurolaw suggests that our neural circuitry is like the “gatekeeper” in Kafka’s parable 
“Before the Law.”1023 (This of course reflects a theme raised at the start of this Dissertation:  “We 
all stand before the law; such is the lot of man.”1024 )  The gatekeeper convinces a man who 
desires access to the law that the law is inaccessible to ordinary people, that other, more 
frightening gatekeepers guard the law’s impenetrable inner sanctum.  The gatekeeper takes 
everything the man owns, all the man’s possessions, his health, his years of life, spent in the vain 
hope that the gatekeeper will grant access to the law.  At the end of his life, exhausted and dying, 
the man asks the gatekeeper, “Everyone strives after the law … so how is it that in these many 
years no one except me has requested entry?”  The gatekeeper replies:  “Here no one else can 
gain entry, since this entrance was assigned only to you.  I’m going now to close it.”   
                                                     
1023 In The Trial (CreateSpace 2011); Ian Johnston Trans., available at 
http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/kafka/beforethelaw.htm. 
1024 Conor Cunningham, DPI,, 414. 
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Kafka’s gatekeeper is pure force, the force of the man’s own self-consuming anxiety, which 
reduces the man to meaningless servitude.  The gatekeeper in fact guards no sacred sign and 
offers no protection from higher powers, for there is no sacred sign, and there are no higher 
powers.  There is only the man’s meaningless pursuit of a law he cannot find because he cannot 
escape his self-deception.  And so, many law and neurobiology scholars tell us, are we captive to 
the self-deceptive pursuit of meaning beyond our gatekeeper-brains. 
Commenting on Kafka’s parable, Giorgio Agamben remarks that “life under a law that is force 
without signifying resembles life in the state of exception, in which the most innocent gesture or 
the smallest forgetfulness can have most extreme consequences.”1025  This is a state in which law 
cannot protect us from tyranny.  The law that ordinarily stands between the average person and 
the powerful ruler has been suspended, meaning there is no law but power.  This is the only 
intellectually honest conclusion to Eagleman’s reductive concept of neurolaw:  “law” that is 
reduced to an epiphenomenon of brain activity is just a “force without signifying.”  It is the 
destruction of “reason,” and therefore of “law,” and therefore of “societies” and “persons.”  In 
the work of reductive neurolaw scholars, we have met Kafka’s Gatekeeper, Hobbes’ Leviathan, 
and Agamben’s state of exception, and it is us – or rather, it is our brains.   
However, the history of human evolution in the supposed state of pure nature, unfortunately for 
the project of reductive neurolaw, is deeply ambiguous.  There is strong evidence of “altruism” 
and cooperation, yet there is also strong evidence of competition and violence.  Moreover, in 
neurolaw’s state of pure nature there is no procedure for deriving how humans “ought” to live 
from the “is” of neurobiology.  At any moment in the flow of evolutionary time, it might be 
possible to describe a fitness landscape of human behaviors, with highly localized accounts of an 
ordinary distribution of behavior ranges.  Yet there is no principled way to construct a legal 
system that would seek to “correct” any particular behavior along any of these behavioral fitness 
curves.  The act of attempting to effect such “corrections” itself would simply represent another 
                                                     
1025 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 52. 
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adaptive behavior.  And the legal machinery necessary to implement such corrective action 
necessarily would imply force and violence.   
Reductive neurolaw therefore is nothing other than the inexorable rule of natural selection, but 
with “nature” itself stripped of goals and purposes.  It is pure force – the “force of the law” 
without law.  Thus the legal system of reductive neurolaw would perfectly enact the state of 
exception.  With no rule of law, the will of the most powerful persons or groups would 
marginalize, exclude, control, and eventually replace and extinguish the less powerful, until the 
race of humanity is comprised only of the master race – except that not even the promised 
master race would make its parousia, since the fitness landscape changes ever and the cycle of 
competition is a world without end.1026  Indeed, the pure nature imagined by reductive neurolaw 
destroys even “nature” itself.  There is no whole – “nature” – which selects for its parts, and there 
are no parts oriented towards a whole.  Finally, only these three remain -- time, energy, and 
change – and the greatest of these is change.1027 
6. Law and Christian Participation in Violence 
The response to Eagleman, Sloan Wilson and other reductive neurolawyers, then, must return ad 
fontes to Christ, scripture, and the Apostolic and Patristic tradition, with its rich metaphysics, to 
recover a sense of transcendence.  Our archeology of law in the classical Christian tradition has 
demonstrated that the concept of law was tied to the participation of the human soul in the life 
of God.  Law reflected an order of love and peace.  The Gospels bear witness to the early Christian 
claim that Christ, the “prince of peace,” was the fulfillment of the law.  The founding event of law 
was an event of love:  the creation of the universe by the free outpouring of the Divine Logos.  A 
human person or community’s failure to participate in the Divine law, with the resulting penalty, 
                                                     
1026 Cf. the “Glory Be”:   
Glory be to the Father, 
and to the Son, 
and to the Holy Spirit. 
As it was in the beginning, 
is now, 
and ever shall be, 
world without end. 
Amen. 
1027 Cf. 1 Cor. 13:13:  “And now these three remain: faith, hope and love. But the greatest of these is love.” 
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was not an imposition of violence but a consequence of the human decision towards the bondage 
of sin and away from the freedom of law. 
It would be overly simplistic, however, to posit a stark contrast between Agamben’s archeology 
of the camp as a state of legal suspension and the Christian tradition of legal thought.  Already in 
Augustine, there is a tension, often a severe tension, between the law of love handed down by 
Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount and the role of positive law in the earthly city.  Very few, if 
any, contemporary Christian political theologians will want to defend all of Augustine’s actions 
against the Donatists.  There are at least two related axes to this tension:  the “vertical” axis of 
the relation between God’s being, God’s will, and God’s law; and the “horizontal” axis of the 
relation between the Church as the new community founded by Christ and the earthly city.  This 
section works on both of these axes:  first, it explores further the relation between “law” and a 
founding act of arbitrary violence; and second, it explores the relation between the Church, the 
Christian ethic of nonviolence, and positive law. 
Tertullian and Lactantius, writing to mitigate the persecution of Christians by the Roman state, 
advocated a broad concept of religious freedom based on a theological concept of human 
dignity.1028  Augustine, writing to Christian rulers facing the Donatist controversy, takes a 
different approach. 
The exercise of violence in the service of the law, for Augustine, could represent an act of love, if 
such violence was necessary to secure the peace and foster the conditions under which people 
could move towards God.  This included not only general breaches of the peace, but also 
specifically religious concerns – particularly when, as is often the case, those religious concerns 
bled into general breaches of the peace.  The persecuted Church could become the persecutor. 
This is illustrated starkly in Augustine’s writings against the Donatists.   In his treatise The 
Correction of the Donatists, Augustine advised the Emperor:   
For both the physician is irksome to the raging madman, and a 
father to his undisciplined son,—the former because of the 
                                                     
1028 See Chapter 2.4 and 2.5 above. 
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restraint, the latter because of the chastisement which he inflicts; 
yet both are acting in love.  But if they were to neglect their charge, 
and allow them to perish, this mistaken kindness would more truly 
be accounted cruelty. 1029 
Augustine argued that the Donatists could not position themselves as martyrs, because true 
persecution occurs only when a person is unjustly punished for disobeying a law that contradicts 
truth.  A person who disobeys a law that promotes truth, however, is justly punished and 
therefore not a martyr.1030  Since the laws against the Donatists were in the service of the true 
Church, those who disobeyed them were justly punished and not martyrs.  Moreover, since just 
laws can be enforced by violence, the punishment received is not a form of unjust 
persecution.1031 
And, since the Church seeks man’s salvation, persecution inflicted on behalf of the Church should 
be seen as an act of love:  “Moreover, she persecutes in the spirit of love, they in the spirit of 
wrath; she that she may correct, they that they may overthrow:  she that she may recall from 
error, they that they may drive headlong into error.” 1032  Love demands that Christian rulers not 
shrink from inflicting pain:  “What then is the function of brotherly love?  Does it, because it fears 
the short lived fires of the furnace for a few, therefore abandon all to the eternal fires of hell?”1033  
Finally, Augustine argued, it is an act of faith in God’s provision of civil authorities to invoke the 
force of law rather than merely enduring schism:  “When the Church, therefore, was reduced to 
these straits in its affliction, anyone who thinks that anything was to be endured, rather than that 
the assistance of God, to be rendered through the agency of Christian emperors, should be 
                                                     
1029 ¶7, available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf104.v.vi.iv.html.    
1030 ¶8. 
1031 ¶10. 
1032 ¶11.  Augustine stated that 
 
Finally, she persecutes her enemies and arrests them, until they become weary in their 
vain opinions, so that they should make advance in the truth; but they, returning evil 
for good, because we take measures for their good, to secure their eternal salvation, 
endeavor even to strip us of our temporal safety, being so in love with murder, that 
they commit it on their own persons, when they cannot find victims in any others.  
 
1033 ¶14 
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sought, does not sufficiently observe that no good account could possibly be rendered for neglect 
of this precaution.”1034 
This view was tied to Augustine’s theology of history.  He recognized that the Apostles who were 
persecuted for Christ’s sake did not invoke civil law on their own behalf, but he argued that this 
illustration fails to “consider the different character of that age, and that everything comes in its 
own season.  For what emperor had as yet believed in Christ, so as to serve Him in the cause of 
piety by enacting laws against impiety. . . .”1035   Christian Kings should indeed view the 
persecution of schism as part of their sacred duty:  “In this way, therefore, kings can serve the 
Lord, even in so far as they are kings, when they do in His service what they could not do were 
they not kings.”1036 
Not surprisingly, how one interprets the political theology underlying Augustine’s activity against 
the Donatists depends in large part on one’s perception of the value of his goals.  A sympathetic 
Catholic Augustinian may take Augustine’s expressed motives at face value:  he was deeply 
concerned with the unity of the body of Christ, and encouraged strong but still moderated civil 
legal action to bring this schismatic group back into fellowship.1037  Anabaptist and other peace 
church writers may interpret Augustine’s role in the Donatist controversy as the height of 
Constantianism – for them, a grave heresy in its own right.  
7. Jesus, Law and Violence 
Augustine’s willingness to encourage the use government force against the Donatists, and  to 
some extent the contemporary Catholic Church’s softer Augustinianism, stand in stark contrast 
to Anabaptist and other theologians who emphasize an ethic of peace.   
Christian pacifists, however, generally have not offered a satisfying response to the dilemma of 
using force or allowing innocent people to suffer violence.  There seem to be at least two broad 
                                                     
1034 ¶18 
1035 ¶19 
1036 Ibid. 
1037 See, e.g., Donald X. Burt, Friendship and Society:  An Introduction to Augustine’s Practical Philosophy (Grand 
Rapids:  Eerdmans 1999),, 215-218.  Burt notes that Augustine allowed, but did not favor, the use of the death 
penalty in cases of heresy, and that he was more tolerant of outsiders such as Jews and Pagans than of the 
Donatists, whom he viewed as insiders under the Church’s direct jurisdiction.  See Ibid. at 218-221. 
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streams of thought (with many sub-branches) among pacifists.  One is a quietist strand 
exemplified in Robert Brimlow’s essay titled “What About Hitler” in a recent collection of essays 
offering an apologetic for Christian pacifism.1038  Brimlow attempts in that essay to respond to 
the common belief that the violence of war was just and necessary to stop the Nazi machine – a 
belief finally held, famously, even by the great Christian pacifist Dietrich Bonhoeffer.   
Brimlow admirably does not shy away from the connection between the violence of large-scale 
war against Hitler and the violence of any state action against a dangerous person:  "I think it is 
important,” he says, 
for us to bear in mind that when we think of just war and the just 
war tradition that we are also referring  -- at least implicitly -- to the 
state's police power as well [as] to the war-making power of the 
state in international affairs.  The justifications for each is the same, 
so much so that I have referred to police powers and war powers 
as flip sides of the same coin.  And the ultimate source of those 
justifications is the same.  It lies in the fundamental function of 
nation-states.1039 
The justification for violence by nation-states against despots and criminals, Brimlow argues, is 
in turn rooted in the presumptive right of self preservation.  Indeed, he says, “[t]o paraphrase 
Hobbes again, the threat of the sword underlies every statute, every treaty, as well as every 
interpersonal relationship.”1040 
For Brimlow, then, all exercises of war and police power are founded on a sinful desire to preserve 
the self at the expense of others.  In contrast, he argues, “[w]e are heirs to a new politics of faith 
and love that overturns the politics of the nations and rejects the violence of states.  This new 
politics makes love of God and love of neighbor our sole virtues from which everything else flows, 
and thus replaces the primacy of the right of self-preservation."1041  There is little doubt, he 
concludes, that if we were to confront a new Hitler with such an ethic, "given that we are dealing 
                                                     
1038 Robert Brimlow, “What About Hitler,” in Tripp York and Justin Bronson Barringer, eds., A Faith Not Worth 
Fighting For:  Addressing Commonly Asked Questions About Christian Nonviolence (Eugene:  Wipf and Stock 2012). 
1039 Ibid. at 52. 
1040 Ibid. at 55. 
1041 Ibid. at 56. 
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with a powerful evildoer, the result is that we will fail."1042  Apparently, then, Christians would be 
obligated to leave the innocents consumed in this new Hitler’s genocide to their fates, or at best 
to suffer martyrdom with them.  Brimlow does not quite draw out the consequences of his ethic 
for law in ordinary circumstances, but it seems hard to escape the conclusion that all state 
coercion, including all positive law of any kind, is sinful and invalid, and that all legal institutions 
represent only ungodly powers. 
There is something that rings true in Brimlow’s attempt to wrestle with the demonic ghost of 
Hitler.  He is right to decry the “Hitlerization of politics,” by which Christians and others justify 
fights to the death (often quite literally) over every threat or disagreement.1043  Brimlow’s 
account fails, however, because of his cramped understanding of the virtues, which leads to a 
devolution of the self.   
For Brimlow, apparently, any self-regard must comprise a form of violence against God and 
against neighbor.  The doesn’t seem to be any room in Brimlow’s thought for a self-regard that 
derives from love, in which the self is known and received as gift.  And this deprives Brimlow’s 
ethic of a self that is even capable of loving God or neighbor, and therefore of love itself.   
Other Christian pacifists, led by Gerald Schlabach, have argued for “just policing” ethic instead of 
“just war” theory.1044  Schlabach acknowledges that policing is a lacuna in Christian pacifist 
thought.1045  He also readily admits that "[n]o community can do without some kind of police 
function.  No Christian community.  No human community."1046  Schlabach further notes that the 
peace churches have advocated for the rule of law, and particularly international law, as a hedge 
                                                     
1042 Ibid. 
1043 Ibid. at 52. 
1044 Gerald W. Schlabach, “Must Christian Pacifists Reject a Police Force,” in A Faith Worth Not Fighting For; 
Schlabach, ed., Just Policing, Not War:  An Alternative Response to World Violence (Collegville:  Liturgical Press 
2007). 
1045 Schlabach, “Must Christian Pacifists Reject a Police Force,” p. 61.  Schlabach acknowledges that  
As we turn to ask whether Christian pacifism entails a rejection of police force, readers may 
quickly realize that this is where those practitioners of nonviolence are often 
ambivalent.  Frankly, Christian pacifists have not had a consistent answer to this 
question....  Ethically, they have not always been sure how to square actual practices with their 
peace theology.   
1046 Ibid. at 66. 
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against war, which necessarily implies the police function.1047  Schlabach agrees that a rule of law 
backed by a “just” police force requires the potential exercise of force:  if “terrorist crimes against 
humanity should be treated within the rubric of prosecuting criminals not waging war,” he says, 
“we must assume that as criminals, the perpetrators would probably refuse to turn themselves 
in.”1048  Therefore, “some kind of SWAT team with recourse to lethal violence still seems 
necessary,” along with “prison guards to hold the criminal terrorists they apprehend.”1049  
Schlabach and his co-authors describes a number of practices that could distinguish “just 
policing” from war, including community policing models, strengthening international 
organizations such as the United Nations, and the networking of non-governmental organizations 
through new technologies.1050  
Stanley Hauerwas’ work reflects the tension between the nodes of Anabaptist thought 
represented by Brimlow and Schlabach.  In one of his seminal works, The Peaceable Kingdom, 
Hauerwas starkly reverses Mao’s pragmatic thesis:  Christians, he says, “cannot seek justice from 
the barrel of a gun; and we must be suspicious of that justice that relies on manipulation of our 
less than worthy motives, for God does not rule creation through coercion, but through a 
cross.”1051  In The Peaceable Kingdom, Hauerwas argues that this ethic of radical nonviolence 
extends even to efforts to promote justice for others: 
We must be a people who have learned to be patient in the face of 
injustice.  But it may be objected:  Surely that is too easily said if 
you are not the ones who are suffering from injustice.  Precisely, 
but that does not mean that we ought to legitimize the use of force 
to overcome injustice.  Such legitimation often comes from the 
attempt to have justice without risking the self, as when we ask the 
‘state’ or the ‘revolution’ to see that justice is done, but in a manner 
that does not significantly affect our own material position.  If we 
are to be a helpful and patient people in a world of injustice, 
                                                     
1047 Schlabach, Just Policing, Not War,, 99 (noting that Mennonites have faced this question with varying degrees of 
consistency when their own ministries have positioned Mennonites to take governmental roles in health systems, 
welfare programs, international development agencies, and so on.  Yet these state functions already assume the 
rule of law, made possible through policing.”  A 
1048 Ibid. at 80. 
1049 Ibid. 
1050 Ibid. at 153-67. 
1051 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom (South Bend:  Notre Dame Univ. Press 1983),, 104. 
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however, we cannot just identify with the ‘cause’ of the poor, we 
must be like them poor and powerless.1052 
Nevertheless, Hauerwas insists that injustice must be resisted:  “Those who are violent, who are 
also our neighbors, must be resisted, but resisted on our terms, because not to resist is to 
abandon them to sin and injustice.”1053  Yet the primary form of this resistance, for Hauerwas, is 
not violent action, but the power of the Church’s life in its witness to the story of the Gospel, its 
sacraments, and its prayers.1054 
Is this an adequate response of love to the child who is being raped in snuff films distributed by 
a child pornographer?  If a Christian knows where and when the rape is occurring, should she 
contact the police?  Can a Christian serve as a lawmaker, lawyer, judge, police officer, 
investigator, or other government official whose job involves locating, arresting, and prosecuting 
child rapist pornographers? 
Hauerwas is not deaf to these questions.  He asks, “Can Christians ever be justified in resorting 
to arms to do ‘some good?’  Are Christians not unjust if they allow another person to be injured 
or even killed if they might prevent that by the use of violence?”1055  His response is that he has 
“some sympathy” for this view, and that “it certainly cannot be discounted as a possibility for 
Christians,” but that the exercise of power is dangerous because it is intoxicating and 
corrupting.1056  Moreover, “true justice,” he says, “never comes through violence, nor can it be 
based on violence.”1057  He seems to view Christian participation in any sort of state violence as 
a rare and extreme possibility, at most. 
At the same time, Hauerwas suggests that Christians might participate in a society’s government 
depending on the nature of the society and the nature of the role to be performed.1058  “Most 
governmental functions, even within the military,” he suggests, “do not depend on coercion and 
                                                     
1052 Ibid. at 105. 
1053 Ibid. at 106. 
1054 Ibid. at 106-111. 
1055 Ibid. at 114.   
1056 Ibid. 
1057 Ibid. 
1058 Ibid. at 169, Note 19. 
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violence.”1059  This might even mean that a Christian could serve as a police officer or prison 
warden, so long as they also “work to help their societies develop the kind of people and 
institutions that make possible a government that can be just without resort to violence.”1060 
The problem with Hauerwas’ qualification here is that he is wrong about the dependent relation 
between “most governmental functions” and “coercion and violence.”  All “governmental 
functions” are governmental only insofar as they are authorized by law.  An act that purports to 
be “governmental” but is not authorized by law is not properly considered an act of 
“government”; such an act is simply an exercise of individual or group power.  The rule of law is 
what defines something as properly “governmental.”  And in any earthly society, the rule of law, 
always, without exception, even in societies based on social contracts, is finally secured by power 
and violence.  Anyone who participates in any function of government, including the arrest and 
detention of child rapists, is implicated in state violence. 
This conundrum was recognized in a recent symposium on Hauwerwas and the law at Duke 
Divinity School.  Law professor and theologian Cathleen Kaveny stated the problem succinctly:   
Unlike the ‘peaceable kingdom’ of Jesus, earthly kingdoms are 
inherently built on violence – not only the violence of warfare, but 
also the threats of coercive force that ultimately and undeniably 
back any system of positive law.  The law, in other words, describes 
and implements the operating system of the strikingly unpeaceable 
secular world.  Upon what basis could Hauerwas possibly engage 
it?1061 
Kaveny notes that she writes from the Roman Catholic tradition, “which tends to recognize more 
continuities between nature and grace, and therefore more possibilities for natural theology and 
natural ethics (sometimes called natural law) than Hauerwas ordinarily acknowledges.”1062  As 
Kaveny notes, Hauerwas’ theological project is a sharp critique of any “natural theology” that 
purportedly is “defensible and intelligible on grounds fully independent from the complete and 
                                                     
1059 Ibid. 
1060 Ibid. 
1061 Cathleen Kaveny, “Hauerwas and the Law:  Framing a Productive Conversation,” 75 Law & Contemp. Prob. 135 
(2012). 
1062 Ibid. 
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vigorous account of reality offered by Christianity. . . .”1063  Kaveny notes two ways in which 
Hauerwas’ broader theological project could interface with the law:  through the casuistic 
tradition of the common law, and through Barth’s covenantal framework for creation.1064  The 
common law, Kaveny notes, is a historically embodied narrative reflected in the practices of the 
community governed by the law – much as Hauerwas understands the relationship between the 
Church, the Church’s practices, and scripture.1065  Barth’s understanding of creation and covenant 
– that God’s purpose in creating was the establishment of covenant – Kaveny suggests, supplies 
the basis for ad hoc engagement between the Church and the world on matters such as law.1066  
This, again, corresponds to Hauerwas’ account of theology, particularly his aversion to natural 
theology, and ethics.1067  Kaveny concludes that “[a]lthough Hauerwas may be opposed to 
‘Christendom,’ he ought not to dismiss the efforts of Christians to discern, over the centuries, the 
concrete requirements of morality in particular cases and controversies, in light of the demands 
of justice, demands that are themselves shaped by the biblical narrative.”1068 
Hauerwas responded to some of these questions and suggestions at the symposium in his 
conversation with H. Jefferson Powell, a former student of Hauerwas’ who is an attorney with 
the U.S. Department of Justice.1069  Hauerwas noted that he identifies himself as a “theocrat” in 
the sense that he takes the claim “Jesus is Lord” as a statement of public truth.1070  However, he 
said, 
That doesn’t mean I want the rule of priests.  Indeed, that would 
be the worst possible thing.  What we have fundamentally in this 
country is a rule of lawyers.  Now that is not all bad.  I assume that 
elite law practice very much determines some of the limits on our 
political life that I think is very much to the good.1071 
                                                     
1063 Ibid. 
1064 Ibid. at 145-151. 
1065 Ibid. 
1066 Ibid. 
1067 Ibid. 
1068 Ibid. at 157. 
1069 John D. Inazu, ed., “A Dialogue Between a Theologian and a Lawyer,” 75 Law & Contemp. Prob. 221 (2012). 
1070 Ibid. at 223. 
1071 Ibid. 
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Those “limits,” of course, imply the sorts of restraints that suggest state violence.  Hauerwas 
attempted to negotiate this boundary by distinguishing certain legal processes from the sort of 
“violence” Christian faith forbids.  “Violence,” he suggested, “is an analogical description.  It 
works pretty well as a description of killing someone, but there may be forms of force that those 
of us associated with nonviolence can understand as an alternative to more determinative forms 
of violence.”1072  Consistent with his focus on casuistry, he suggested that Christians committed 
to nonviolence could work with other Christians “to see how we can make the law, as nearly as 
possible, a service into the community in which those called to the police function are more 
nearly able to fulfill that calling nonviolently.  They are called peace officers.”1073  Hauerwas also 
notes that John Howard Yoder, the thought leader of contemporary pacifist Anabaptism, never 
thought of “law” as univocally violent.  Rather, Hauerwas noted, “Yoder observed that lawyers 
write wills and contracts, defend the poor against housing authority, defend people against 
capital punishment, prosecute, judge, postpone environmental rules, structure corporate 
mergers leveraged with junk bonds, and so on.”1074  The “’so on,’” Hauerwas suggested, “makes 
clear that the many things done in the name of ‘the law’ are not morally the same.”1075  In short, 
Hauerwas agreed that Kaveny had read him well and that her constructive proposal for viewing 
the common law as a narrative that provides points of contact between creation, Church, and 
culture, was important.1076 
Hauerwas’ conversation with these legal scholars, together with Schlabach’s work on just 
policing, may represent something of a breakthrough for reconciling Christianity’s non-violent 
ethic with its emphasis on law.  A similarly clear but limited endorsement of police power can be 
found on the Mennonite Central Committee’s publication “Pursuing Peace.”  The document 
notes that  
                                                     
1072 Ibid. at 229. 
1073 Ibid.  
1074 Stanley Hauerwas, “Hauerwas on Hauerwas and the Law,” 75 Law & Contemp. Prob. 233, 237 (2012).   
1075 Ibid. 
1076 Ibid.  In typical Hauerwasian fashion, however, he offered this qualification about the notion of covenant:  "I 
have never trusted Calvinists, other than Barth, when they talk about contracts being a form of covenant. When 
Calvinists talk that way about contracts, it usually indicates they are representatives of a rapacious business 
practice and they would eat you alive if they were able."  Ibid. 
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Romans 13 says that God has established governing authorities to 
support the good and to punish the wrongdoer. This refers to 
government’s ordering function, policing role and judicial 
processes. However, this is not a blanket authorization for war, as 
sometimes interpreted.  Moreover, our nation’s best ideals call for 
freedom, justice and peace for all people. . . . 
Christians should recognize that there are varying levels of force 
and some have greater legitimacy than others.  A military invasion 
intended to overthrow a regime and bring a society to its knees is 
very different than the use of a limited armed force to protect the 
lives of people who are in great peril.  Christian pacifists will 
condemn the former, but perhaps not the latter.1077 
The same document further describes a more open attitude towards policing: 
Mennonites and Brethren in Christ have been uneasily silent about 
the issue of participation in domestic police forces.  Most people 
avoid training for or joining a police force because of the traditional 
resistance to “bearing the sword.”  At the same time, these same 
people have few qualms in calling on the police for protection when 
they are threatened. 
By promoting restorative justice principles and programs, 
Mennonites and Brethren in Christ have made significant 
contributions to the development of alternatives to the criminal 
justice system. We believe that restorative justice processes are 
appropriate ways to deal with those who commit crime.  But 
offenders still need to be apprehended and brought to the 
restorative justice table.  And that may require some measure of 
force. 1078 
                                                     
1077 Esther Epp-Tiessen, Pursuing Peace:  The Essence of Mennonite Central Committee (Mennonite Central 
Committee 2009), Response to FAQ No. 3, available at 
http://peace.mcc.org/system/files/Pursuing%20peace%2009_press.pdf. 
1078 Ibid., Response to FAQ No. 5.  The document continues: 
What do we have to say about this?  Mennonites and Brethren in Christ have 
begun to talk more  about policing. Some suggest that pacifists should be in the 
system, helping to promote and train officers in conflict resolution, mediation 
and other techniques which lessen the tendency to resort to force. Other people 
suggest that Mennonites should support community policing–a model of policing 
in which officers develop strong and healthy relationships with particular 
communities, thereby reducing the need for guns and the threat of violent force. 
Still others suggest that Mennonites should be helping to envision, develop and 
test completely nonviolent forms of policing. Minimally, it is important that 
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Finally, in response to the question “What about evil people like Adolph Hitler,” the MCC’s 
“Pursuing Peace” manual states that “[p]eople who commit abhorrent acts of violence should be 
held accountable for their crimes through national and international mechanisms of law, such as 
the International Criminal Court.  Christian pacifists should support legal and nonviolent means 
which hold evildoers to account for their actions.”1079 
Schalbach’s work on just policing suggests some potentially rich connections between Anabaptist 
and pietist peacemaking theologies and the broader catholic-Augustinian tradition (indeed, 
Schlabach, a Mennonite convert to Catholicism, describes himself as a Mennonite Catholic).1080  
Brimlow’s approach, in contrast, seems to undermine the classical Christian virtues.   
For Aquinas, for example, the instinct of self-preservation is part of the natural law and is not 
intrinsically evil.  Yet, unlike Hobbes, Aquinas did not take self-preservation to be the most 
fundamental good.1081  Virtue might require actions contrary to self-preservation in order to 
pursue a higher good – as in the highest example of the virtue of courage, which for Thomas was 
martyrdom.  But there is no sense in Aquinas’ account of the virtues, or in his connection between 
natural law, the virtues, and positive law, that all law which preserves the self against the 
unlawful actions of others must inherently be sinfully selfish and violent. 
Of course, a pacifist such as Brimlow will not be overly taken with Thomas’ account of the virtues 
in relation to the justice of violence and war.  But Brimlow’s account of the virtues also seems to 
conflict with scripture – even with the scripture from which he apparently derives his account of 
virtue and politics.  It is frequently observed that Jesus’ restatement of the shema and 
accompanying “Golden Rule” presumes self-love:  “‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart 
and with all your soul and with all your mind.’  This is the first and greatest commandment.   And 
                                                     
congregations help individuals who are interested in policing as a career to 
discern God’s will for their lives. 
Ibid. 
1079 Ibid., Response to FAQ No. 6. 
1080 See Prof. Schalbach’s faculty page at the University of St. Thomas, available at 
http://www.stthomas.edu/theology/faculty/gwschlabach.htm, and his personal website, available at  
1081 See Hobbes, Leviathan, xiii, ¶14. 
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the second is like it: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’  All the Law and the Prophets hang on these 
two commandments.”1082  The first of Jesus’ two great commandments is derived from the shema 
in Deuteronomy 6:5, which supplies the epilogue to the Ten Commandments:  “Hear, O Israel: 
The Lord our God, the Lord is one.  Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your 
soul and with all your strength.”  This second of the two great commandments of Jesus seems to 
be derived from Leviticus 19:18:  “Do not seek revenge or bear a grudge against anyone among 
your people, but love your neighbor as yourself. I am the LORD.”  For Jesus, offering himself as the 
fulfillment of Israel’s law,1083 the integrity of the self is presumed – love God with all your heart 
and your soul and your mind – and the integrity of the self is a model for community – love your 
neighbor as yourself.1084    
In the Sermon on the Mount Jesus goes on to deconstruct and rebuild what all of this means in 
light of the Kingdom he inaugurates.  It is striking to read the herem warfare commands in 
Deuteronomy 7 immediately following in the text after the Ten Commandments and the shema 
in Deuteronomy 5 and 6: 
                                                     
1082 Matthew 22: 37-40 (NIV); see also Luke 10:27 (NIV) (“Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all 
your soul and with all your strength and with all your mind'; and, 'Love your neighbor as yourself.”); Mark 12:29-31 
(The most important [commandment],” answered Jesus, “is this: ‘Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one.. 
Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind and with all your strength.’  
The second is this: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’  There is no commandment greater than these.”). 
1083 Jesus said,  
 
Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to 
abolish them but to fulfill them.  For truly I tell you, until heaven and earth disappear, 
not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from 
the Law until everything is accomplished. Therefore anyone who sets aside one of the 
least of these commands and teaches others accordingly will be called least in the 
kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and teaches these commands will be called 
great in the kingdom of heaven. For I tell you that unless your righteousness surpasses 
that of the Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you will certainly not enter the 
kingdom of heaven. 
 
Matt. 5:17-20. 
1084 As Oliver O’Donovan notes, “[t]he Augustinian ipse praemium had no trouble with the praemium, the ‘for me,’ 
because it laid the stress upon the ipse.  Everything depended upon the object.  The criticism of self-interestedness 
was expressed as a criticism of an inadequate object of love, a ‘private,’ i.e. a diminished and restricted, good.  
When the object of love is God himself, the author of all love and of all subjects who love, there need be no more 
anxious enquiry about right and wrong love, selfish and unselfish love, noble and ignoble love.”  Oliver O’Donovan, 
Resurrection and Moral Order:  An Outline for Evangelical Ethics, at 250. 
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When the LORD your God brings you into the land you are entering 
to possess and drives out before you many nations —the Hittites, 
Girgashites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites and Jebusites, 
seven nations larger and stronger than you— and when the LORD 
your God has delivered them over to you and you have defeated 
them, then you must destroy them totally.  Make no treaty with 
them, and show them no mercy. . . . 
This is what you are to do to them: Break down their altars, smash 
their sacred stones, cut down their Asherah poles and burn their 
idols in the fire.  For you are a people holy to the LORD your God. 
The LORD your God has chosen you out of all the peoples on the 
face of the earth to be his people, his treasured possession. . . . 
You must destroy all the peoples the LORD your God gives over to 
you. . . .1085 
In this light, the love command of Leviticus 19:18 seems far more pinched:  it applies, after all, 
only to anyone “among your people” – there is no sense in which a Girgashite was counted as a 
“neighbor.”  In the Deuteronomic law, Israel’s self-preservation was not just grudgingly 
permitted.  Violence in support of self-preservation was in fact Divinely ordained.  God’s incentive 
to Israel in Deuteronomy 7 involved their own health, security and wealth:   
If you pay attention to these laws and are careful to follow them, 
then the LORD your God will keep his covenant of love with you, as 
he swore to your ancestors.  He will love you and bless you and 
increase your numbers. He will bless the fruit of your womb, the 
crops of your land—your grain, new wine and olive oil —the calves 
of your herds and the lambs of your flocks in the land he swore to 
your ancestors to give you. You will be blessed more than any other 
people; none of your men or women will be childless, nor will any 
of your livestock be without young. 15 The LORD will keep you free 
from every disease. He will not inflict on you the horrible diseases 
you knew in Egypt, but he will inflict them on all who hate you. You 
must destroy all the peoples the LORD your God gives over to you. 
Do not look on them with pity and do not serve their gods, for that 
will be a snare to you.1086 
                                                     
1085 Deut. 7: 1-26 (NIV). 
1086 Deut. 7: 12-15. 
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Mountains of ink have been spilled by detractors and defenders of the Bible alike concerning 
these holy war texts.1087  There is no simple answer to the problem of violence in these texts.  
Even with all due consideration for their ancient near eastern context, on their face they involve 
God commanding His people to commit what today we would call religious genocide.1088    
Yet whatever else we might say about these texts hermeneutically, they do encode a value that 
remains central for the Church:  purity in our worship, which is purity in our love.   In his ethical 
judo in the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus flips his religious interlocutors and demands that they 
conduct herem warfare on the greed and lust within their own souls.  And, most crucially for 
Christian political theology and ethics, in response to the lawyer’s question, Jesus extends the 
“neighbor” principle to anyone in distress, including the enemy and the outcast.1089  There is no 
question that herem warfare against peoples, nations or religions is illegitimate for the Church.  
But Jesus retains the focus in the shema and in the Levitical law on the integrity of the self.  For 
Jesus, the law does not annihilate the self.  Rather, the law fulfills the true self, which is given by 
God. 
8. Radical Orthodoxy:  Law and Violence, Law and Theocracy 
Hauerwas’ critique of “secular reason” resonates with the similar critique offered by Radical 
Orthodoxy, and indeed Hauerwas has aligned himself in some respects with Radical Orthodoxy.  
Radical Orthodoxy, however does not shy away from engagement with the secular authorities, 
including law and politics.  Indeed, Radical Orthodoxy thinkers are regularly accused of 
                                                     
1087 Richard Dawkins famously stated that “[t]he God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant 
character in all fiction: jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty 
ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, 
sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully.”  Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston:  Mariner Books 
2008), 51. 
1088 Some evangelical commenters attempt to cabin the herem commands to the context of heavily fortified 
military cities.  See Richard S. Hess, “Apologetic Issues in the Old Testament,” in Douglas Groothuis, Christian 
Apologetics:  A Comprehensive Case for Biblical Faith (Downers Grove:  IVP Academic 2011); Paul Copan and Matt 
Flannagan, Did God Really Command Genocide?:  Coming to Terms with the Justice of God (Grand Rapids:  Baker 
Books 2014).  There do not seem to be any such limitations in Deuteronomy 7, however, and in any event the 
violence of launching a military incursion into someone else’s land is hardly diminished by the fact that the 
defenders have erected military outposts to protect their farms, wives and children against pillagers and invaders.  
For another creative reading of these texts, which suggests that they are clearly violent but not “literal,” see 
Douglas S. Earl, The Joshua Delusion?  Rethinking Genocide in the Bible (Eugene:  Wipf & Stock / Cascade Books 
2010). 
1089 Luke 10:25-27. 
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Constantianism by Hauerwasians and Yoderites, and not without good reason.  As John Milbank 
has argued, Radical Orthodoxy is more inclined to argue that “charity without power, an 
ineffective charity, is not really charity at all but rather an impossible aspiration, because it is 
ironically doing nothing.”1090  Milbank outlines this dilemma clearly: 
So the dilemma would seem to be this:  Christianity announces and 
shapes a new realm of non-violence which proclaims the power of 
weakness, a power operating through collaboration and 
reconciliation.  But this power is still power:  indeed it is the only 
entirely powerful power, because any exercise of violence always 
leaves on vulnerable; a house divided against itself cannot stand.  
Hence, the practice of peace is not a matter of isolated individual 
motivation; it is rather a matter of a shared habit and an achieved 
practice. . . .  At the very least, one might say, the New Testament 
makes it quite clear that Christians are involved in paradoxical 
warfare:  a power-struggle in which one seeks to extend the 
powerful reach of the very sphere of ‘powerlessness’ (which is yet 
that of genuine power) itself.  But does this mean some adoption 
of the coercive and utilitarian instruments of worldly power on the 
part of the ecclesia?1091   
Milbank agrees with the Mennonite / pacifist / Hauerwasian notion that “the church itself is the 
true polity” and that there is a “possibility of ‘living beyond the law’ in terms of a new social and 
political practice.”1092  He recognizes with Hauerwas “the specifically Catholic witness of the 
churches of the Radical Reformation and their later descendants, including the Quakers.”1093  Yet, 
Milbank notes, “even if one agrees with the Mennonite tradition that the church itself is the place 
where charity is combined with power of a new and more genuinely powerful kind, there remains 
the question of the relationship of this power to contaminated, compromised, coercive 
power.”1094  For Milbank, the merging of Jewish and Roman political history and law after 
Constantine can 
                                                     
1090 John Milbank, Forward to Chris K. Huebner & Tripp York, eds. The Gift of Difference:  Radical Orthodoxy, 
Radical Reformation (CMU Press 2010). 
1091 Ibid. at xiii. 
1092 Ibid. at xiv. 
1093 Ibid. 
1094 Ibid. 
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be read as a more emphatic recognition that the gospel transcends 
and fulfills, yet does not abolish, the literal and political level of the 
Old Testament, just as charity fulfills and surpasses yet does not 
abolish the need to pass laws and administer justice.  Of course 
there is ambiguity here:  the danger that ecclesia will be submerged 
in regnum.  Yet regnum also gets qualified as ecclesia:  the Justinian 
code really did make laws more human; codes of warfare really did 
become more constrained; state and social welfare really did 
expand within Byzantium later in the West.1095 
Milbank goes so far as to defend Christian monarchy and the use of the sword in cases of extreme 
threat to the just order that makes the institution of the Church possible:  “[s]hocking as it may 
seem,” he says, “because God creates us as hybrid material-spiritual creatures, ecclesia includes 
certain physical spaces which it is arguable that, in extremis, one may have physically to defend.  
Certainly in the name of secular justice rather than ‘defense of the holy,’ yet without the space 
of justice the offer of the sacred cannot really be made.”1096 
What can a Christian pacifistic ethic say to this example?  Stanley Hauerwas argues that such 
"What Would You Do If" arguments often betray a lack of eschatological imagination and 
patience.  In response to my example about child pornographers / rapists, for example, one 
pacifist writer suggested that Christians should be involved in therapeutic interventions with the 
perpetrators rather than supporting law enforcement efforts against them.1097  While 
therapeutic interventions certainly are worthy and important, however, what happens when the 
perpetrator refuses therapy, or proves refractory to treatment (the vast majority of child rapists 
are serial recidivists)?  Must the Church simply refrain from further action and await Christ’s 
return?  Is Christian eschatology then simply entirely unrealized? 
Graham Ward pursues this sort of analysis in his book The Politics of Discipleship:  Becoming 
Postmaterial Citizens.1098  For Ward, the theopolitical vision of Biblical eschatology is undeniably 
                                                     
1095 Ibid., xv. 
1096 Ibid. at xvi. 
1097 See comments at Running Heads, Milbank, Military Academies, and the Peace of Christ, 
http://www.runningheads.net/2012/07/20/milbank-military-academies-and-the-peace-of-christ/ 
1098 Graham Ward, The Politics of Discipleship:  Becoming Postmaterial Citizens (Grand Rapids:  Baker Academic 
2009). 
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theocratic.1099  John the Seer’s vision of the Heavenly City, Ward notes, portrays a three-fold 
hierarchical order:  God and the Lamb, the kings of the earth, and the people.1100  Ward notes 
that the Church is absent from the Seer’s vision of the Heavenly City – the kings and the people 
adore God directly with “no hieratic order mediating between absolute sovereignty and the 
masses.”1101  With Oliver O’Donovan, Ward understands the Church as “a moment in the coming 
kingdom,” and it is the recognition of this momentary status that “saves the church from 
‘theocratic tyranny.’”1102   
Nevertheless, Ward says, “[a]cknowledging our theocratic condition and the theocratic 
resonance that governs the eschatological remainder sharpens the distinctions” between the 
Church and the putatively secular state, “so that contestation becomes inevitable.”1103  Such 
contestation is not a failure.  Rather, it “is a manifestation of the liveliness of civil society and a 
refusal of the zero degree dialectic that depoliticization encourages.”1104  Moreover, 
“contestation is not war; it can be honest talk that sets out practices of coexistence and common 
values.”1105   
Ward envisions a trans-national alliance of religious leaders and organizations that subvert the 
secularizing discourse of liberal modernity:  “Religion will not go away; it will not be repressed; it 
will not succumb to instrumental reasoning.  There will be no new Enlightenment.”1106  In Ward’s 
vision, then, the “postsecular state” must work with religions and religious institutions, including 
the Church, that are transformative of the state.  For Ward, eschatology becomes realized as the 
Church and the State finally become one community of kings and people who require no 
mediatory political structures before God and the Lamb.  Ward’s Constantinian theo-politics 
finally deconstructs secular power through the eschatological dissolution of the earthly regnum 
                                                     
1099 Ibid. at 294-301. 
1100 Ibid. at 296. 
1101 Ibid. at 297. 
1102 Ibid. at 299 n. 29. 
1103 Ibid. at 299. 
1104 Ibid. 
1105 Ibid. 
1106 Ibid. at 301. 
246 
 
when the kings and the people adore the Lamb together in the fully realized Heavenly City.  But 
we are not there yet. 
9. Law and the Tale of Two Cities 
Augustine believed that there would be no need for law in the heavenly city.  In this Augustinian 
vein, John Milbank also has suggested that law is an accommodation to the Fall that will be done 
away with in the eschaton.  Perhaps it is correct that the institutions of the law – courts, judges, 
penal systems, and the like – will not be required when sin is no more.  Even here, the 
eschatological picture given by scripture is hazy.  In his first letter to the Cornithians, St. Paul 
takes the congregation to task for tolerating lawsuits between Christians in the secular courts, 
and urges them to resolve their disputes internally.1107  His argument is that the Church should 
not submit to the secular judicial system because the Church will finally stand in judgment over 
the world:  “Or do you not know that the Lord’s people will judge the world? And if you are to 
judge the world, are you not competent to judge trivial cases? Do you not know that we will judge 
angels?”1108  It seems that Paul envisioned some sort of legal process in the eschaton.   
Moreover, as Milbank has recognized in his more recent work, governance, and therefore “law,” 
was part of the cultural mandate given to humanity prior to the Fall in Genesis 2.1109  Milbank 
acknowledges that Aquinas “recuperated both the ancient Greek academic-peripatetic and the 
Greek Patristic sense that political rule would have existed even despite the fact of sin.”1110  
Indeed, as Aquinas suggested, love is not the absence of law:  it is the law of love, the law of 
reason proceeding from the Divine Logos, in which all creation participates.  This is the Law that 
was in the Garden, and it was good.  We humans are, in our creaturely goodness, prior to our 
fallenness, embodied in a universe embedded with law.  In this sense, the Fall is a fall away from 
Law, and our redemption is a restoration of our capacity to enjoy the freedom of God’s Law.   
When we are united with Christ, R.R. Reno argues,  
                                                     
1107 I Cor. 6:1-11. 
1108 I Cor. 6:2-3. 
1109 John Milbank, Beyond Secular Order:  The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People 
(London:  Wiley-Blackwell 2013).    Page # 
1110 Ibid.,, 123. 
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Christ the good shepherd infuses in us the power of his own 
dominion, and we are able to master our sinfulness and obey ‘the 
law of the Spirit of life’ (Rom. 6:3-4).  Thus, we are not released 
from the original structure of divine commandment, the ‘shalt not 
eat’ that is spoken in the very beginning.  Instead, we bear ‘the 
image of the man of heaven’ (1 Cor. 15:49) who was obedient unto 
death.  In him we ‘become slaves of righteousness’ (Rom. 6:18).1111 
The law of love thus is an erotic bond.  It consumes the soul with longing, delight and awe (Psalm 
119:20, 70, 120).  It penetrates the very heart of our being (Psalm 40:8).  It is sweeter than honey, 
it revives, it gives joy, it enlightens, it endures eternally (Psalm 19; 119:160).   
Oliver O’Donovan likewise argues that a shared, collective life – that is, a political life – is the true 
end of human freedom.  As O’Donovan argues, “[h]uman freedom consists not only in the power 
to act alone, but in the power to act together, as a co-operating fellowship.”1112  The bond of this 
fellowship, O’Donovan notes, is love:  “love is the principle which confers unifying order both 
upon the moral field and upon the character of the moral subject.  It is the fulfillment of the moral 
law on the one hand, and the form of the virtues on the other.”1113  Moreover, O’Donovan argues, 
love is ordered towards the true ends of all of creation, and thus love, morality, virtue, and law 
entail an ontological realism.  The ordering of love, O’Donovan states, “is the free conformity of 
our agency to the order of things which is given in reality.”1114  And this reality, O’Donovan 
correctly asserts, has an “eschatological reference.”1115  The consummation of love is the return 
of the risen Christ who fulfills the Church’s faith and hope with love.1116  O’Donovan concludes 
that “[t]he true moral life of the Christian community is its love, and its love is unintelligible 
except as a participation in the life of the one who reveals himself to us as Love, except, that is, 
as the entry of mankind and of the restored creation upon its supernatural end.”1117  But, 
O’Donovan cautions, we must not confuse the hope of that future realization with our actual 
present condition.  Echoing Barth, O’Donovan affirms that God has spoken his “Yes” over all 
                                                     
1111 Ibid. at 72. 
1112 Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 163. 
1113 Ibid.,, 226. 
1114 Ibid., 236. 
1115 Ibid., 245. 
1116 Ibid. 
1117 Ibid., 246. 
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creation in Christ, which also implies God’s “No” to all that is opposes the love of Christ.1118  The 
future hope infuses and informs how we live in the present, but remains future, which in the 
present requires faith that is “always open to repentance, able to relax the compulsive grip of 
self-justification upon the past,” and that is “renewed and sustained, not out of the agent’s 
established character but by continual conversion.”1119  Although O’Donovan does not connect 
this theme directly to positive law as such, it clearly suggests that positive law, like any other 
human cultural act that can point us always back towards God, can comprise part of God’s “Yes” 
over creation and participate in God’s eternal love.1120 
This participatory understanding of law addresses the problem of originary violence but not of 
applied violence.  Applied violence must be addressed in a casuistic way depending on the 
particulars of time, place, culture, and in light of eschatological time.  This distinction helps 
resolve some of the problems of pacifist quietism and is evident in the work of Schlabach.  It 
further shows why Augustine’s approach to the Donatists was wrong or mostly wrong because it 
does distinguish the Church from the World – to some extent, contrary to Milbank and Ward.  
But it also helps bridge the gaps between Milbank, Ward, O’Donovan and Hauerwas, because it 
                                                     
1118 Ibid., 255-56. 
1119 Ibid., 256. 
1120 O’Donovan further notes that the final verdict of “yes” or “no” belongs only to God:   
 
We are not able to draw quick conclusions from appearances as to whether someone is a good or 
a bad person, a saved or a damned soul. The invasive reality which touches and shapes human 
lives is nothing other than the eschatological judgment of God in Christ; and only when that 
judgment is finally manifest can we expect to see clearly with what design it has cut through the 
fabric of human conduct. The words 'Judge not, that you not be judged (Mt. 7:1) are not 
intended, as a liberal indifferentism can so easily construe them, to forbid moral judgment. There 
is a tolerance which comes from not taking moral questions seriously, from regarding the 
difference between right and wrong sceptically because of the ambiguities with which human 
behavior confronts us. There is another tolerance, quite different in spirit from this, which comes 
from taking moral questions so seriously that we recognize the point at which they exceed our 
competence to resolve them. We can speak and think about the right and wrong of acts, the 
values of virtues and traits of character; but when it comes to pronouncing a verdict on a human 
being's life in its totality, we know that too much is hidden from us to permit any anticipation of 
God's final word. 
 
Ibid., 256-258.  In baptism, however, we are given a visible sign of the invisible work of God’s grace.  Ibid., 
259.  To this we might also add that in the Eucharist the promise of God’s future “Yes” breaks into the 
present, and that in the prayers and mission of the Church through the Spirit the hope of God’s future 
“Yes” proceeds throughout the present Earth.  
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allows for institutions that as participants in the divine law are already in a sense participating in 
the Church, and this in turn opens space for members of the Church to participate in appropriate 
institutions of law.  This is not a Neihbuhrian surrender, but a positive role for law.  Further, it 
overcomes to efforts “scientize” or “naturalize” the law, such as neurolaw, by insisting that the 
origin of law is supernatural. 
And yet, the Heavenly City still lies before us.  We have not yet arrived.  As Oliver O’Donovan 
notes, in the present, “[l]aws come in many forms and stand at variable distances from 
reality.”1121  But this does not mean we can ignore some part of the moral law in favor of another.  
Rather, we must see the “interconnectedness” of every aspect of the moral law.1122   
In particular, O’Donovan says, “we may speak of a two-way control between the law of love and 
the detailed moral laws.”1123  In this understanding, “love is the ‘sum’ and ‘fulfillment’ of laws; it 
is the culmination and final outcome.  The sum is not totaled without its constitutive elements; 
the fulfillment completes, without superseding, what has gone before it.”1124  The coherence of 
the moral field under the law of love helps us navigate the specific demands of action in our 
present world and time.1125  In fact, it is the fulfillment of the law in Christ that enables the agent 
to rejoins the law that must be lived out in this present world and time with the universal law of 
love:  “from where does such coherence come, if not from a ‘second law giving,’ a self-disclosure 
on the part of God himself with a law that interprets the plurality of laws, and is therefore at the 
same time a Gospel?  It is not for no reason that Saint Paul read that passage from Deuteronomy 
as a prophecy of Christ.”1126 
O’Donovan’s take on the connection between “law” and “gospel” is tied to his view of how moral 
action relates to the narrative of salvation.  Our actions in the present world and time are not 
                                                     
1121 Oliver O’Donovan, Ethics as Theology Vol. 2:  Finding and Seeking (Grand Rapids:  Eerdmans 2014), 197. 
1122 Ibid. at 198. 
1123 Ibid. at 200. 
1124 Ibid. 
1125 The themes of “self,” “world,” and “time” are critical to O’Donovan’s theological ethics, as is evident in the title 
of Volume 1 of his planned trilogy on “Ethics as Theology.”  O’Donovan, Ethics as Theology Vol. 1:  Self, World, and 
Time (Grand Rapids:  Eerdmans 2013). 
1126 O’Donovan, Finding and Seeking, 201.  The passage referred to is Deut. 30:12-14:  “the word is very near you; it 
is in your mouth and in your heart, so that you can do it.”  See Rom. 10:8. 
250 
 
predetermined by the moral law or by scripture.  O’Donovan suggests that “[w]ere [ethics] to 
posit an ideal relation of text to action which, in the name of obedience to scriptural authority, 
effectively abolished thinking, it would abolish morality, and thereby abolish itself.”1127  
Obedience is not the rote application of a predetermined outcome, but rather the exercise of 
reasoned deliberation that searches out what faithful action requires.1128  The agent’s freedom 
arises from recognizing that the resurrection of Christ is the center of history through which the 
redemption of historical time is revealed.1129   
The contingency of the self within this present world and this present time, and thus the 
contingency of moral indeterminacy, is thereby superseded by the fulfillment of eschatological 
time.  In the hope of this fulfillment, “[t]he risen life of the last Adam gives hope to the first Adam 
in the midst of God’s created work.  The risen life of the last Adam inaugurates the Creator’s 
purpose to consummate all life, past, present, and future, in the reign of life.”1130  This hope “is 
the mark of true freedom,” which allows the agent to “see the moral law from a new vantage-
points as a witness to God’s purpose to order and bless the human race.”1131  Then, “[w]hat 
previously looked like disconnected arbitrary norms come together to form a coherent ‘law of 
Christ,’ the love of neighbor as self.”1132  
This sort of freedom does not seem evident anywhere in the “natural history” of the human 
species.  Its possibility is not buried in fossilized bones or burned into static neural pathways.  If 
our “ordinary” or “natural” lives seem constrained by the power of our evolutionary past, that 
fact is no threat to any orthodox conception of “freedom.”  The real possibility of “freedom” is 
only remembered by its absence, revealed in scripture and in Christ, and realized in the death and 
resurrection of Christ.   
Human beings seem unique among the creatures of the Earth in our development of elaborate 
cultural systems, including in particular systems of positive law, which acknowledge and attempt 
                                                     
1127 O’Donovan, Self, World, and Time, 77. 
1128 Ibid.  
1129 Ibid. at 92. 
1130 Ibid. at 93. 
1131 O’Donovan, Finding and Seeking, 8. 
1132 Ibid. 
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to compensate for a the knowledge that we are not as we should be.1133  We know something is 
missing.  We know we cannot “choose” the good – that is, the good as utterly good simply and 
for its own sake as good.  But this knowledge it the first hint of our freedom.1134  It is what 
demonstrates that we are “human” while even the most complex and amazing of the other 
animal creatures on Earth are not “human.” 
Scripture reveals to us that the root of this lack is not part of our created human “nature” yet 
stems from the deepest historical roots of our humanity.  The “Fall” is a fall away from law, a 
dissolution of the bond of the law of love.  We possess a distant memory of this law but our 
memory dims.  Christ reveals to us what the law of love truly means, how it instantiates our true 
humanity, and how it can be lived out in the world.  The Logos of the universe united to human 
nature and born as a human infant, with us in every way, even in the solidarity of death, is the 
Word of love.  Christ’s resurrection realizes the power of love.  The Resurrection demonstrates 
that love conquers death.  Resurrection is the eschatological power through which the politics of 
death become transformed by the law of love.1135  Love is the relation between theology and 
science, between law and justice, between the earthly city and the New Jerusalem.   This is the 
vision of the prophet Micah, who concludes our reflection on the ends of the law: 
In the last days 
the mountain of the LORD’s temple will be established 
    as the highest of the mountains; 
it will be exalted above the hills, 
    and peoples will stream to it. 
Many nations will come and say, 
“Come, let us go up to the mountain of the LORD, 
    to the temple of the God of Jacob. 
He will teach us his ways, 
    so that we may walk in his paths.” 
The law will go out from Zion, 
    the word of the LORD from Jerusalem. 
He will judge between many peoples 
                                                     
1133 On law and human uniqueness, see Chapter 3. 
1134 Cf. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (trans. Henry Beveridge, Edinburgh:  Calvin Translation 
Society 1845), Book One, Chapter 1.1:  “Our wisdom, in so far as it ought to be deemed true and solid Wisdom, 
consists almost entirely of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves.”. 
1135 This is the heart of O’Donovan’s argument in Resurrection and Moral Order. 
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    and will settle disputes for strong nations far and wide. 
They will beat their swords into plowshares 
    and their spears into pruning hooks. 
Nation will not take up sword against nation, 
    nor will they train for war anymore. 
Everyone will sit under their own vine 
    and under their own fig tree, 
and no one will make them afraid, 
    for the LORD Almighty has spoken. 
All the nations may walk 
    in the name of their gods, 
but we will walk in the name of the LORD 
    our God for ever and ever.1136 
  
                                                     
1136 Micah 3:9 – 4:5 
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Conclusion 
In this Dissertation I have argued that “law” is a constituent element of the human soul.  The 
capacity to formulate positive law is unique to humans among all the creatures of the Earth.  
Some other creatures can construct fascinating systems of social discipline, but none can 
formulate codes or institutions of positive law.  The human capacity for lawmaking is different in 
kind from any similar capacity in other animals – or at least, it is so different in degree that it is 
essentially different in kind. 
The paleoanthropological record suggests that this kind of cultural capacity did not arise before 
the very recent cultural explosion among anatomically modern humans, and the historical record 
suggests that positive law developed at the dawn of systems of writing in the ancient near east.  
The Bible’s second creation narrative in Genesis 2 in this sense is consistent with the 
paleoanthropological and historical evidence:  it was to Adam, and not to the other animals, that 
God gave the primal command not to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.  The 
historical beginning of positive law therefore marks the historical beginning of humanity and 
identifies the elusive “historical Adam.” 
I have not argued, however, that this framework represents a “literalist” or “concordist” reading 
of the Bible and modern science.  The genetic, paleanthropological, and archeological evidence 
demonstrate that anatomically modern humans evolved over millions of years from a common 
ancestor shared with modern great apes, that there were numerous “human” species that went 
extinct over those ages, and that modern humans emerged from a population pool, not from a 
single pair of genetic progenitors in the recent past.  This evolutionary process included the brains 
and other neurophysical components of our creaturely being, which means that our minds and 
emotions cannot be separated from our deep evolutionary past.   
The juxtaposition of these two themes – “law” as a source of the “historical Adam” and the reality 
of our deep evolutionary past – seems jarring if not Quixotic.  Indeed, I have traced a theme in 
contemporary Western jurisprudence that seeks identify “law” with neuroscience, called 
“neurolaw.”   Some neurolaw scholars argue that “law,” like everything else we think of as “mind” 
or “consciousness,” is merely an epiphenomenon of brain processes shaped by evolution.  This 
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trend, I have argued, reflects the efforts of legal positivists who, since the nineteenth century, 
have sought to elide concepts of transcendence from jurisprudence and to render positive law 
as a kind of quantifiable science.  If the neurolawyers are right, the Adam I think I have found in 
the law is just another ghost in the machine. 
But legal positivism, I have suggested, is itself part of a deeper flow of the intellectual currents of 
modernity, which have at their headwaters a number of assumed and usually unexamined 
metaphysical claims.  In the first Chapter of this Dissertation, I explored the question of method 
in “theology and science,” and argued for a method that refuses to bracket such metaphysical 
questions.  I claimed, in fact, that the metaphysical assumptions of basic Christian orthodoxy – 
that the Triune God revealed in the incarnate Christ is the transcendent creator of the cosmos – 
make better sense of the phenomena of human persons, including both our deep evolutionary 
history and our remarkably recent capacity for cultural institutions such as positive law than 
materialist explanations.   
The doctrine of the Trinity, I have argued, is the proper foundation for a robust concept of both 
the natural law and the Divine command.  In our efforts to formulate what we mean by the claim 
that God is Triune, we see that the Divine hypostases are delimited by love, which flows from 
their mutual indwelling in the one Divine ousia.  The order of God’s being is an order of love, and 
from this order flows the order of creation, which is nevertheless as given not a necessary order, 
but a contingent order defined in its particulars by God’ free, gracious decision to create.  As 
God’s free, contingent act of creation participates in His eternal, unchanging being, so God’s 
contingent, historical commands to the human creatures prepared to hear them participate in 
God’s eternal law of love.  As God’s act of creation was not a moment “in time” but rather 
encompassed and encompasses the generation of time, so God’s creation of Adam is not a 
definable moment in the paleoanthropological or genetic record but rather is the generation of 
a new kind of being in relationship to God through the reception of the Divine command 
embodying the law of love. 
The record of human history, though it includes love, is not in its essence a record of love.  I have 
agreed with Foucault, Agamben, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and others, that historical human 
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law is instituted by originary violence, a violence we can see, apparently, even in the remains of 
our Neadnderthal cousins.  But “law” that is really “violence” is not “law.”  The neurolawyers can 
offer stories that account for violence, including forms of violence called “altruism,” but they 
cannot account for “law.”   
It is here, I have argued, that robust Christology is required.  The true Adam, the Adam we can 
identify in recorded history, is Christ.  Christ fulfilled the law of love through his incarnation, life 
and atoning death on the cross, and Christ inaugurated his reign under the law of love through 
his resurrection.  Only in Christ can we know that the first Adam, the Adam lost to us in the 
complex history of human evolution, truly existed, because we can know the second Adam who 
brings humanity to its completion. 
Finally, I have outlined some ways in which my Trinitarian / Christological metaphysic of law and 
anthropology relates to the present time – that is, to political theology.  Christ arose, and Christ 
ascended, and Christ established his Church through the sending of the Holy Spirit – but Christ 
has not yet returned.  How then, today, in this earthly city, should we think about the nature and 
purposes of positive law?  I have drawn historical sources as well as a diverse group of 
contemporary political theologians, including John Milbank, Graham Ward, Stanley Hauerwas, 
Jean Porter, Robert Spaemann, Christos Yannaras and Oliver O’Dovonan, to suggest that our 
thinking about law and human persons in the present must not obscure the ideals of the heavenly 
city in favor of an apologetic program dictated by modernity.  However we work out the 
innumerable thorny questions of application for law and policy in a desperately fractured world, 
the task for Christian theologians is to demonstrate how particularly Christian narrative of 
creation, fall and redemption illuminates the nature and purposes of human persons and 
cultures.  In reductive neurolaw we see the end of the law, that is, the dissolution of “law” as any 
kind of thing.  In Christian theology, I have argued, we see the true end of the law, that is, the 
culmination of the powers and potentialities of creation, including those of human persons, in 
the embrace of God’s eternal perichoretic love.  
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